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Abstract  
 
Countless high profile cases like the recent patent litigation threatening to shut down the 
BlackBerry® service have long drawn sharp criticism; and in response, most of  the intellectual property 
(IP) literature argues for the use of  weaker, or liability rule, enforcement as a tool for solving the 
problems of  anticompetitive effects and downstream access while still providing sufficient rewards to IP 
creators.  This paper takes an unconventional approach under which rewards don’t matter much, but 
coordination does matter a great deal. The paper shows how stronger, or property rule, enforcement 
facilitates the good type of  coordination that increases competition and access.  The paper further shows 
how, paradoxically, the reforms urged by IP critics end up facilitating the different, bad type of  
coordination that decreases competition and access.  Simply put, the paper shows how policy debates 
would be radically improved by consideration of  these two different coordination effects.   
The paper follows the general approach of  the field called New Institutional Economics 
(“NIE”), which has explored many problems that are triggered by different institutions of  laws and 
norms.  Because no institution is perfect, the NIE approach suggests that our choices among institutions 
must be informed by our views of  the solutions we most want and the problems we can best mitigate or 
bear.   
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The paper explores a theory of  the institution of  property rights backed up by property rules as 
playing a particular, good role in facilitating coordination among many diverse complementary users of  
an asset in a way that increases competition and access.  Under this view, coordination is offered as an 
alternative to other goals that have been suggested including internalizing externalities, mitigating rent 
dissipation, or providing direct incentives, and property is offered as an alternative to other institutions 
or organizations that also can facilitate this coordination goal, including, norm communities such as 
open source projects, firms, and government.  The paper also shows how property rights backed up by 
weaker, or liability rule, enforcement can play a particular, bad role in facilitating the kind of  
coordination among large, established players that decreases competition and access.     
The shift in focus towards the link between property rule treatment and coordination has several 
practical effects.  First, it explains why many of  reform proposals of  yesterday and today that do not use 
the coordination approach should be expected to exacerbate the two key persistent problems of  
anticompetitive effect and reduced downstream access.  Second, it explains why certain aspects of  IP 
regimes may be working well and why others may be candidates for change or elimination.  Third, it 
elucidates factors that cut against changing IP regimes in ways that likely will exacerbate the two key 
persistent problems of  anticompetitive effect and reduced downstream access.  Providing one example 
of  how the coordination approach could inform practical policy discussions, the paper frames a 
discussion for evaluating a case against the present copyright regime.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite numerous reforms over the past century,1 important problems continue to plague the IP 
systems of  today, generating numerous proposals for further reform tomorrow.  For example, recent 
high profile cases like the patent litigation threatening to shut down the BlackBerry® service2 have 
drawn sharp criticism in the business community3 as being prime examples of  the pernicious impact of  
protecting intellectual property (IP) rights with strong property rules, backed up by injunctions, rather 
than weaker liability rules, which would give rise only to a right to payment.4  Various forms of  liability 
treatment have been offered.  For example, Ayres & Klemperer advocate a patent litigation system 
characterized by uncertainty and delay, which they show could serve as a form of  compulsory license, or 
liability rule.5  Others simply advocate various exemptions to infringement, such as for what they call fair 
use.6   
Underlying these critiques of  IP is a view that property rights either restrict access or cause 
anticompetitive effects.  The arguments raised today are quite similar to those raised throughout most of  
the past century; and, as usual, the reform efforts target all three branches of  the federal government – 
legislature, executive agencies, and courts.7   This paper endeavors to show how addressing these 
 
1  See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG A. NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN, AND F. SCOTT KIEFF, 
PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6-42 (2nd ed. 2001) (reviewing history of  changes to patent law); WILLAIM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 1-120 (1994) (reviewing history of  changes to copyright law); BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, ET AL., 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1-5 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing history of  changes to trademark law); FRANK I 
SCHECTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW (1925) (same).   
2  Indeed, there are two similar cases that have been sharing the high profile.  One involves the BlackBerry® service, 
and the Supreme Court ultimately did not grant review of  this one, and one involving the eBay service, in which the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that a trial court is not writing entirely on a clean slate in view of  past practices when the court is applying 
the ordinary four-factor test for permanent injunctions to determine whether a patentee may get a permanent injunction once 
patent validity and infringement have been adjudicated.  See, NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), cert denied, 126 S.Ct. 1174 (2006) (BlackBerry®); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 126 S.Ct. 1837, ___ U.S. ___ (May 15, 
2006).  For more on the BlackBerry® case see infra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.   
3  See, e.g., Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2006), at A14 (criticizing a set of  cases including NTP); Bruce Sewell, 
Troll Call, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2006), at A14 (criticizing both the NTP and eBay cases).   
4  The label “property rule” is used here as it is used in the classic Calabresi-Melamed framework under which an 
entitlement is said to enjoy the protection of  a property rule if  the law condones its surrender only through voluntary 
exchange.  The holder of  such an entitlement is allowed to enjoin infringement.  An entitlement is said to have the lesser 
protection of  a liability rule if  it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay some court-determined compensation.  The 
holder of  such an entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringement.  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of  the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).  But see, Jules L. 
Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of  Legal Rights, 95 YALE. L.J. 1335 (1986) (offering a “reinterpretation of  the 
Calabresi-Melamed framework” under which property rules and liability rules merely represent two pieces of  a broader 
“transaction structure” in that they are two different approaches for setting forth “conditions of  legitimate transfer”).   
5  See, Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse 
Benefits of  Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that sufficient incentive to invent can be 
provided without the monopoly power associated with a property right).   
6  See, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward A Doctrine of  Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (offering 
fair use exception because of  excessive transaction costs causing too many market failures in the transactions over IP rights as 
property rights).   
7  Representative examples from different times throughout the past century include the effort by Congress to create 
the Temporary National Economic Committee (also known at the TNEC), S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong. § 2 (1938), the President’s 
Commission on the Patent System, “To Promote the Progress of  ... Useful Arts” In an Age of  Exploding Technology (1966), 
and the year-long set of  hearings jointly held in 2001 by the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Division.  See Notice of  Public Hearings Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146, 58,147 (Nov. 20, 2001).   
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concerns about competition and access with conventional approaches8 is likely to exacerbate the 
problems of  competition and access by tapping into property’s bad coordination effects, and how these 
problems can be mitigated by adopting an unconventional strong-property-rule approach informed by 
property’s good coordination effects.  
This paper offers a comparative institutional analysis using the set of  analytical tools from the 
field generally called new institutional economics (“NIE”), which is often associated with the work on 
institutions, transaction costs, agency costs, and the theory of  the firm.9  This systems-based approach10 
is broader than prior works at the interface between NIE and IP, and is particularly timely given the 
recent surge in interest in particular aspects of  the interface between NIE and IP.11   
The tools NIE uses to conduct comparative institutional analyses have played a central role in 
the scholarly debate within property theory about the shifts that occur over time among property 
regimes, generally.12  Yet, despite the many recent shifts that have occurred within the field of  IP,  the 
 
8  For more on conventional approaches see infra Part III.   
9  Some examples that are accessible to a broad audience include the works by Robert Fogel and Douglass North as 
discussed in “The Bank of  Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel 1993,” available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/, and the work by Ronald Coase as discussed in “The Bank of  Sweden Prize 
in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel 1991,” available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/.  The term NIE, itself, was coined by Oliver Williamson, in Oliver E. 
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975) at 1, whose work has elucidated the pervasive 
impact of  transaction costs across a range of  settings from markets and firms to other organizational structures and politics.   
 As Coase points out, while the older field known as “institutional economics” highlighted the economic impact of  
institutions as compared with capital, labor, and technology, the newer field of  NIE develops a research agenda devoted to 
characterizing this impact.  That is, NIE does not just note that institutions matter, or that law matters, NIE studies how 
institutions matter.  See Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998).   
 Although some see NIE as a distinct field, there is some debate over the relation between the field of  NIE itself  and 
other fields such as “Law and Economics,” and “neoclassical economics.” For a collection of  views on the debate over the 
proper characterization of  the field of  NIE in relation to the disciplines of  economics and law, see, generally, Richard A. 
Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 73 
(1993)[hereinafter Posner, NIE Meets L&E]; Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Costs Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 
149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., (1993); Ronald H. Coase, Coase on Posner on Coase, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON., 96 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Reply, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 119 (1993).  This 
paper is agnostic about these debates and takes as positive the contributions of  the many scholars whose work serves as the 
basis on which the field, by any name, has been built.   
10  See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997) (describing systems approach). 
11  See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND L. REV 1857 (2000) 
(essay elucidating some important lessons from NIE for IP); Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 
(2004) (exploring the importance of  IP rights for firms), Mark Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (framing debate about IP rights in terms of  timing); John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004) (exploring the problems associated with pricing above marginal cost for IP); 
Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries of  the Firm (Working paper, June 24, 
2004) (available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=559195) (connecting IP and the theory of  the firm); Clarisa Long, 
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright,  90 Va. L. Rev. 465 2004 (exploring information costs of  IP).   
12  See, e.g., Symposium, The Evolution of  Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002) (including Thomas W. Merrill, 
Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of  Property Rights, at S331, Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property 
Rights and the Optimal Value of  an Asset, at S339, Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, at S359, Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of  Rights, at S373, Saul 
Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of  Property Rights, at S421, Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, at S453, Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, at S489, Richard A. Epstein, The 
Allocation of  the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, at S515, David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property 
Rights, at S545, Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of  Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, at S589, 
Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of  the American Bison, at S609, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of  Property Rights 
II: The Competition between Private and Collective Ownership, at S653).   
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basic case for or against formal property rights13 for IP backed up by property rules has largely escaped 
the attention of  the NIE literature.14   
Put simply here for introductory purposes, the paper first suggests a goal that IP can achieve 
effectively and efficiently.  The paper endeavors to shift the dialog over property rights in general to 
include in its focus the problem of  coordination in addition to the long-standing focus on the problems 
of  externalities and rent dissipation.   
In the context of  IP in particular, the paper explores reasons why although IP regimes should 
not be expected to be very effective in achieving a narrowly tailored reward function by providing direct 
incentives for specific inventive or creative efforts, they should be expected to be fairly effective in 
facilitating the coordination among complementary users of  the subject matter IP rights protect that is 
needed to facilitate commercialization of  that subject matter.  This type of  good coordination, which is 
important for increasing competition and access, hinges on whether the IP rights themselves are 
enforced by strong property rules backed up by a right to exclude.  The basic intuition behind this view 
is motivated by the recognition that enforcing property rights with property rules helps property achieve 
two beneficial effects: a beacon effect and a bargain effect.  The beacon effect refers to the drawing 
together of  these many complementary users.  The bargain effect refers to their ability to negotiate with 
each other.  While the private ordering needed to achieve commercialization can lead to textured 
contracts having many terms including price but also including a host of  seemingly esoteric and unique 
provisions – such as technical support, field-of-use or territory limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, 
payment schedules, most-favored-nation provisions, etc. – a court imposed damage award, which is 
emblematic of  liability rule treatment, is in all but the rarest of  cases reduced to a simple monetary 
amount.  In this regard, property rule treatment is seen as a criterion of  efficacy.   
Recognizing that enforcing IP rights with property rules also would require them to be designed 
in ways that would mitigate the various social costs generally associated with property rule treatment, the 
paper explores ways this can be done.  The rights must have their contours staked out at their time of  
creation by claimants instead of  being set immutably by statute so as to mitigate problems of  rent-
dissipation and information cost.  The creation of  these rights must not frustrate reasonable investment 
backed expectations of  others when staked out so as to mitigate the problems of  the asset specificity and 
opportunism.  Once in existence, these rights must give clear and predictable notice about what they 
cover after being staked out so as to mitigate transaction costs.  In addition, to mitigate monopoly effects 
and anticommons effects, the ownership of  these rights must be in the hands of  an openly identifiable 
residual claimant, which is an individual market actor who can negotiate over them and extract value – 
the residual claim – from electing to give up either permission via a license or title via an assignment.  
 
13  To some extent, the use here of  the term “property” is somewhat imprecise, which is good in providing a short hand 
introduction to help frame the central theme of  the paper, and bad in failing, like all short hand expressions, to capture the full 
complexity of  the situation.  The approach in this paper may be fairly characterized under the taxonomy of  property provided 
by Henry Smith, as focusing on the exclusion forms of  property rather than on governance forms.  See, Henry E. Smith, 
Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).  See also Adam Mossoff, 
What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZONA L. REV. 371 (2003) (reviewing theories of  property).   
14  Those works that are at the interface between NIE and IP have been more narrowly focused than the present effort, 
as discussed supra note 11.  See also, F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
697 (2001) (comparative institutional analysis of  patent-enforcing rules) [hereinafter “Kieff, Commercializing Inventions”]; F. Scott 
Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of  Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L.REV. 55 (2003) 
(comparative institutional analysis of  patent-obtaining rules) [hereinafter, “Kieff, Registering Patents”].  In addition, many other 
works have explored the case for property rights in IP using approaches other than NIE.  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
REINVENTING PROPERTY (1993) (applying Hagel’s personhood theory as an approach); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of  
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (reviewing philosophical approaches); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: 
Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 841, 866 (1993) (same); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, What Property Is, University of  Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-05 (2004) 
(offering a “unified value” approach to property generally).   
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This owner must be given broad flexibility to divide them up and aggregate them.  Together, these 
several parameters can be seen as criteria of  efficiency.   
The paper next shows how property rights backed up by weaker, or liability rule, enforcement 
can play a particular, bad role in facilitating the kind of  coordination among large, established players 
that decreases competition and access.    One basic intuition behind this view is that populating a market 
with only weak forms of  property rights allows the large players in that market to fight with each other 
over those rights in a way that mitigates two key problems of  trust and antitrust otherwise facing such 
large players endeavoring to engage in the communication and coordination that enables anti-
competitive collusive behavior.  Another basic intuition behind this view is that because legal institutions 
are endogenous to the established political and social processes, the particular features of  the liability 
rules that ultimately get adopted end of  being dangerously tiled in ways that keep out market entrants, 
such as by locking-in a set of  immutable rules around which new entrants cannot contract to even try 
out their new business models.  Together, these several parameters can be seen as particular hallmarks of  
anticompetitive effects.   
Setting forth these various criteria in this summary format is designed only to highlight some 
reasons why some different institutional features of  the different IP regimes of  patent, trademark, and 
copyright may be working well and why others may not.  The ultimate net economic performance of  
each regime is highly multi-factorial and indeed most industries do not interact with just one IP regime.  
But while judging overall net economic performance is beyond the scope of  this paper, what this paper 
does endeavor to add to the analysis is an elucidation of  the types of  impacts different institutional 
choices are likely to make for a given system, as well as how some types of  positive impacts might be 
achieved and some types of  negative impacts might be mitigated.   
For example, the different regimes employ different degrees of  property rule treatment.  The 
patent regime generally follows a property rule approach.15  The trademark regime is somewhat similar, 
but does provide for some fair use defense.16  In contrast, the copyright regime employs a host of  
liability rules, as well as exceptions to infringement (such as fair use and home recording for self  use and 
for distribution to friends and family) and exceptions to those exceptions (such as the Napster case 
holding liability for sharing with peers where done over the internet).17    Other examples include the 
compulsory licensing at positive rates in many areas like re-transmissions18 and jukeboxes,19 as well as 
the compulsory licensing for free for those uses determined to be fair.20  This paper’s focus on 
coordination helps show why the extent to which a regime employs property rule treatment is an 
 
15  See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that university research is not exempt from 
patent infringement).  A notable exception is the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of  1984, 
commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), which enacted a special legislative 
compromise to deal with some problems facing branded and generic pharmaceutical companies.  The statute essentially 
provides for a special exemption for acts of  infringement reasonably related to obtaining approval from the Food and Drug 
Administration in exchange for various forms of  exclusivity including patent term extension for the patentee and special 
regulatory exclusivity for the first generic to successfully challenge a patent.  For more on the Hatch-Waxman Act, see 
Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 
585 (2003).  See also, Merck v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd, __ US __, 125 S.Ct. 2372 (2005) (giving rather broad reading to the 
regulatory infringement exemption).   
16  See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of  Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
105, 178 (2005) (reviewing limits of  trademark fair use defense).  Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether this doctrine 
really provides an exemption for a use that otherwise would be infringing or whether it merely restates what is not 
infringement in the first place because it refers to trademark being used in a non-trademark sense.   
17  See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (suit against service that facilitated peer 
to peer sharing of  copyrighted music). 
18  17 USC §§ 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, and 122. 
19  17 USC § 116.   
20  17 USC § 107 (fair use); 17 USC § 122 (copies for the blind).   
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important factor in explaining why that regime should be expected to be effective in facilitating the good 
coordination among complementary users of  the subject matter protected by the regime that is needed 
to facilitate commercialization.  At the same time, the extent to which a regime employs liability rule 
treatment is an important factor in explaining why that regime should be expected to be effective in 
facilitating the bad coordination among established market players that frustrates market entry.   
This paper proceeds as follows.  Employing a comparative analysis of  alternative goals such as 
providing direct incentives, mitigating rent dissipation, or internalizing externalities, and alternative 
institutions and organizations such as norm communities like an open source project, firms, and 
government, Part II develops a theory of  the institution of  property rights as playing a particular role in 
coordinating among the many complementary users of  an asset.  Part III shows how this coordination 
theory of  property in general is particularly well suited as a theory for IP, especially when compared to 
other dominant IP theories in the literature such as the reward and prospect, or rent dissipation, theories.  
The coordination theory also is shown to explain why some particular aspects of  IP regimes may be 
working well and why others may be candidates for change.  Part IV concludes.   
II. NIE, COORDINATION, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS  
The field of  NIE pays particular attention to the economic significance of  institutions and 
organizations, as distinct from other factors, such as technology, capital, or labor.21  As described by 
North:  
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up 
of  formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of  behavior, 
conventions, and self  imposed codes of  conduct), and their enforcement characteristics…. 
It is the interaction between institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of  
an economy. If  institutions are the rules of  the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the 
players. 
Organizations are made up of  groups of  individuals bound together by some common purpose to 
achieve certain objectives. Organizations include political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city 
council, regulatory bodies), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social 
bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations), educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational 
training centers).22
This paper focuses on several of  the most salient alternative tools for facilitating coordination:  
norm communities, firms, government actors, and property rights.  Although applying the above 
definitions strictly would make some of  these tools look more like organizations than institutions, for 
purposes of  this paper it is sufficient to note that they all have important institutional aspects that 
benefit from NIE’s comparative institutional analyses.   
 
21  For a good introduction to NIE, see JOHN DROBAK & JOHN NYE, FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS (1997) (volume of  papers honoring Douglass North and his contribution to the field of  NIE). See also THRAINN 
EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS (1990) (survey of  NIE, or as Eggertsson refers to it: “neo-
institutional economics”); Philip Keefer & Mary M. Shirley, Formal versus Informal Institutions in Economic Development, in CLAUDE 
MENARD, INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2000) 
(collecting sources).   
22  Douglass C. North, Prize Lecture, available on-line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1993/north-
lecture.html.  The logical relationship between organizations and institutions can be conceived topologically in at least two 
ways.  The first sees organizations as operating within institutions, such as a firm following society’s laws and rules.  The 
second sees institutions as operating within organizations, such as the internal set of  rules, norms, and enforcement 
characteristics that govern those within the organization and, in effect, define who is within the organization and who is 
outside of  it.   
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NIE emphasizes the use of  comparative institutional analyses to look at the different 
characteristics of  institutions and what impact they have on individuals and organizations over time.23  
Following such an approach suggests we should ask not only what we want, but also which mix of  
formal and informal institutions will work better in achieving our set of  goals.  The approach makes 
both conceptual and practical sense.   
Engaging in a comparative institutional analysis makes conceptual sense because the perfect 
institution, like the perfect anything, simply is not achievable.  Every real institution will have some 
problems.  For this reason, institutional choices should not be about a singular search for perfection but 
rather about which sets of  problems and benefits are best suited to tolerances and needs.  It is better to 
compare the particular costs and benefits of  actually available options than merely to identify problems 
with any one option and seek to perfect it.  This is a theory of  the “second-best.”24  Because different 
institutional choices will have different implications – positive and negative – for different problems, 
NIE teaches why it makes sense as a conceptual matter to pay attention to means as well as ends.   
What is more, institutions are essentially endogenous in that we make them and we can change 
them if  we want.25  As a result, a comparative institutional analysis makes great sense as a practical 
matter as well.   
As discussed more fully below, our views about the proper role for a particular institution like 
property should be informed by what NIE has shown about various problems operating on what can be 
seen as three distinct levels.  Recognizing them to be terms of  art discussed more fully below, the labels 
typically used for each of  these problems are mentioned here by way of  introduction.  On the individual 
level, these problems include, inter alia, those of  incentives, rent dissipation, information costs, and 
behavioralism.  On the interpersonal level, these problems include, inter alia, those of  transaction costs, 
agency costs, and the need for coordination and private ordering.  On the institutional level, these 
 
23  For detailed explorations of  NIE, see EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2003) (reviewing field and collecting sources) and 
MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001) (applying game theory to comparative 
institutional analysis and NIE).   
24  See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of  Intramarket 
Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849 (2000) (applying second-best analysis in antitrust context); Richard S. Markovits, 
Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and the Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1979) (same); Richard S. 
Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (1998) (overview of  second best 
theory); Andrew P. Morriss, Implications of  Second-Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case Study of  Public Utility 
Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135, 170-76 (1998) (application to administrative law); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (example of  early work using second-best approach); Oliver 
E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977) (same).  The search for perfection is what 
Harold Demsetz calls the “nirvana” fallacy, Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor of  a comparative institution approach), and as Voltaire noted, it is 
through such searches that “the perfect is the enemy of  the good.”  VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (“le mieux est 
l’ennemi de bien:” literally, “the best is the enemy of  the good,” or colloquially, “the perfect is the enemy of  the good”).  This 
is not to say that any particular institution, existing or otherwise, should not be studied critically or that everything should be 
left alone.  Such complacency would ignore the countervailing sage warning by John Dewey and reiterated by Cass Sunstein 
that “the better is too often the enemy of  the still better.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 315 (1992) 
(citing John J. McDermott, ed, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY 652 (Chicago, 1973)) (“To the economists’ plea that ‘the 
perfect is the enemy of  the good,’ we might oppose Dewey’s suggestion that ‘the better is too often the enemy of  the still 
better.’”). 
25  The term “we” is used here in its broadest sense to refer to people, in general.  Often, even groups of  people are 
unable effectively to have particular government agencies or other institutions fully incorporate their views.  It is recognized 
that some institutions are harder to change than others.  For example, re-writing statutes may not change the behavior of  
courts, and may also not have the desired effect on norms.  In the end, the mix of  institutions that may be best may depend in 
part on the institutions that are presently at play.  Put differently, path dependency may also be relevant to the comparative 
institutional analysis.  In addition, the field of  NIE extends far into the realm of  political science, where the process of  
institutional change is well studied.   
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problems include, inter alia, enforceability of  laws and norms, market failures, the differences between 
dynamic and static efficiency or between ex ante and ex post considerations, monopoly effects, 
government failures and public choice, as well as public goods problems and the tragedies of  the 
commons and anticommons.26   
The discussions that follow explore two themes about the institution of  property rights.  The 
first theme elucidates a role for property rights as tools for facilitating coordination among 
complementary users of  an asset and compares the institution of  property rights to other institutional 
and organizational arrangements in how they play this role.  The second theme ties together a number of  
important insights from NIE about how the detailed institutional arrangements that implement a system 
of  property rights can be structured so as to mitigate what otherwise are important recognized problems 
associated with property.   
A. Coordination as an Emerging Theory of  Property Rights  
Although property rights have long existed, evolution continues in the views about why property 
rights emerge within communities and what role property rights can and should play.  This paper 
elucidates one view that has only recently emerged in the literature: a view that sees the role of  property 
rights as facilitating coordination.  Property rights in general and IP rights in particular are not offered as 
perfect solutions to every problem.  The case is not being made for property or IP, uber alles.  Rather, the 
point is that property rights can provide an important additional and middle-ground tool for optional use 
by individuals engaged in private ordering beyond those offered by the extreme poles of  either the free, 
open market without them on the one hand or the hierarchies of  a norm community, firm, or 
government on the other hand.  But, to play this role, property rights must be designed to facilitate 
private ordering in a way the increases output of, and as a result access to, the subject matter they 
protect.  To achieve this role effectively, they must operate as rights of  exclusion around which 
coordination can take place.  This provides incentives to complementary users of  the asset protected by 
the property right to engage in trades with each other.  To do so efficiently, property rights must be 
structured to mitigate the costs of  rent dissipation, information, transactions, and public choice.  The 
below discussions show how each of  these goals can be targeted.   
1. Overview of  Conventional Focus on Externalities 
The conventional view of  property rights in the literatures of  both law and economics follows 
the 1967 work by Demsetz that sees property rights as tools for internalizing externalities.27  Demsetz 
built on the 1960 work on externalities by Ronald Coase,28 which itself  was a response to work on 
externalities from the beginning of  the 1900s by A.C. Pigou.29   
 
26  For a short and accessible overview of  most of  these various problems in the context of  NIE see Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Institutions of  Governance, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 75 (1998) (collecting sources)).  See also Oliver E. Williamson, The 
New Institutional Economics:  Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 595 (2000) (same).   
27  See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of  Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 (1967) (explaining the emergence 
of  property rights when benefits of  internalization outweigh transaction costs of  recognition of  property rights).   
28  See Ronald Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (pointing out how a fully defined set of  property 
rights can allow for externalities to be internalized).   
29  Pigou saw factory chimney soot as a problem of  externalities imposed on others in the environment around the 
factory and argued that the proper use of  taxes or subsidies could be used by the government to encourage such factories to 
account properly for the benefits and harms they project on those around them.  According to Pigou, “resources devoted to 
the prevention of  smoke from factory chimneys” provide an “uncompensated service,” or what some would call a positive 
externality, while smoke “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community,” or provides what some would call a negative 
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Although this lineage likely is familiar to those versed in the property literature, a review is useful 
in highlighting some important questions that it left open, which relate to the issue of  coordination.  
What is more, as discussed infra in Part III.A, the majority conventional view of  IP rights is premised on 
the same externalities focus as this literature, but seems to follow only its beginnings relating to 
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, while overlooking its refinements relating to property rights.  The 
discussion here has two central goals:  to remind IP theory about the benefits of  using property rights to 
solve externality problems; and to introduce to both IP theory in particular and property theory in 
general the questions left open by this lineage.  The discussion in the following section will explore the 
role coordination can play in addressing these open questions and its implications for shaping regimes.   
The term “externality” typically is used to refer to some cost or benefit that is external to a given 
economic decision-making system in that it is not factored into the decisions made by that system.30  But 
the term can be somewhat misleading because if  the decision-making process is working perfectly, then 
nothing will be completely external to the individual or the market.31  Because decision-making in the 
real world is not perfect, Coase’s work points out two other and more important implications about 
externalities:  (1) the problem of  externalities is entirely reciprocal;32 and therefore (2) the tough 
questions facing any real decision-making process about how best to allocate rights among reciprocal 
 
externality.  See generally, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-61, 166-68 (1920).  See also, ARTHUR C. PIGOU, 
WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912).   
30  Some definitions in the literature seem to define the term in relation to individuals, in that an externality is seen as 
something external to the decision-making of  an individual.  See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 423 (3rd ed. 
1992) (“When the actions of  one agent directly effect the environment of  another agent, we say that there is an externality”) 
(emphasis in original).  Other definitions in the literature see the term as referring to something external to the decision-
making process of  the entire market.  ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 297, 617 (1989) 
(“Such costs or benefits are called externalities because they are ‘external’ to the market.” “In this chapter we study externalities 
– the effects of  production and consumption activities not directly reflected in the market”) (emphasis in original).   
31  This is one of  the insights of  the work by Coase that was labeled by Stigler as the Coase Theorem.  See supra note 9 
(discussing Nobel Prize to Coase).  See also, RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 157 (1988). (“I did not 
originate the phrase, the ‘Coase Theorem,’ nor its precise formulation, both of  which we owe to Stigler.”); GEORGE J. STIGLER, 
THE THEORY OF PRICE, 113 (3d ed. 1966) (coining the term “[t]he Coase Theorem” writing that it “asserts that under perfect 
competition private and social costs will be equal” and Coase supra note 28).   
32  See Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, supra note 28, at 2, 13 (“If  we are to discuss the problem in terms of  causation, 
both parties cause the damage.”).  See also, Terry L. Anderson, Donning Coase-Colored Glasses: A Property Rights View of  Natural 
Resource Economics, Distinguished Fellow Address presented to Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, 13 
February 2004, at 3 (copy of  manuscript on file with author) (“Coase emphasized that because one use precludes the other, the 
costs are reciprocal.”); A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 60 (1996) (describing one of  the 
core ideas presented by Coase to be that “the problem of  social cost [or externalities] is, at least to an economist, a reciprocal 
problem.”).  Even a leading scholar who is often seen as a critic of  Coase has agreed that this lesson is not merely a question 
of  ideology.  See Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 738 (2005) (citing Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of  Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 506 n.24 (1961)).  In the case of  the externality of  soot, for example, the 
factory’s neighbor would see a potential interference with the right to use the air as a reservoir free from emissions while the 
factory would see a potential interference with the right to use the air as a reservoir in which to place the emissions.  In this 
sense, there is no such thing as “an externality,” in the singular, because externalities only come in pairs.  What this means for 
the externality analysis is that it must be studied from both angles, with the understanding that otherwise the attractiveness of  
different institutional responses may likely turn on the angle from which the problem is viewed rather than on the proposed 
solution’s overall ability to ensure that resources are used best over time. Put differently, the questions facing society as a whole 
in this hypothetical case concern both how free the air should from emissions and how full the air should be of  emissions.  
This is because both parties to the problem are to at least some extent connected to both sides of  the problem.  For example, 
as long as the factory has constituencies of  owners, workers, and customers having some preference for air that is free of  
emissions, the factory must consider both its own direct interest in dumping and its indirect interest through these 
constituencies in avoiding dumping.  Similarly, as long those constituencies want the investment opportunities, jobs and 
products that are associated with a factory having some need to use air as a reservoir into which it can dump, they must 
consider both their direct interest in avoiding dumping and their indirect interest through their tie to the factory in having 
dumping. 
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claimants requires determining what truly is the best allocation in every given case and how best to 
insure its implementation.33   
Coase pointed out that under appropriate conditions, such as zero transaction costs, a well 
defined allocation of  property rights among those impacted would ensure that these individuals traded 
with each other to achieve the same perfect result sought by Pigou.34  A central benefit of  Coase’s 
property rights alternative is that it would not require an ex ante determination of  what truly is the best 
allocation in every given case because the impacted parties themselves would gather information and 
make trades to ensure the resource is put to its highest and best use at any given time.  Coase continued 
by pointing out that of  course the world is not perfect and therefore not all potential exchanges will 
occur, due to the presence of  transaction costs and other imperfections.35  As a result, he urged that 
there be consideration of  overall net costs and benefits associated with the alternative initial allocations, 
including the costs of  any subsequent transactions that might be needed, with an eye towards ensuring 
that that the entitlement to the resource be allocated in such a way that the resource itself  would most 
likely end up at its highest and best use.36  The essential policy implication from this point is therefore to 
compare carefully real costs and benefits of  available institutional arrangements – such as different 
entitlement allocations, enforcement rules, or taxes and subsidies.37   
This focus by Coase on the comparative costs of  institutions laid an important part of  the 
foundation for the later work by Demsetz on the emergence of  property rights as a tool for internalizing 
positive externalities,38 among those facing what Garrett Hardin soon thereafter termed the “tragedy of  
the commons.”39  What is so tragic about a commons is its resources tend to be either overused or 
underused because of  what some call a free rider problem or a public goods problem.40   
 
33  See generally COASE supra note 31, at 157-186 (1988) (responding to a number of  common misperceptions regarding 
the Coase Theorem).   
34  See Coase, The Problem of  Social Cost, supra note 28, at 8.  In the case of  the soot this would be either a right to emit it 
or a right to be free from it.   
35  Id. at 16 (and noting that because of  transaction costs “the initial delimitation of  legal rights does have an effect on 
the efficiency with which the economic system operates”).   
36  Id. at 27 (arguing that we should ask “whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which 
would be suffered elsewhere as a result of  stopping the action which produced the harm”).   
37  Anderson, Donning Coase-Colored Glasses, supra note 32, at 8 (“Following Coase’s lead, we need to carefully examine the 
institutions”).  As a qualitative example, consider that the costs of  using a government tax or subsidy approach include public 
choice costs, and administration costs, while the costs of  using an entitlement delimitation approach include transaction costs 
and enforcement costs.   
38  See Demsetz, supra note 27, at 356 (explaining the emergence of  property rights in land among Labradorian Indians 
as a response to over hunting: “an owner, by virtue of  his power to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards 
associated with husbanding the game and increasing fertility of  his land”).     
39  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of  the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (elucidating how unrestricted sharing of  limited 
resources can lead to their over use and depletion).  See also, THE COMMONS, ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER FOLLIES, (Tibor R. 
Machan, ed., 2001) (providing critical review of  literature on the “tragedy of  the commons”).  For more on the role of  
property rights in avoiding the tragedy of  the commons see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Rights Paradigm, 
33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 23-24 (1973) (providing the example of  a community in which food caught in a hunt for animals may be 
shared by all and the resulting diminished incentive for individuals in that community to elect to hunt, or in their words “shirk,” 
absent other inducements such as a state order to hunt or a cultural indoctrination to hunt) and Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy 
of  the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998) (providing the example of  a 
hypothetical community called “Poach Pond” in which under-fishing of  the pond may occur if  the rule were that any 
community member could appropriate fish until the moment of  consumption because people might prefer to wait on shore 
and poach others’ catches rather than invest in fishing itself). 
40  Public goods are distinct from private goods in being both nonrival (i.e., inexhaustable) and nonexclusive. A good is 
considered to be nonrival if  consumption by one individual does not leave any less of  the good to be consumed by others.  Put 
differently, a good is considered to be nonrival if  for any given level of  production, the marginal cost of  providing it to an 
additional consumer is zero.   A good is nonexclusive if  people cannot be excluded from consuming it.  National defense, 
television signals, and police protection are generally considered to be examples of  public goods.  For a more detailed 
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Demsetz argued that property rights emerge when the benefits of  internalization outweigh its 
costs – when the good of  concentrating benefits and costs on owners so they deploy resources more 
efficiently outweighs the bad of  the transaction costs associated with recognizing those rights.41  
According to Demsetz, property rights emerged among the historical native North American population 
he was studying because with the lack of  property rights, “the underuse of  animal husbanding and land 
management resources (skills and labor) led to near exhaustion [or overuse] of  animal resources (food 
and clothing) . . . [while the presence of  property rights] provided incentives for individuals to make 
more use of  the one set of  resources so as to not waste, and indeed to replenish, the other.”42   
But this left open two important questions.  The first concerns the exact mechanism by which 
property rights operate to achieve this internalization benefit.  The second concerns the ways the costs 
and benefits of  using property rights compare to the costs and benefits of  alternative institutions.   
2. New Focus on Coordination 
This paper contributes understanding of  these open questions by focusing on the issue of  
coordination.  The paper elucidates how property rights can operate to achieve coordination in a way 
that involves a unique mix of  the benefits and costs associated with relying solely on other institutional 
and organizational tools.   
The type of  coordination emphasized here refers to the process by which many diverse 
individuals interact with each other for a particular activity to be achieved effectively.  This helps them 
not only achieve that common goal, it also helps them to be more diverse from each other and 
specialized in what skills and other resources they each bring to the collective enterprise than if  they 
could not coordinate.43  For IP, coordination can be particularly important because the subject matter 
protected by IP ideally is not yet the subject of  successful commercialization, or perhaps not even 
known yet.44  Although it has long been recognized that such uncertain and risky endeavors have a 
 
discussion of  public goods and the market failures associated with them, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, at 46-49, 108-119, and 134-141 (1988); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 617-
641 (1989); BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS  99-102, 556-585 (1988). 
41  Id. at 353 (noting that property rights did not emerge among those living on the southwest plains because the 
benefits would have been less since there were no animals of  commercial importance comparable to the furry animals of  the 
north whose pelts were tradable and because the costs would have been more since the animals that were there tended to 
wander more).   
42  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 718, n.95.   
43  For more on the link among specialization, division of  labor, and coordination, see generally, Gary S. Becker & Kevin 
M. Murphy, The Division of  Labor, Coordination Costs, and Knowledge, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER, 609 (Ramon Febero & Pedro 
Schwartz, eds. 1995).  In the context of  IP, for example, the process of  bringing a new invention to market after that invention 
has been made – a process called commercialization – often requires the coordination of  inventors, financiers, labor, 
management, advertisers, and marketers.  See generally, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14 at 707-712 (discussing role 
of  patents in commercialization of  inventions).  That is, without the ability to coordinate, in the case of  an invention for 
example, the inventor hoping to achieve commercialization would need to serve simultaneously as financier, laborer, manager, 
advertiser, and marketer.  The recognition of  this problem was indeed one of  the motivating factors behind the present U.S 
patent system, which focuses on the importance of  coordination to achieve invention commercialization.  See, Giles S. Rich, 
The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 177 (Mar., 1942) (discussing incentive 
aspects of  patent system and noting that one of  its most important components “applies to the inventor but not solely to him, 
unless he is his own capitalist”).  See also Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14 (discussing the commercialization theory 
of  the patent system). 
44  The IP regimes have rules governing what may be protected by IP that operate to make sure this is true and the basic 
reason these rules must operate in this way is to protect the reasonable investment backed expectations of  third parties.  See 
Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14 (exploring normative case for positive law rules for validity within the context of  patents).   
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particularly strong need for coordination,45 it also has been long recognized that this is a call for 
“collective action, but not necessarily state action.”46   
Coordination of  this type is more about a beacon effect than control, and more about stability 
and certainty of  complex deals (a bargaining effect) than about simple rate of  return investment.  The 
key is the incentive for diverse complementary users of  the asset to come together (the beacon effect) 
and transact with each other (the bargaining effect).  Both effects are facilitated by the credibility of  the 
threat of  an injunction, which is the signature attribute of  a legal entitlement that is backed up by a 
property rule, and frustrated by the alternative of  a liability rule.   
The basic Calabresi-Melamed framework for deciding between property and liability focuses 
attention on which locus of  decision-making about the true value of  the underlying asset is the lowest 
cost provider of  a correct decision.47  Under this rubric, a liability rule can be more efficient if  a 
collective, public, or governmental determination of  the true value of  the asset would be cheaper than a 
private evaluation reached by agreement of  the parties; and conversely a property rule should be used if  
the private evaluation would be cheaper.48  Rob Merges points out that one implication of  this approach 
is that property rules are better for IP because private parties have a comparative advantage over courts 
in valuing IP.49  But the coordination approach explored here pushes beyond this rubric’s focus on the 
problem of  relative advantages information-processing and extends the analysis to these two other 
concerns – the beacon effect and the bargain effect.   
The beacon effect is achieved because the more credible the threat of  the injunction behind 
every patent, for example, the more it creates incentives for diffuse individuals having an interest in the 
subject matter protected by the patent to decide individually to act in a way that ends up being 
coordinated.  While the infringe-and-pay-damages approach of  liability rule treatment may provide 
sufficient incentive for the individual patentee to come to court to receive payment, it does little 
compared to the right to exclude in drawing towards that individual all of  the other potential 
complementary users of  the patented subject matter so they may work together to engage successfully in 
the complex commercialization process.   
But the bargaining effect associated with property rule treatment is even more important.  
Where there are large numbers of  potential infringers, liability rules make bargaining between the 
patentee and the potential infringers, licensees, or assignees, more difficult.50  The problem afflicts both 
sides of  the potential transactions.   
The patentee’s incentives are disrupted in at least two ways.  First, the patentee may face 
decreased incentives because of  the ordinary under-compensation error that is typically associated with 
 
45  See, e.g., FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, 268 (1965).   
46  See, e.g., FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 64. (citing Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of  Economic Activity: Issues 
Pertinent to the Choice of  Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in Joint Econ. Comm., 91st Cong., The Analysis and Evaluation of  
Public Expenditures: The PPB System 47-64, at 62 (Comm. Print 1969).   
47  To be sure, important additional considerations not directly applicable here have also been offered.  See, e.g., Richard 
R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden Of  Determining Property Rules And Liability Rules: Broken Elevators In The Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 267, 268, n. 8 (2002) (elucidating analytical framework for assessing “the relative burden (or costs, or difficulty) faced by 
judges when attempting to determine property rules and liability rules”).   
48  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4 at 1106.  Also compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (1st 
ed. 1972) (“where transaction costs are high, the allocation of  resources to their highest valued uses is facilitated by denying 
property right holders an injunctive remedy against invasions of  their rights and instead limiting them to a remedy in 
damages”) and James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440, 459-64 (1995) (arguing that property rules are better when administrative costs are high) with A. Mitchell Polinsky, 
Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of  Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1111 (1980) (pointing 
out that where decisions by a court are more costly the case for property rules is stronger) 
49  See Robert P. Merges, Of  Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2655, 2664 (1994). 
50  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 733 (citing David Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for 
Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990)).   
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liability rules.51   Second, the use of  a liability rule may create a prisoner’s dilemma or collective action 
problem among potential infringers in which each individual’s dominant strategy is to infringe in order to 
garner more of  the potential gains from exchange for itself.  That is, the use of  a property rule is 
particularly important for the impact it has in limiting each potential infringer’s incentive to infringe ex 
ante.  Otherwise, under a liability rule, the patentee will not have adequate incentive to bargain with these 
infringers because such bargaining will not yield effective protection from others.  In effect, the patentee 
faces what property skeptics call an anticommons problem because the patentee must get a binding 
commitment from each of  the many possible takers; but because none of  them can sell such a binding 
commitment under a liability rule regime, they leave the owner facing a thicket.52   
The problem is similar to one previously described by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in the 
context of  multiple, serial takings:   
Consider the situation of  an owner and a particular potential taker who values the car less highly than 
does the owner (but above the level of  damages).  The owner would like to bargain with the taker and 
pay him not to take the car.  However, it would be irrational for the owner to pay this taker not to take 
the car, for he would subsequently have to pay another potential taker not to take the car, and then 
another and another. Therefore, the potential taker will tend to take the car even though the owner 
values it more highly.  The general point, in other words, is that when courts err and set damages too 
low, bargaining by owners will be effectively infeasible, and socially undesirable takings will occur.53
But although instructive, the Kaplow and Shavell discussion understates the problem.  It is not just a 
question of  setting damages too low, but rather is a question of  relying on damages rather than 
injunctions.  Several negative impacts follow from the lack of  injunction to block the behavior they 
correctly identify would otherwise be practiced by the set of  infringers.   
First:  
Each infringer may calculate the impact of  his marginal output on price without taking into account 
the output from other infringers. Such uncoordinated acts of  infringement may cause collective 
profits—those reaped by the patentee directly and through damages awards from infringers—to fall 
below the total costs of  creating and commercializing the invention, resulting in a destruction of  
wealth.54  
Second, as recognized by Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel, the threat of  this potential 
onslaught of  infringements induced by a liability rule will discourage investments in the subject matter 
 
51  See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of  The Cathedral: The Dominance of  Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091 (1997).    
52  See infra Part II.C.5 (discussing anticommons thicket).   
53  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 765-
66 (1996).  Kaplow and Shavell further point out:  
Our conclusion from the present argument is that a property rule enjoys a strong advantage over the 
liability rule, assuming, as is plausible, that the probability of  underestimation of  owners’ values would be 
substantial under a liability regime.  We emphasize that this conclusion does not depend upon the 
assumption that there is systematic underestimation of  owners’ values under a liability rule.  Even when 
one assumes that courts’ estimates are on average correct, but are sometimes too high and sometimes too 
low, the liability rule will be inferior because the occasions in which damages are too low will involve the 
multiple-taker problem we have identified.  (When damages are too high, there will be few takings, so the 
liability rule in such instances will be similar to a property rule.) 
Id. at 766.   
54  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 733 (“As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, if  there are fixed costs of  
entry or exit, or if  infringers have higher marginal cost than the patentee, then market entry by infringers will generate extra 
costs for society.” (citing Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 5, at 1015).  See also, Henry Smith, Property and Property Rules, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1719 (2004) (noting that in addition to information costs, property rules also make sense because they deter 
opportunism by potential takers and discourage owners from engaging in wasteful self  help) 
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covered by the IP right ex ante.55  But this drop of  individualized investment by the IP owner, alone, is 
not the only result and could be mitigated by higher damages amounts.56   
While the patentee’s incentives can be maintained under a liability rule regime by awarding 
enhanced damages or letting the patentee engaging in self  help,57 the many complementary users of  the 
patented subject matter also will face a drop in their incentives to even be drawn to the beacon effect 
otherwise associated with a property rule regime’s right to exclude; and this incentive can’t easily be 
maintained.  The heart of  this problem is tied to the limited nature of  a court imposed liability rule.  
Often price is not the only important term in these deals and courts are woefully inadequate compared 
to the marketplace for determining and enforcing these other terms.  While private ordering among 
parties can lead to textured contracts having many terms including price but also including a host of  
seemingly esoteric and unique provisions – such as technical support, field-of-use or territory limitations, 
grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, most-favored-nation provisions, etc. – a court imposed 
damage award is in all but the rarest of  cases reduced to a simple monetary amount.   
This effect is increased the more that those investments can’t otherwise be deployed to other 
uses, the more they can’t be insured, the more they can’t be hedged, and the more they can’t be 
diversified.  What this means is that the more the players approach each investment decision simply as 
one item in a large portfolio, the more they will not care whether the investment is in an activity 
associated with a liability rule or a property rule.58   Conversely, the more the players are deploying 
unique assets and the more those investments cannot be insured, hedged, or diversified, which is often 
the hallmark of  market entrants, the more they will care whether the enforcement is by a liability rule or 
a property rule.  Put differently, the more the activity is associated with a liability rule, the more only 
large portfolio players will elect rationally to invest in it and the less it will be rational to invest unique 
skills and unique assets.  In this way, liability rule treatment, which often is urged in the name of  
increasing competition, has the paradoxical effect of  favoring large players, not market entrants.   
Although the role of  property rights as tools for facilitating coordination recently has been 
mentioned in the NIE literature, it has not been elaborated until now.  As discussed previously, the 
classic work by Demsetz on the emergence of  the institution of  property rights focuses on their role in 
internalizing benefits and costs.59  Within the field of  IP, prior work by the present author suggested the 
role of  property rights as focal points in facilitating coordination among complementary users of  an 
invention.60  Independently, newer work by Demsetz also highlighted this coordination function of  
property rights when discussing the increased specialization of  labor that has occurred over time:  
Difficulties in stipulating and enforcing agreements so as to encourage and facilitate productivity-
increasing cooperation between different owners come into play here.61   
*** 
The legal institutions that define private ownership and guide exchange arrangements must become 
operative if  the complexity that is inherent in specialization is to be productive.62
 
55  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 733 (citing Haddock et al. supra note 50, at 16-17).   
56  Although, these higher damages amounts would still raise the ire of  those who see property rights as tools that 
enable unfair holdout strategies.   
57  See Smith, supra note 54, (discussing the problems of  requiring self-help as an alternative to property rule protection).   
58  The portfolio effect explains why property rules can dominate liability rules (in situations where assets and 
information are highly individualized and non-portfolio) even in the face of  the very elegant and insightful projects that have 
shown how across a portfolio of  decisions there are ways in which liability rules dominate.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Optional Law 
(2005). 
59  See supra notes 38-42, and accompanying text (discussing work by Demsetz).   
60  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 717-18, 727-41 (emphasizing the coordination function and citing 
Demsetz, supra note 59).  See also Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 67-68.   
61  Demsetz, Toward a Theory of  Property Rights II, supra note 12, at S657.   
62  Id. at S664-5, S656.   
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More specifically, he disavowed the extent of  his earlier focus on internalizing externalities:  
In retrospect, it now seems to me that the theory of  property rights implicit in this explanation places 
too much weight on externalities (where, in the case discussed, the externality is the neglected impact 
of  hunting today on the cost of  hunting tomorrow). The “Toward” that begins the essay’s title, 
therefore, should be taken seriously. Externality here refers to an effect on the production 
transformation opportunities facing others, such effect being a result of  actions taken by someone 
who does not bear the value consequences of  this effect. Hunting today causes a change in the 
production opportunities facing hunters tomorrow. As circumstances make the externality more costly 
to bear, private rights adjust to reduce the seriousness of  the externality. This is an important pattern 
of  property right development. Nonetheless, private-ownership arrangements would exist even if  
there were no externality problems of  the type being discussed.63   
Under the Demsetz new view, the key is “coordination in the sense of  bringing forth control decisions 
that are consistent with each other but that emanate from different persons.”64  This is consistent with 
the approach that is more fully elaborated above, which shows how coordination is achieved by property 
through at two effects.  It brings parties together (beacon effect) and it helps them interact with each 
other once brought together (bargain effect).  Both of  these effects have been explored in earlier drafts 
of  the present paper65 and are confirmed very recently in the independent works of  others, as discussed 
below.   
Part of  the beacon effect is discussed in recent work by the team of  Antoine Bureth, Rachel 
Lévy, Julien Pénin, and Sandrine Wolff, which shows that firms elect to use patents as tools for 
coordinating with each other.66  This work confirms the analysis offered here by showing empirical data 
about the ways patentees, themselves, can and actually do use patents as tools for facilitating 
coordination.  But such a focus on patentees does not explain how those other than patentees voluntarily 
act in a way that achieves an overall coordination effect for society.  One important implication of  the 
beacon view of  property’s coordination function described here is that it makes it easier to see is why the 
transactions facilitated by coordination need not even be direct.  That is, the many complementary users 
of  the asset protected by the property right that are drawn towards the beacon may interact with each 
other only transitively.  Each individual might not directly interact with each other in a pair-wise fashion, 
but each would still be interacting on the same broadly defined endeavor.  Assuming individuals A 
through E are needed for commercialization to take place,67 individual A may not directly interact with 
each of  the other individuals B through E, and individual B may not directly interact with individuals A 
and C through E, and so forth, but each of  the individuals will be interacting with the same invention 
commercialization process and with a least a subset of  the group comprising A through E.  In effect 
each individual is interacting with each other at least by transitivity.  As a result, the beacon effect can be 
achieved even if  all the individuals are not drawn together at the same time or in the same place.68  
 
63  Id. at S656.   
64  Id. at S664.   
65  F. Scott Kieff, The Case against Copyright: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of  Intellectual Property Regimes,  
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 297, Washington U. School of  Law Working Paper No. 04-10-01 
(October 2004) (working paper) (available on line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=600802).   
66  Julien Penin, Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: A New Look, 34 RES. POLICY 641 (2005); Antoine Bureth, et al., Patenting 
practices within the Upper-Rhine Biovalley network: Exclusion and coordination rationales (Working paper) (available on-line 
at http://www.liuc.it/ricerca/istitutoeconomia/laweconomicsjuly2005/papers/Bureth_et_al_LIUCpaper.pdf); Antoine Bureth, 
et al., The Ambivalence of  the Local Practices of  Patenting within the BioValley Network, 58 CHIMIA 796 (2004).   
67  Each of  course would be brining a different asset to bear, such as capital, labor, management, advertising, marketing, 
complementary technologies, etc.   
68  This is consistent with, albeit a more expansive version of, the view offered in Demsetz’s newer work.  See supra note 
64, and accompanying text.   
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Similarly, part of  the bargain effect is discussed in recent work by Robert Merges on the 
interface among NIE, property, and IP.69  Merges shows how property rights can facilitate contracting in 
at least two ways:  pre-contractual liability and enforcement flexibility.  Merges first points out how 
property can serve as a tool for cracking the Arrow Information Paradox.70  Contrasting the different 
institutional frameworks associated with the types of  rights provided by trade secrets and patents, 
Merges points out that patents can better achieve this effect because they offer in essence more property 
treatment.71  Merges second points out how property can mitigate the problems of  asset specificity and 
opportunism that are associated with contractual interactions generally.72  As Merges explains, property 
rights provide several options for enforcement on top of  contracts: suits before contract liability 
attaches, suits against third parties, a longer statute of  limitations, increased damages, and injunctions.73   
Paul Heald makes a related point but adds important detail to the analysis.74  Borrowing from 
the asset portioning literature of  corporate law, Heald’s core insight is that maintaining a distinction 
between patent and the underlying information that it protects also eases transactions at the level of  
practical commercial law by providing something having title that can be recorded so as to be good as 
against third parties, unlike contracts.75  This eases financing, long term planning, team building, etc.  
Financing is eased because a separately titled asset is now available to be used as collateral, protected by a 
recording statute.  Long term planning is eased for both the firm and inventors working for it because 
asset specificity is decreased in that the option of  a separate patent relieves a firm from having to keep 
track of  the inventor.  This also facilitates team building by avoiding the need for the firm to have the 
types of  invasive practices over its employees’ lives that would be needed if  trade secrecy were the only 
option.76 Finally, Heald points out that because it is easier for someone to take ownership of  a patent 
than of  a bundle of  technical know how and the people who created it, patents increase the ability for 
the one owning the patent to be a mediating hierarch among those interested in the technology.77  This 
last point builds on the point Joseph Schumpeter made about the role of  patents and their owners in 
controlling development.78   
The view explored here extends the analysis by highlighting the difference between coordination 
and control.  The focus here is on the incentives for each of  the diverse individuals associated with each 
input to come together and negotiate with each other, but it is agnostic about which individual ends of  
controlling the negotiations.  Control is left to be decided by the individuals involved in each case based 
on various factors including importance of  different resources, including bargaining skills.  The key is 
that the more it is easy and predictable for each individual to come to and extract value from the trade 
(the greater the residual claim), the more easy and attractive it will be for that person to do so.   
 
69  Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of  Property Right (March 10, 2005). (available on-line at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=707202).  
70  As pointed out by Kenneth Arrow, the “fundamental paradox” of  information is that “its value for the purchaser is 
not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.”  KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE 
THEORY OF RISK-BEARING, at 152 (1971).    
71  Merges supra note 69, at 28-30.   
72  Id. at 31 (highlighting temporal benefits of  the option of  enforcing with property remedies in addition to contract 
remedies).   
73  Id.    
74  Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of  Patent Law 66 Ohio St. L.J. 473 (2005).   
75  Id. at 480-84.   
76  Heald, supra note 74, at 487-89.   
77  Id. at 491-99.   
78  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 100-02 (discussing control of  a monopolist).   
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One implication of  the coordination view explored here,79 is that property rights backed up by 
property rules increase access, rather than decrease it.  This is explored in greater depth infra in Part 
III.B.   
A second implication of  the focus on this type of  coordination is that when considering the 
alternative tools available for facilitating it, as discussed immediately below in Part II.B, it is important to 
recognize that the alternatives to property are more closely associated with large, established market 
actors, while property rights will be at least also associated with smaller market entrants.  More 
particularly, the alternative of  norm communities and firms are closed to outsiders, by definition, while 
the alternative of  government organizations is more responsive to public choice pressures from existing 
larger firms.  In this way, the choice to rely on these other alternatives for coordination instead of  
property rights has the impact of  increasing anticompetitive effect. 
A third implication is that coordination, like all things, can be both good and bad.  While 
facilitating coordination among complementary users of  under-deployed assets increases access and 
competition by easing market entry and commercialization, coordination among large, existing firms will 
facilitate anticompetitive effects.  Regrettably, as discussed infra in Part III.A.3, there are several aspects 
of  the modern IP regimes that are having this bad coordination effect.    
B. Contrasting Property with Other Tools for Facilitating Coordination  
Because the other tools that often get used in place of  property – such as firms, norm 
communities like open source projects, and government – also can facilitate coordination of  the type 
needed to increase access, it is important to consider how property compares to these other tools.  The 
below discussions elucidate how property provides a unique mix of  some particular benefits and costs 
associated with each of  these other options.  This unique mix, in and of  itself, is generally a useful 
option to have.  What is more, because these other options are each less accessible to outsiders and 
market entrants than is property, relying on them to the exclusion of  property is expected to have the 
particular impact of  increasing anticompetitive effect.   
1. Norm Communities like Open Source Projects 
Coordination also may occur among individuals who are linked to each other through some 
social group such as family, friendship, ethnic or religious identity, or some other norm community such 
as an open source software project.  The NIE literature looks at the different approaches to informal 
rules, often called norms, because, as Williamson argues, what otherwise would be a focus on positive 
law regimes would reflect a type of  “legal centrism” that fails to account adequately for dispute 
resolution and enforcement activities that occur without the formal legal system.80  Indeed, the first 
significant connection between the literatures of  NIE and IP centered on the role of  norms.81  Norms 
can be thought of  in at least two ways:  as “prescriptive norms,” also called “normative norms,” which 
refer to beliefs about what people should do, and as “descriptive norms,” or “regularities,” which refer to 
how people tend to behave.82  
 
79  See also, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14.   
80  See, OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 20-21 (1985) (discussing “legal 
centrism”).   
81  See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. 
L. REV. 1293 (1996) (exploring the role of  norms in establishing private institutions to coordinate IP transactions); Arti Kaur 
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of  Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999) (applying law and 
norms theory to intellectual property).   
82  For a recent discussion of  these two types of  norms within the context of  IP see, e.g. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of  Science - A Response to Rai & Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 693, 696 (2001).  
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Much of  the NIE literature on informal, or non-legal ordering has focused on enforcement and 
dispute resolution.  One recent example is the work by Lisa Bernstein on relational contracting within 
homogeneous communities, which has focused on what it calls “private ordering” as a mechanism by 
which individuals in the market can interact with lower administrative costs than with formal legal 
institutions through the use of  more informal institutions for enforcement and dispute resolution such 
as norms, reputation, etc.83  Similarly, recent work by Barak Richman comes closer to the theory of  the 
firm literature and focuses on the importance of  the private enforcement and dispute resolution 
techniques as means for ensuring not just lower administrative costs, but also better contractual 
enforcement, and enhanced transaction certainty.84   
The view of  property rights offered in this paper differs from both of  these perspectives by 
seeing private ordering in the more general sense than simply private enforcement.85  Instead, private 
ordering is seen as the set of  interactions among individuals that are more reliable because they are 
enforced in some way, whether by private informal institutions, such as norms, or by formal legal 
institutions, such as the coercive power of  the state.  This view is consistent with traditional liberal views 
of  the rule of  law and role of  government as the monopoly over the coercive powers – such as force – 
to back property rights and contractual arrangements because such backing enhances the overall market 
economy by enhancing individual liberty to elect to deploy one’s resources in whatever way best suits that 
individual.86   
 
To be sure, norms of  each type may influence the other.  What is more, when it comes to prescriptive norms about how 
individuals should behave, they may be driven by either external, or internal pressures.  See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems 
Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1087-88 
(2004) (“By ‘norms’ I do not mean those steps that managers take to please the market or to avoid shame or a lawsuit, 
although sometimes ‘norms’ is used broadly this way. Rather, I am referring to a sense of  right and wrong – a  sense of  duty 
and responsibility – that directors and officers internalize and enforce on themselves simply because it is the right thing to do”) 
(citing, inter alia, Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of  U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take? 10 
(UCLA School of  Law, Working Paper No. 02-11, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=313679 (“In lay terms, 
corporate insiders act like fiduciaries not only because they fear external sanctions, but also because they have internalized a 
sense of  obligation or responsibility toward others ....’); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104, 1013 (1997) (“All of  us internalize rules and standards of  conduct with which we 
generally try to comply. We do this not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or informal, but also because doing so 
is important to our sense of  self-worth, because we believe that doing a good job is the right thing to do.”)).   
83  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of  the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992) (showing how some communities opt for informal private enforcement mechanisms for contractual 
relationships instead of  formal legal approaches because the administrative costs can be lower).  See also, Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law In The Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, And Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).  
Bernstein’s use of  the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement is consistent with the use by Williamson, which 
is narrower than the use in this paper, which encompasses all private interactions voluntarily entered.  See infra note 93 
(contrasting Williamson’s use of  the term “private ordering”).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
319 (2002) (also using the term “private ordering” to refer to private enforcement or regulation).   
84  Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of  Private Ordering, at 4 (working 
paper, forthcoming as 104 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2004) (available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=565464) (“This paper 
argues that concerns over transactional assurance and contractual enforcement, not administrative costs, drive merchant 
communities to private ordering (and to vertical integration as well).”) 
85  See infra note 93 (discussing this more general use of  the term “private ordering”).   
86  See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) 
(elucidating the importance to economic growth of  the reliable enforcement of  property rights and contracts by formal public 
legal institutions); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD (1973) (putting property 
rights at the center of  the explanation of  economic performance); Avner Greif  & Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement 
Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status in Russia, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: 
REALITIES OF REFORM (Edward P. Lazear, ed., 1995) (same).  See also, Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Principles of  a Liberal Social 
Order, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK, (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube, eds., 1984) (providing general discussion of  the theory 
of  liberal government including its use of  coercive powers to enforce law).   
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While recent work by Richman has shown that private enforcement mechanisms may, under 
appropriate conditions such as small and homogenous communities, provide even more transactional 
security at a lower administrative cost than public enforcement,87 the point here is that having the option 
of  public enforcement is a benefit to those under other more generalized or diverse conditions than such 
homogenous communities.  Put differently, one disadvantage of  such closed markets is that they are 
closed to outsiders.  As Troy Paredes explains within the context of  corporate and securities laws:  
“when laws are in place, parties can rely less on personal and family relationships when transacting, 
allowing them to engage in transactions with strangers.”88   
Keeping transactions entirely within a particular organization like a firm or norm community 
also raises the disadvantages that Stephen Haber calls the problems of  “crony capitalism.”89  The 
enforcement benefits within closed organizations are due to the specificity of  investments the 
community’s members must make in it, which in turn bring along the inevitable concerns about 
opportunism.  What is more, the attributes that underlie the unique connection to the community 
typically are non-fungible – such as family, religious, or ethic affiliation, or a close relationship with the 
community leadership.   
The development of  software like Linux within a community that adheres to an open source 
philosophy can be seen as one example of  a coordinated activity that occurred within a norm 
community around a coordinating device akin to fame rather than around more formal property like 
patents.  Under this view, the fame of  Linus Torvalds allows him to control development of  the Linux 
kernel to ensure that it occurs in a coordinated fashion.  The ability for fame or other focal points to 
achieve coordination is consistent with the beacon view of  property discussed earlier.90   
While open participation would seem to be a touchstone promise of  open source, several 
empirical studies of  several different open source software projects have shown that this openness is not 
experienced in reality, in that changes to the actual projects in these cases actually are limited to a very 
small number of  individuals in a different cohesive control group for each case studied.91  While it 
makes sense as a practical matter of  information processing needs for there to be a small control 
group,92 this stark difference from the rhetoric of  the legend matters a great deal.  Unlike the formal 
property rights in something like patents, the fame that is the key to open source type of  centralized 
coordination is less easily transferred, divided, or bundled.  It also is specific to that community.  In 
addition, fame can be more difficult to obtain in general than property.  And its exclusivity makes it more 
 
87  Compare, Barak D. Richman, Community Enforcement of  Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, (John M. 
Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business, Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002), at 24 (contrasting benefits and costs of, inter 
alia, private and public enforcement mechanisms under different conditions).   
88  Paredes, supra note 82, at 1064 (also noting that “Strong legal protections for shareholders expand the available pool 
of  capital for businesses and entrepreneurs and facilitate contracting by shoring up shareholder rights.”).   
89  STEPHEN HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
(2002) [hereinafter “HABER, CRONY CAPITALISM”].   
90  See also, Randy Calvert, The Rational Choice Theory of  Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication, in 
MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW DIRECTIONS 216, 244 (J.S. Banks and E.A Hanushek eds., 1995) 
(“[r]ecognizing or creating focal points is one important way in which the players can successfully coordinate.”).   
91  See Jai Asundi, et al. Examining Change Contributions in an OSS Project: The Case of  the Apache Web Server 
Project,  (Working Paper, 2005) (providing data for the Apache project and discussing numerous examples of  empirical studies 
of  other projects).   
92  The smaller the control group the more intense can be the information content of  the communications among them.  
As Henry Smith has pointed out there is a fundamental informational tradeoff:   
As audience size increases, the marginal benefits of  intensive communication are likely to decrease and the 
marginal costs are likely to increase.  Thus, to minimize the sum of  communication costs, any 
communication system faces a tradeoff  between information intensiveness on the one hand and 
information extensiveness on the other.   
Henry E. Smith, The Language of  Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2003).   
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difficult for diverse individuals to obtain.  At bottom, the element that allows control by the leader within 
a norm community, whether it be fame or some other special community attribute, is only available to 
those who are insiders – in the case of  Linux, that includes only Torvalds and his chief  lieutenants – not 
those wanting to enter.  Simply put, the above discussion elucidates some reasons why relying on norm 
communities like open source projects to the exclusion of  property would have the effect of  generally 
biasing against new entrants and in favor of  those who are members of  the establishment.   
2. Firms 
The NIE literature on the theory of  the firm contributes much to the understanding of  the way 
property rights facilitate coordination by exploring the tension between collective action among those 
within a hierarchy such as a firm on the one hand and collective action among those interacting across an 
open market on the other hand.93  These two types of  collective action – the one within firms and the 
other using contracts across an open market – can be seen as two polar examples of  modes of  private 
ordering, bracketing the two other examples already discussed – one using the set of  arrangements that 
constitute a norm community and the other using contracts formed around a property right like a 
patent.94  The below discussion contrasting the firm with the open market (absent the addition of  any 
set of  property rights or another), is designed to highlight the ways in which the addition of  property 
rights can make available a unique mix of  attributes.   
As Williamson notes when describing what Hayek referred to as the “marvel of  the market,” 
“[o]f  special importance to Hayek was the proposition that the price system, as compared with central 
planning, is an extraordinarily efficient mechanism for communicating information and inducing 
change.”95  But he also noted that this requires spontaneous cooperation and coordination, in contrast 
with the “kind of  cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful,” which he referred 
to as the “marvel of  internal organization.”96  In sum, Williamson noted that markets are characterized 
by “high powered incentives” and hierarchy only weaker incentives and greater bureaucratic costs, but 
increased coordination.97   As Coase elaborated, “[t]he main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm 
would seem to be that there is a cost of  using the price mechanism.”98  But as Williamson points out, 
such transaction cost market failures are only failures to the extent “that they involve transaction costs 
 
93  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 24 (emphasizing the relative “adaptive capabilities of  markets or 
hierarchies.”) (citing (Friedrich von Hayek, The Use of  Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (markets)) and (CHESTER I. 
BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 30th Anniversary Edition (1968) (hierarchies)).   
94  The term “private ordering” is used more broadly in this paper than it is in some of  the NIE literature.  Williamson, 
for example, often uses the term “private ordering” to refer to the various informal mechanisms to privately enforce 
contractual relationships as compared with formal legal process.  See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 163-68 (suggesting that repeat play and reputation can serve as “private ordering” tools for 
enforcement).  Here, the term is used to refer to all private interactions entered into voluntarily by individuals as compared to 
those coerced by a hierarch, such as cooperation directed by management among different divisions within a firm or tax 
transfers directed by law among members of  a state.  For uses of  the term private ordering as it is used here see, e.g., Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of  Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 983 (2004) (using the term “private ordering” to 
refer to private voluntary exchanges, not to private enforcement); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization 
in the Law of  Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,  8 (2000) (using the term “private ordering” in the context 
of  individual choice and freedom of  contract); Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 569 
(1991) (“Within the context of  Eastern Europe, property and economic protections are critical to the ability to turn nations 
and economies around from central planning to private ordering”).   
95  Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of  Organization, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 36, 47 (1993) 
(citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of  Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV., 519, 524-27 (1945)).   
96  Id. (citing CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE, 4 (1938)).   
97  Williamson, supra note at 95, at 49.   
98  Ronald Coase, The Nature of  the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 390 (1937).   
KIEFF COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 22 
 
                                                  
that can be attenuated by substituting internal organization for market exchange.”99  Indeed, in 
recognition that not everything can be done as well inside a firm, Williamson asked:  “Why can’t a large 
firm do everything a collection of  small firms can do, and more?”100   
The central answer is that hierarchy inevitably entails “agency costs,” a term that generally refers 
to all the costs associated with the inevitable divergences in the interests among two individuals in 
situations in which one individual (known as an agent) acts on behalf  of  the other (known as a 
principal).  As summarized by Michael Jensen and William Meckling: 
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of  the agent.  In 
addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that 
he will not take certain actions which would hard the principal or insure that the principal will be 
compensated if  he does take such actions . . . . In most agency relationships the principal and the 
agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary).  And in 
all there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would 
maximize the welfare of  the principal. 101
Thus, agency costs can be seen to include the costs of  the agent’s looting, shirking, other inadvertent 
deviations from instructions, and bonding, and the costs of  the principal’s unmet reasonable 
expectations, monitoring, and enforcing.   
Integration within a firm or other hierarchy also brings with it some problems of  asset specificity 
and opportunism.102  Although integration within a firm has been seen by some within the NIE 
literature as decreasing certain problems of  asset specificity and opportunism, it is not clear that this is 
correct.103 What is more, property rights as an alternative to a firm may decrease other problems of  asset 
specificity and opportunism – for example, it can be easier for an inventor to walk away from a patent 
license with a firm than also to have to surrender a basic employment relationship with the firm.  It also 
may be easier for the firm to walk away.104
 
99  Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of  Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 114 
(1971) (exploring relative advantages of  “once and for all contract,” series of  short term contracts, and outright vertical 
integration, as alternative options for firms).   
100  WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 93, at 131.  This problem is sometimes cited 
as the “Williamson Puzzle.”  See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).  The problem is also 
explored in Coase, supra note 98, at 394 (“Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?”) (citing Frank Knight, Risk, 
Uncertainty, and Profit, Preface to the Re-Issue, London School of  Economics Series of  Reprints, No. 16 (1933)).   
101  Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of  the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. FIN. ECON., 305, 308 (1976) (emphasis in original).   
102  Williamson explains that asset specificity refers to the problem that arises when an asset cannot be re-deployed from 
its present use to some alternative use without a decline in value.  WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 52-56 (reviewing history of  scholarship on asset specificity, collecting sources, and pointing out 
that “[a]t least four types of  asset specificity are usually distinguished: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, and dedicated assets… [and that t]he importance of  asset specificity to transaction costs economics is difficult to 
exaggerate.”). He defines ex post opportunism to be “[s]elf-interest seeking with guile, [including] calculated efforts to mislead, 
deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise confuse.”  OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, 378 (1996).  See 
also WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 47-52, 64-67 (exploring in detail various 
types of  opportunism within the context transaction cost economics and collecting sources).  
103  Compare Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Re-visited, 43 J. L. & ECON. 33, 34 
(2000) (“The GM-Fisher case is . . . the most widely cited example of  vertical integration reducing problems of  physical and 
human asset specificity, and it serves as an empirical cornerstone for hold-up explanations of  unified ownership …[but] while 
holdup was not an issue prior to integration, the Fisher brothers successfully held up GM after they became employees; far 
from reducing opportunistic behavior, vertical integration increased GM’s vulnerability to rent-seeking behavior.”) with R.H. 
Coase, The Acquisition of  Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J. L. & ECON. 15, 21-27 (reviewing facts of  the GM-Fisher integration 
and pointing out that there is no evidence that hold-ups occurred prior to integration).   
104  See Freeland supra note 103 at 34.   
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 Finally, hierarchy raises particular problems for innovation both because the process of  
innovation is itself  particularly fraught with uncertainty and because information about an innovator’s 
efforts is likely to be especially asymmetrical as between a technologically trained innovator and a non-
technologically trained manager.  According to Williamson,  
selective integration, whereby integration realizes adaptive gains but experiences no losses, is not 
feasible. Instead, the transfer of  a transaction out of  the market into the firm is regularly attended by 
an impairment of  incentives, and this type of  difficulty will tend to be particularly severe where 
innovations are important.105
Models of  both the private and academic sectors show the impairment of  incentives to innovate within a 
firm.106  Relational contracting like that among individuals within a hierarchy is just one typical form of  
incomplete contracting for which there are well studied strategies to mitigate agency costs.107  Yet, the 
general uncertainty of  allocating credit for innovation within a hierarchy combined with the problem of  
potential expropriation by control groups of  the reward associated with innovation operate 
synergistically to particularly impair incentives for innovation within a hierarchy.108   
In sum, the while firms provide coordination among those within their hierarchy, they do so 
using the strong form of  control associated with hierarchy.  In contrast, property rights can facilitate 
coordination with a much weaker form of  control simply by serving as a beacon around which diverse 
and complementary users of  an asset can gather.  In addition, while the contracts over property rights of  
course trigger problems of  agency costs, asset specificity, and opportunism, like all contracts, the degree 
to which an individual must get mired in these problems when dealing only with a property right can be 
significantly less than when having to be brought within the hierarchy of  a firm.   
One impact of  these tradeoffs is that when property rights are not available, those activities that 
would be a better match for the set of  attributes associated with property rights either will occur less 
often or occur using the remaining alternative modes of  private ordering – open market, norm 
communities, or firms.  Indeed, recent work by Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky exploring the 
case of  the coordination needed to facilitate an invention’s commercialization, concludes that absent IP 
rights, there will be either an inefficiently high level of  integration, or not enough invention 
commercialization.109  The availability of  patents facilitates the business model under which one 
individual can do research, another development, and another management.  Separating these jobs out 
facilitates divisions of  labor that are efficient.  This leads to improved commercialization, which in turn 
generates access.  It also allows for the option of  the commercialization to be done outside of  the large 
firm setting, which increases competition.    
 
105  WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 161. (included in the problems he 
identifies is the decrease incentive to innovate because of  sharing with other divisions within the new merged firm).   
106  See, Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305 (1989) (modeling agency costs in 
innovation and identifying attributes that make it comparatively more difficult as a production activity in which to solve 
ordinary principal/agent problems compared to ordinary production processes because of  greater ex ante uncertainty, and 
asymmetric information about the innovator’s efforts).  See also, Wallace Huffman & Richard E. Just, Setting Incentives for 
Agricultural Research: Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, 82 AM. J. AG. ECON. 828 (2000) (applying principal agent theory to model 
different funding approaches for basic scientific research in the field of  agriculture).   
107  Williamson notes the general importance of  repeat play, reputation effects, and other private enforcement techniques 
he collectively calls “private ordering” as tools for mitigating problems such as agency costs and asset specificity.  See, e.g., 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 163-68).   
108  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 336-37 (highlighting Williamson’s discussion of  the problems of  “causal 
ambiguity” and “general office instruction” (expropriation) leading to impaired incentives to innovate and citing WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, supra note 80, at 141-42)).   
109  See Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 11.   
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3. Government  
There are various ways in which government can facilitate coordination.  For example, an 
executive branch agency can achieve the coordinated effort entirely on its own by serving as a type of  
hierarchy, just like a firm, but where the agenda is set through the political market rather than through 
the market for corporate control.  As a second example, the legislative branch can provide additional 
entitlements or change the existing regimes governing entitlements in ways that shift the landscape more 
towards either property rules or liability rules.  As a third example, an executive branch agency, such as 
the Department of  Justice Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission, can act to enforce 
antitrust laws in a way that leaves standing the contract and property arrangements of  private parties to 
varying degrees.  As a fourth example, the judicial branch can mediate disputes over entitlements in a 
way that ends up treating them more like liability rules or more like property rules.   
Each of  these types of  government action is premised on underlying decisions to act, and the 
study of  these types of  decisions within the government setting is associated with the area of  the 
literature known generally as “public choice,” or “collective choice.”110  As noted by Richard Epstein, 
“modern public choice literature postulates self-interest to all political players, and asks how they 
respond to the incentives created by the rules of  the political game.”111  
Public choice problems begin with the particular difficulties government actors – executives, 
legislators, regulators, and judges – have in determining exactly what the public really wants the 
government to do.  While the focus of  this literature was initially on understanding the behavior of  
legislatures and agencies, the field is recognized now to focus also on courts,112 and the term “public 
choice” is used in this paper in its broad sense, to encompass legislatures, agencies and courts.   
One common view of  the of  government is for it to step in to provide services the market 
would fail to provide efficiently because of  economies of  scale or scope, or because of  collective action 
problems, or positive externalities.113  Some paradigmatic examples of  such services are national defense, 
policing, and dispute resolution.  Others see government as also providing tools for achieving important 
distributive social justice goals.114  Along these lines, for example, work by Amartya Sen elaborates 
 
110  For an excellent review of  the field see, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); Dennis C. 
Mueller, PUBLIC CHOICE II 232 (1989); Maxwell L. Stearns, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (1997); Mark Kelman, On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of  the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); 
Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of  Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the 
Normative Elements of  the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988); Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Misguided Renaissance of  Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).    
111  Richard A. Epstein, The Perils of  Posnerian Pragmatism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 652 (2004).   
112  See, e.g., McNollgast, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW: DECISION-MAKING BY JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 109-125 (Working paper, August, 2005) in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., Elsevier Science)(forthcoming) (reviewing field and collecting sources).   
by McNollgast 
113  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) (setting forth classical libertarian exposition of  
the role of  the minimalist state as “limited to the functions of  protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and 
to the enforcement of  contracts”). For later refinement of  the issue see ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-87 (1989) 
(“The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate ....”).  See also, MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25-32 (1962) (emphasizing that the role of  the government can be justified not as a tool for 
protecting rights in and of  themselves but as a tool for protecting rights as a method for solving collective action problems).   
114  See generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (elaborating a view that justifies a more expansive role of  
government to protect the disadvantaged).  To be sure, there are many important views on distributive and redistributive justice 
that are beyond the scope of  this article.  Some of  these relate rather closely to NIE.  For example, one take on the views of  
government by some including those in the critical legal studies movement is that it inevitably has redistributive qualities to it 
and because those have been controlled by subordinating groups to the detriment of  subordinated groups they have inevitably 
redistributed from the subordinated to the subordinating.  For a recent take on anti-subordination see Christoper A. Bracey, 
Adjudication, Antisubordination, and the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853 (2003) (exploring the antisubordination principle and 
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methods for aggregating values across different individuals and offers important hope for improving 
welfare distributions through social choice.115   
But regardless of  what goal government is trying to achieve, like the market, it has both 
strengths and weaknesses.  And just like for markets, each of  the problems explored in the sections 
above can be, and often is, viewed as a type of  government failure.  For example, just as the transaction 
costs of  the market include the costs of  bargaining over property rights and striking and enforcing 
contracts, as well as the costs of  professional lawyers and accountants to help with these processes, the 
transaction costs of  the political process include the costs of  striking and enforcing political deals, as 
well as the costs of  professional lobbyists, and political parties to help with these processes.116  In 
addition, it often is overlooked that the transaction costs of  government also include administrative 
costs, or the costs of  administering particular government processes.117  As another example, while 
behavioralism problems can plague those negotiating over property rights and contracts, they also can 
plague legislators, administrators, and judges.118  As a third example, just like the market, government 
must bear the costs of  obtaining and processing the information needed to make decisions and the 
agency costs of  ensuring its decisions are carried out.119   
But the information and transaction cost problems facing individuals in government may be 
even greater than those facing individuals in the market.120  As North points out, referring to one type 
of  information costs – the information needed to engage in exchanges – the intuition behind this lesson 
is that in government it is “extraordinarily difficult to measure what is being exchanged – promises for 
votes.” 121  Government also faces a problem in obtaining the information needed to make a decision in 
the first instance.  As Haddock points out, “[o]ne crippling bureaucratic disadvantage is that many 
external costs and benefits are subjective and thus knowable only to the demander or supplier, while [for 
government] the links from production to consumption skirt formal markets where objective proxies 
might be observed.”122  Although the government can simply ask individuals what they want and feel in 
 
collecting sources).  See also Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of  the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919 (1997) (elucidating 
tax policy implications of  various theories of  government and pointing out that any theory of  government must provide for its 
funding).  The NIE literature’s take on these perspectives is to elucidate the problems of  rent seeking and collective choice.   
115  See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).  See also, Press Release: The Sveriges 
Riksbank (Bank of  Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel for 1998, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1998/press.html. 
116  See generally, FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 47-49 (summarizing political transaction costs) (citing MANCUR 
OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 46 (1965).   
117  These costs include the costs of  obtaining the information needed to carry out these processes, the costs of  
behavioralism by those charged with carrying out these processes, as well as the transactions that occur when they are 
attempted to be carried out.  In addition, just as transaction costs of  the market include the costs of  transactions that are 
efficient but that fail, the transaction costs of  government administration include the costs of  failed processes that should have 
been successful.   
118  F. Scott Kieff, Contrived Conflicts: The Supreme Court vs. The Basics of  Intellectual Property Law, 30 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1717, 1730 (2004) (pointing out in the context of  IP that government actors also experience behavioralism problems 
most often discussed in the context of  market actors and that in addition they experience the public choice problems discussed 
in this Part, and citing Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 461-2 (2003) (same, but in the context of  securities law, and collecting sources)).   
119  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 47.   
120  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 22 (“transaction costs associated with political markets are high, and for this 
reason institutional inefficiency tends to persist”) (citing NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 86, at 52).   
121  Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 18 (1993).  See 
also, NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 86 at 51 (“[efficient] 
markets are scarce enough in the economic world and even scarcer in the political world.”). 
122  DAVID D. HADDOCK, IRRELEVANT INTERNALITIES, IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES, AND IRRELEVANT ANXIETIES, 
Northwestern University School of  Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 03-16, at 9-10 (2003) 
KIEFF COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
the hope they will reveal such subjective information accurately, as Haddock notes: “survey respondents 
do not put their money where their mouths are, and often return either zero or unrealistically high 
valuations with little variation across a wide range of  amenities, in addition to cross-amenity comparisons 
that are inconsistent, intransitive, or sensitive to query order and wording.”123    
Two initial problems involve the general difficulties in assessing the information content of  
votes due to their limited ability to fully reflect intensity of  preferences, and relative preferences.    
Concerning intensity of  preferences, while in a market the mechanism of  price provides a finely grained 
medium for expressing intensity of  preferences, votes in a political system do not convey similarly fine-
tuned expressions of  intensity of  preferences.  In the U.S., for example, when an individual casts a vote 
in a national election, the individual is only able to elect for each ballot item whether to cast a single vote, 
or not.  The individual cannot cast a smaller or larger vote.  Indeed, this is why the technique of  
cumulative voting is offered as alternative voting system mitigating this effect.124  Concerning relative 
preferences, while in the market the fungibility of  money and many other resources allows them 
potentially to be spent on various competing uses, votes within the political system can only be spent on 
the few items on the ballot at any given time and indeed efforts to make them more fungible by, for 
example, offering them for sale, are strongly discouraged.125  The increased fungibility of  price over 
voting helps price develop greater information about a wider range of  relative preferences.126
Even when it might be known, or surmised, what the pubic in general would like, the public 
choice literature has elucidated at least two additional problems facing the processing of  voter input – 
interest group politics127 and agency capture. 128  Where minorities cares a great deal about an issue but 
the majority cares little, George Stigler pointed out that such “small minorities achieve their effectiveness 
primarily because it is uneconomic for the majority to oppose them.”129 When this effect is consistently 
targeted to one particular part of  the government, it has the effect of  leaving that part captured by that 
interest group.   
 
(available on-line at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=437221) (citing Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of  Knowledge in Society, 35 
AM. ECON. REV. 529 (1945)). 
123  Id. at 10, (citing Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000)) 
124   LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 14-
15 (1994) (describing cumulative voting).   
125  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of  Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 671 (1997) (comparing votes 
markets to price markets).   
126  Of  course, also price is not a perfect vehicle for information.  For example, one shortcoming of  price is that 
marginal consumers can have a disproportionate impact on decision making, and Michael Spence has shown that on issues like 
quality, the preferences of  those within the margin may be ignored.  See A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 
BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975) (noting benefits of  rate of  return regulation to concerns about of  quality).   
127  For more on interest group politics see Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Deadweight Costs, in THE 
ESSENCE OF BECKER, supra note 43, at 544 (presenting model of  competition among interest groups and showing that “an 
increase in the deadweight cost of  taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers, while an increase in the deadweight costs of  
subsidies discourages pressure by recipients”).   
128  For more on agency capture see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1050-52 (1997).   
129  George J. Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 117, 125 in THE ESSENCE OF STIGLER (Kurt R. Leube 
and Thomas Gale Moore, eds. 1986) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of  Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGM’T. SCI. 3 
(1971)); Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of  Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel for 
1982, available on line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1982/press.html.  See also, David B. Spence & Frank 
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 105 n.37 (2000) (collecting sources and describing two 
variants of  capture: one they attribute to the formation of  “subgovernments” along the lines outlined by Stigler and another 
that is slightly different in which the general public is seen to lose “interest in agency policymaking, leaving only regulated 
interest groups to participate in the process”).  
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But this problem is exacerbated by the rent dissipation it triggers in those seeking such 
government benefits.  Indeed, this link between what is essentially lobbying and rent dissipation was first 
elaborated in work by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.130  The basic concept is that the 
“competition for government favors … involves a wastage of  resources in (unproductive) lobbying 
activities, bribes, legal fees, and so on.”131
The problem is then further worsened when the government actors themselves realize they, too, 
can benefit from the process.  As explored in work by both Fred McChesney and Hernando de Soto, 
where the beneficiaries include the government actors themselves, who might for example, enjoy 
enhanced political contributions or political power (depending in part on whether they are elected or 
appointed), the problem can also be seen as one form of  the principal agent problem in which the 
official is the agent of  the public and is pursing its own goals instead of  those of  the public.132  Under 
this view, “the problem then, is how principals in the form of  … taxpayers can protect themselves 
against opportunistic behavior on the part of  their agents (the policy authorities).133   
This problem is worsened when government actors compete to extract this benefit, giving rise to 
what is called the tollbooth problem in work by Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-
Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.134  The tollbooth problem is itself  worsened by a mission creep problem as 
other actors in the government are drawn to shift towards the operating tollbooths and to erect their 
own in addition.  That is, even when those within an agency experience periods of  underuse, there will 
be a tendency for the agency to take on additional missions in the same area as the successful 
tollbooths.135  Recent empirical study of  entry regulation in 85 countries including the United States by 
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer confirms both the 
extent and nature of  the capture problem and tollbooth problems.  In concluding their report of  the 
data showing decreased public benefits and competition and increased corruption, they note that “[t]his 
evidence is difficult to reconcile with public interest theories of  regulation but supports the public choice 
approach, especially the tollbooth theory that emphasizes rent extraction by politicians.”136  Such rent 
extraction implicates both the cost of  rent-seeking caused by the option of  a particular legal result,137 as 
well as any improper restrictions on freedom of  contract and exchange imposed by such a law.138     
At bottom, the public choice literature shows a set of  parameters that limit the ability for 
government to achieve the goals of  the governed:  the information content of  votes compared to price, 
 
130  See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); TOWARDS A THEORY OF A 
RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1980); See also, Press Release: The 
Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of  Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel for 1986, available on line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/press.html.   
131  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 479.   
132  See, Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of  Regulation,” 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 101 
(1987) (elucidating that politicians and bureaucrats use legislation, regulation, and their threat both to create rents and to extract 
them through campaign contributions, votes, political favors, or even bribes).  See also, FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR 
NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (same, and collecting sources); HERNANDO 
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1990) (same).   
133  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 23.   
134  Simeon Djankov, et al., The Regulation of  Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 3 (2002 (empirical data showing existence and 
extent of  the problem).   
135  Milton Friedman, Why Government is the Problem, Hoover Institution Essays on Public Policy (1993), 9 (“If  the initial 
reason for undertaking the activity disappears, [that part of  the government has] a strong incentive to find another justification 
for its continued existence”).  
136  Djankov, et al., supra note 134, at 35.   
137  James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF A RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY, 359-67 (1980) (exploring rent seeking effects). 
138  JAMES D. GWARTNEY, ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995 (1995) (comparative study of  the 
effects of  reduced economic freedom).   
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the general dominance of  narrow interest groups compared to the broad public, the ways in which that 
affect gets particularly targeted to certain parts of  the government leaving them captured, the way 
groups will dissipate rents associated with capture when competing to achieve, and the way different 
parts of  the government will erect toolbooths in an effort to be captured.  These effects are seen within 
the context of  legislatures and agencies through models of  these actors being able to extract some very 
tangible benefit, such as votes and money.  But these same effects also impact judges.  Even judges with 
lifetime tenure act strategically within some institutional constraints – including formal affirmances and 
reversals, critiques by academia, the bar, and the media, and informal social pressure at all levels, etc. – 
and they do so in response to their own individualized preferences for procedural and substantive 
policies, for prestige, for fame, to stand out or to fit in, etc.  The objects of  these preferences in the 
judicial setting still drive actual behavior, even through they are less tangible than the votes and money 
that are emblematic of  the legislative and agency models.  For all of  these reasons, the greater discretion 
that is given to judicial actors, which leaves them greater room to act, the greater will be the opportunity 
for them to exhibit these public choice problems.   These problems, in turn, leave the government most 
exposed to being co-opted by large, entrenched interests to the detriment of  market entrants, and to the 
detriment of  the increased commercialization and resulting access these new business models would 
have generated.     
4. Overview of  Coordinating Options  
Property rights backed up by property rules can be seen as offering a type of  middle ground 
among several other alternative institutional and organizational arrangements for facilitating 
coordination: atomized individuals in the free market without property rights, norm communities like 
open source projects, firms, and government.  Each has its own costs and benefits, which are 
summarized for convenience in Table 1 of  the Appendix.  The option of  having something that brings 
the unique mix of  attributes associated with property is not only helpful, generally, it is particularly 
helpful for market entrants than because the other options are each less accessible to outsiders.  Relying 
exclusively on these other options to the exclusion of  property rights in IP, therefore, should be expected 
to shift towards an increase in anticompetitive effect and a decrease in overall downstream access to the 
subject matter that IP rights protect.   
C. Mitigating the Problems of  Property Rights  
The above discussions explored the benefits of  property.  Coordination was explored as a goal 
that property rights can achieve.  So, too, were the ways in which property rights can achieve this goal 
differently than alternatives.  Like all things, through, property has both benefits and costs.  The 
discussions that follow unpack some of  the leading criticisms of  property rights that have been offered 
in the NIE literature, along with some of  the tools that have emerged for mitigating these problems.  
The discussions also show how these tools actually are being put to use in present IP regimes.   
1. Rent Dissipation 
One of  the first problems that arises when property rights are made available to individuals 
within a community – or indeed when any government benefit is made available – is the problem of  rent 
dissipation.  Rent can be thought of  as the benefit that is gained by engaging in a certain activity.  Private 
rents are those accruing to the individual.  Public rents are those accruing to society as a whole.  Private 
and public rents may be different.  The potential differences in both magnitude and sign between public 
and private rents my cause private incentives to engage in a given rent-generating activity to be either too 
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little or too big than would be socially optimal.  Where the availability of  private rents provides 
incentives for an individual to engage in efforts designed to gain those private rents that are too strong, 
the resulting efforts may turn out ultimately to dissipate the social rents.139  This is the problem of  rent 
dissipation.   
Rent dissipation itself  can take at least two forms.  One type of  rent dissipation involves over 
investment in the race to obtain the rent.  Another type of  rent dissipation involves investment in 
alternative but socially undesirable techniques to win that race.  One way to conceptualize the over 
investment type of  rent dissipation is in the context of  a race towards a common prize.  If  the 
community is characterized by a prize having a known value and an uncoordinated group of  individuals 
who are each seeking the prize, then each individual rationally might elect to spend up to just less than the 
value of  the prize to get it, which would mean that as a group they are spending more in aggregate than 
the value of  the prize.140  In the context of  innovation, the effect has been demonstrated by economic 
models of  multiple firms seeking the same invention in a race to patent, which show that investment 
overall may be too great.141   
One way to conceptualize the improper alternative investment type of  rent dissipation is also in 
the context of  a race towards a common prize, but this time where some types of  racing are viewed by 
society as good and others are viewed as bad.  In the context of  sports, for example, the use of  practice 
sessions is often viewed as good while the use of  performance-enhancing drugs is often viewed as bad.  
In the context of  regulated markets, the use of  innovation is generally considered to be a good form of  
 
139  It also may be possible for the private rents to be too small compared to the social rents.  For example, what an 
inventor gets for herself  often is less than what her invention generates for society.  See STEVEN SHAVELL AND TANGUY VAN 
YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (National Bureau of  Econ. Research Working Paper No. 
6956, 1999) (suggesting a system of  government-sponsored cash rewards instead of  or in addition to a system of  patents as a 
tool for improving the match between the private and public rents associated with an invention).  The rent the invention 
generates for society takes into account a wide range of  benefits.  The rent something like a patent generates for society 
properly accounts for a narrower range of  benefits tied to the contribution that patent made towards bringing the underlying 
invention to society more broadly or earlier than what would have occurred absent the patent.  As another example, an 
inventor may develop something only slightly better than available options in a way that turns out to cause waste overall.  A.K. 
Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1977) (showing how it 
may be profitable for the one firm to come to market to get the customers but yet total industry profits can decline by more 
than consumer welfare increases).  Recent work by Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley has explored the way both of  these 
examples also can be thought of  as the problem of  externalities, or what they call “spillovers.”  Brett M. Frischmann & Mark 
A. Lemley, Spillovers (working paper, 2005).   
140  If  the value of  the prize is X and the group of  individuals is Y in number then each individual might rationally elect 
to spend up to just less than X to obtain the prize, say some amount equal to X minus a small discount, say ƥ or (X-ƥ).  Yet, if  
all individuals spend that amount, then the community has spent the amount equal to [(X-ƥ) x Y] to obtain something worth 
only X.  The rub is that the expression [(X-ƥ) x Y] will be greater than X itself  as long as X and Y are positive numbers greater 
than one and ƥ is a positive number less than one.  Put simply, the amount spent in that community as a whole to obtain the 
prize is greater than the amount the community as a whole got by obtaining the prize, which would be a waste of  resources.  
Of  course, there are a number of  reasons to think that even an uncoordinated set of  individuals might also chose to compete 
for the common prize in a way that avoids or mitigates the extent of  rent dissipation or even fails to achieve the common 
prize.  If  each individual knows of  the others, then each individual may discount the expected value of  the prize to reflect the 
chance that one of  the others will win.  Facing such a decreased prize after adjusting for risk each individual may spend less.  
This may lead to a decrease in aggregate spending that in turn leads either to mitigation of  the amount wasted or perhaps even 
failure to achieve the common prize.  Alternatively, the uncertainty each individual has in this low, risk-adjusted payoff  may not 
cause individuals to sufficiently decrease spending to mitigate overall rent dissipation effect.  The large profits state-run 
lotteries earn from individuals paying far more than risk-adjusted payouts would advise is evidence of  this type of  rent 
dissipation behavior in practice despite obviously low risk-adjusted payouts.  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions supra note 14 at 
711, n.68.   
141  See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of  Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968) (showing how overinvestment 
can lead to invention occurring too early); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395 (1979) (model 
showing overinvestment under appropriate conditions); P. Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of  
Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980) (same). 
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competition (making better products or services) while the use of  agency capture is generally considered 
to be a bad form of  competition (getting the government to differentially regulate a competitor).  This 
type of  rent dissipation was discussed earlier within the context of  public choice problems.142   
Importantly, the NIE literature does suggest ways that rent dissipation can be mitigated.  
Anderson & Hill have shown that rent dissipation problems associated with the creation of  property 
rights can be mitigated if  the potential owners of  the rights are able to tailor them at the time of  
creation.143   The intuition underlying this result is that this approach allows the owners to shape the 
right based on the best information available at the time about its value, including the different 
parameters that will impact the value in different ways – for example, its precise contours.  The greater 
the wedge between the definition of  the right and its actual creation, the greater the chance there will be 
a mismatch against actual needs.  Anderson & Hill point out that the two central public choice problems 
will both contribute to the size of  this wedge.  A simple “land-grab” approach will lead to 
overinvestment in racing to grab and over-grabbing of  actual parcels, simply because the opportunity to 
claim later will be forgone.144  In this regard, nobody is able to claim the residual that would be left 
behind by waiting until an actual need were developed – there is no “residual claimant.”145  In addition, 
once government actors see the private interest in obtaining the rights, the bureaucracy will have an 
incentive to withhold the rights unless they determine a particular claimant is “worthy,” which will in 
turn provide a convenient excuse for the bureaucracy to amass the resources it claims are needed to 
judge “worthiness.”146   
At bottom, the more the regime allows those who ultimately hold the rights to craft the rights at 
the time of  creations, other things being equal, the more likely rent dissipation effects will be mitigated.  
Even a quick comparison of  different IP regimes reveals a stark difference in this regard.  For example, 
patent applicants shape their own property rights through the drafting of  the claim.147  Similarly, the 
 
142  See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text.   
143  See Terry Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 441, 447 (1983).   
144  Id. at 442. 
145  Anderson & Hill attribute the term “residual claimant” to the work by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz on the 
theory of  the firm.  Id., at 439 (citing Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)).   
146  Anderson & Hill, supra note 143, at 443.   
147  Indeed, because patentees are the ones who are lowest cost processors of  the information needed to assess validity 
information costs are mitigated when property the owners themselves are given such strong incentives to make these 
determinations, and recent empirical models suggest these incentives do work.  See AMALIA YIANNAKA & MURRAY FULTON, 
PRIVATELY OPTIMAL PATENT BREADTH UNDER THE THREAT OF PATENT VALIDITY CHALLENGES, presented to the 8th 
International Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Research (ICABR): International Trade and Domestic Production, 
held in Ravello (Italy), July 8-11, 2004 (available on-line at 
http://www.economia.uniroma2.it/conferenze/icabr2004/papers/Yiannaka.A.pdf) (showing how patentees integrate concerns 
about validity challenges into their own decision-making ex ante).  At the same time, the rules for patentability over the prior art 
protect third parties’ reasonable investment backed expectations by preventing valid patents from issuing where there have 
been any verifiably prior investments.  See Kieff  Registering Patents supra note 14, at 76-99.  Importantly, these patentability rules 
are all enforced with rules biased in such a way that they involve remarkably low administrative, public choice, and both Type I 
and Type II error costs.  See, F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex Technological Questions of  
Patentability over the Prior Art, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003). 
In addition, the disclosure rules of  patent validity may also help protect third parties’ reasonable investment backed 
expectations by helping these third parties to avoid inadvertent trespass.  Id. at 99-105.  But it is not clear that these rules are 
working as well as they could be for at least two important reasons.  First, the uncertainty governing the process of  patent 
claim construction may be frustrating the patent system’s important ex ante incentives for private ordering by both patentees 
and infringers.  For an excellent collection of  recent empirical work on claim construction by R. Polk Wagner, see 
www.claimconstruction.com.  Importantly, the uncertainty here is not the individualized uncertainty associated with what some 
see as high reversal rates on appeal but rather the lack of  coherence, or predictability, that the entire body of  claim 
construction law seems to be generating.  Ironically, the empirical work by Wagner suggests that although the body of  legal 
rubrics that are available for claim construction may not yield predictability, simply knowing the identities of  the members of  
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contours of  the rights staked out by trademarks are largely set by the rights-holders themselves through 
actual use.148  In contrast, the contours of  a copyright are set as immutable rules (not even default rules) 
through the central regime rather than by the individual claimants.   
Two general conclusions are suggested.  First, the rent dissipation effect would be expected to be 
greater in this regard for copyright than for patent and trademark because of  the difference in the way 
the rights are staked out.  Second, this effect is something that cuts against changing any of  the regimes 
– patent, trademark, or copyright – in a way that would have the effect of  fixing the contours of  the 
rights where they otherwise could be staked out by claimants at the time of  creation.   
2. Transaction Costs 
Property rights, just like any other type of  entitlement, raise the problem of  transaction costs, 
because to work well they must be able to be sold and licensed to those who value them most at any 
given time.  The term “transaction costs” plays a central role in the literature on property rights in 
general and IP in particular; but it is a term that often is misunderstood.  Transaction costs are 
particularly important to the field of  NIE because “transaction-costs economics is the original 
centerpiece of  what Williamson … called the New Institutional Economics.”149  There has since been 
substantial empirical support for the validity of  the transaction costs implications of  NIE, as studied by 
Paul Joskow and others.150
 
the appellate panel at the Federal Circuit may yield at least case specific predictability at the time of  oral argument.  Second, the 
increasing reliance in infringement cases on the doctrine of  equivalents is similarly frustrating the patent system’s important ex 
ante incentives for private ordering by both patentees and infringers.  The point here is that patentees may be able to gain more 
flexibility in claim scope while at the same time providing more certainty to infringers by relying on the established disclosure 
rules of  Section 112 than on the doctrine of  equivalents.  See Kieff  supra note 118, at 1726-27 (discussing Warner-Jenkinson 
Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 1153, 117 S.Ct. 1352 (1997) (holding that patent claims that are not infringed 
literally may still be infringed under the judge-made rule called the “doctrine of  equivalents” to allow patentees flexibility) and 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002) (holding that the doctrine of  
equivalents is cabined by the judge-made rule called “prosecution history estoppel” to allow third parties more certainty in 
knowing what will infringe a patent)). 
148  And as with patents the rules on validity for trademarks help protect third party investments to at least some extent 
through the limited scope of  trademark rights in the first instance by, for example, the doctrine that prevents trademark rights 
from covering functional elements.  See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, 
J.) (reviewing functionality doctrine and collecting sources).  In addition, ex ante investments by third parties are protected 
through rule giving a cause of  action to a prior user of  a mark that is made famous by a subsequent user. See, e.g., Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (protecting small prior user’s mark using theory 
sometimes called “reverse confusion” because the public is lead to confuse the first-user’s mark with the more famous second-
user’s mark and think that the first is the second rather than the more typical confusion case in which a second user’s mark is 
confused with that of  a first user).  In some cases, both users may be allowed to operate in different markets.  See, e.g., Burger 
King of  Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.1968) (holding that the national chain Burger King is allowed exclusive 
use the mark throughout the nation except in the town of  Matoon, IL, where a prior user in that particular location is allowed 
to continue exclusive use).  The rules for enforcing and determining validity of  trademarks facilitate ex ante private ordering 
because, as with patents, they turn on facts equally knowable to all market actors in advance.  Key evidence on trademark 
validity typically takes the form of  survey data from ordinary customers. 
149  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 176 citing Williamson supra note 9, at 1.  For more on transaction costs 
generally, see, Douglas W. Allen, What are transaction costs?, 14 Res. L. & Econ. 1 (1991); Douglas W. Allen, TRANSACTION COSTS 
in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., Edward Elgar 2000).   
150  See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of  Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG., 33 (1983); Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of  Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG., 95 (1988).  See also Howard A. Shelanski and Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A 
Review and Assessment, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG., 335 (1995) (survey of  empirical evidence on transaction-costs economics assessing 
roughly 100 references on empirical research in transaction-cost economics published before 1993).   
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The term “transaction cost” generally refers to all the costs associated with contracting among 
individuals, including the hassle those parties experience in finding and dealing with each other, the costs 
of  lawyers and other professionals to arrange the deals, and the bargaining process itself.151  Transaction 
costs also can be thought of  as including information costs because information must be gathered and 
processed before those individuals decide to interact with each other.152  The term encompasses the 
costs of  successful transactions – such as time and money – as well as the costs of  failed transactions – 
such as lost opportunities – to the extent those failed transactions are good things that would have 
occurred but for the costs of  transacting.   
The comparative analysis of  NIE reminds us that there is both a good and bad side to 
transactions and that as a result the costs of  transactions may be worth bearing.  For example, while on 
the bad side, transactions impose costs, on the good side, they are associated with the very specialization 
and division of  labor that generally are thought to be good things.153  That is, the availability of  
transactions to obtain from others the goods and services beyond those an individual is most interested 
in or most adept at providing, itself  facilitates each individual’s ability both to have and to hone those 
specialized skills and tastes, as well as to bear individualized distributions.  The link between 
specialization and transactions allows even large numbers of  individuals to achieve complex tasks by 
coordinating with each other directly or indirectly.  
In addition, given such individualism in the form of  diverse skills and preferences, transactions, 
and thus their concomitant costs, have other important beneficial side effects that often are overlooked.  
First, transactions are associated with the privately beneficial exchanges among individuals that are 
essential for achieving private gains from trade.154  Second, transactions are associated with the publicly 
beneficial socialization that occurs as individuals come to interact with each other.155  This socialization 
effect occurs because for transactions to achieve gains from trade it must be the case that individuals 
having diverse resources and preferences learn enough about each other’s resources and preferences to 
exploit them.  This process of  learning about each others’ values is part of  socialization.  Third, the 
bargaining process – for both consummated transactions and for failed ones – inherently elicits 
 
151  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 291.   
152  See, Armen A. Alchian, Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment, 7 W. ECON. J. 109 (1969).  See also, George J. 
Stigler, The Economics of  Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961) (noting that acquiring and processing information about 
potential exchange opportunities are costly).   
153  John J. Wallis & Douglass C. North, Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870 –1970, in LONG-
TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 95 (Stanley L Engerman & Robert E. Gallmann, eds.) (Studies in Income 
and Wealth, No. 51, 1986).  The connection between division of  labor and transaction costs, including the inevitable limit that 
transaction costs places on the extent of  the division of  labor, was articulated earlier by Adam Smith.  See Harold Demsetz, The 
Cost of  Transacting, 82 Q. J. ECON. 33, 35 (1968) (empirical evidence of  transaction costs in the market of  the New York Stock 
Exchange and quoting Adam Smith: “As it is the power of  exchanging that gives occasion to the division of  labor, so the 
extent of  this division must always be limited by the extent of  that power, or, in other words, by the extent of  the market.”).   
154  See, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 184 (1991) (pointing out that 
societies tend to develop institutions – such as norms in the case he is studying – that “minimize the members’ objective sum 
of  (1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight losses arising from failures to exploit potential gains from trade.”).  See also, Coase 
The Problem of  Social Cost, supra note 31, at 10.  (noting that the principal condition that must be satisfied for individuals to 
maximize wealth by engaging in an exchange is that the transaction costs of  the exchange must not exceed the gains from 
trade.); Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
111 113 (1998) (“[H]umans interact to capture potential gains from trade – the knowledge for this interaction is bounded by 
transaction costs.  The gains from trade (a positive-sum game) result because people place different values on goods and 
services and because people have different abilities to produce those goods and services.  Because of  these differences, trade 
has the potential to make the parties exchanging goods and services – of  lower value to each respectively – better off.”) 
155  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Value Judgments in Economics, in THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 3, 3-8 (Kurt R. Leube, ed., 
1987) (discussing the “role of  the market as a device for the voluntary cooperation of  many individuals in the establishing of  
common values” and concluding that “[i]n many ways, this is the basic role of  the free market in both goods and ideas – to 
enable mankind to cooperate in this process of  searching for and developing values.”).   
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important information about not only the particular transaction being negotiated, including intensity of  
preferences and budget constraints, but also relative values compared to other available transactions.  
That is, transactions can mitigate information costs.   
It would be great if  transactions could achieve their benefits without their costs.  It also would 
make sense to strive both to increase their benefits and decrease their costs.  But to the extent efforts to 
eliminate the transaction costs associated with direct exchanges between individuals in the market are by 
replacing them with court or agency mandated exchanges – such as by replacing property rules with 
liability rules – they will decrease some of  the benefits of  having those transactions occur directly 
between individuals.  For example, the availability of  court or agency mandated exchange may decrease 
the incentives, opportunities, and abilities for individuals to directly interact with each other.   
What is more, reliance on court or agency mandated exchanges triggers its own set of  costs.  
These costs include the transaction costs and public choice costs associated with these organizations, as 
well as their comparatively increased costs of  obtaining and processing certain types of  information.  
Also included is the general tendency of  such government actors to err on the side of  setting price too 
low, and the potential negative impact they can have on ex ante incentives and private ordering by 
injecting general uncertainty and overall instability with respect to non-price terms.     
Indeed, just as transactions themselves can have positive and negative effects, so too can those 
employed to facilitate transactions, such as lawyers and other professionals.  On the one hand, these 
professionals often are portrayed as a large component of  the negative side of  transaction costs.156  On 
the other hand, because they help the transactions occur,157 they also can be seen as part of  the positive 
side of  transactions to the extent that the transactions are a good thing.  Therefore, a decision to replace 
lawyer mediated transactions with court or agency mediated transactions would require a comparison of  
the net costs associated with each.  But because both are likely to require professional expenses (some 
mix of  lawyers and lobbyists) at roughly comparable levels, it is difficult to imagine a savings of  this cost 
associated with a shift towards government-mediated transactions.   
What is more, the likelihood and extent of  the pernicious impact of  most transaction costs is 
recognized to be, all-in, generally worse in political markets than in economic markets.158  The intuition 
behind this view is that for political markets, the assets being traded – such as promises to vote a certain 
way for example – are both harder to evaluate and harder to enforce in that they are less certain at the 
time of  negotiation, less predictable, less fungible, less dividable, and less bundle-able.159   
 
156  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 62-63 
(1982) (“Let me start with two important elements of  transaction costs in the acquisition setting: information costs necessary 
to identify the opportunity; and mechanical costs – for example, lawyers’, accountants’, and investment bankers’ fees –
necessary to effect the transaction and cope with regulatory or other barriers (including defensive tactics by the target).”). 
157  See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the 
Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1110-12 (exploring Gilson’s analytical framework of  the lawyer as transaction cost 
engineer and citing Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) 
(describing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of  Corporate Law, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1923 (1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers “savvy investors and issuers” also help facilitate 
transactions); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of  Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of  
Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 58 (2000) (also using term “transaction cost engineers” for lawyers)).  See also, Lisa 
Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Costs Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 241 (1995) (further exploring Gilson’s 
analytical framework of  the lawyer as transaction cost engineer and, in addition to Gilson, also citing Lawrence M. Friedman et 
al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 562 (1989) (“[t]he Silicon Valley lawyer 
not only works with engineers, he thinks of  himself  as a kind of  engineer -- a legal engineer ... his job is to solve problems, to 
take a principle, a task and engineer it legally”)).  
158  For an in-depth treatment of  the topic see Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of  Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 355 (1991).   
159  Id. See also, North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, supra note 121, at 11, 18 (“Political markets are far more prone 
to inefficiency”).  While North explains why the net effect of  a shift from economic market to political market is expected to 
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An additional impact of  NIE’s comparative analysis is that it reveals why, all-in, the likelihood 
and extent of  the pernicious impact of  many types of  transaction costs generally is worse in what are 
known as thinner markets as compared with thicker markets, where thinner and thicker refer to the 
amount and diversity of  resources and participants, including their diverse evaluative techniques and 
preferences.160  There are two basic intuitions behind this lesson.  The first is that thickness increases the 
chance some individual in the market will find it profitable to arbitrage what otherwise would be a gap in 
information flow by finding and acting on that information, to offer an attractive option for what 
otherwise might be a hold-up problem, etc.  The second is that the increase in bargaining associated with 
a thicker market mitigates information costs.   
There is reason to think that some types of  transaction costs may be worse in markets that are 
thicker, in at least some sense.  For example, the behavioralism logic behind the problem of  groupthink 
suggests that as the group gets bigger the problem gets worse.161  But, to the extent that thicker is taken 
to mean not only bigger but more diverse, then even the problem of  groupthink may also decrease with 
market thickness.   
The transaction costs effects of  patents in the field of  basic biotechnology research are 
instructive.  While there of  course is some pernicious impact of  the transaction costs associated with a 
state of  affairs that includes patents, the degree of  that impact must be compared against the similar 
problems that arise without patents.  Prior work by the present author explores in some depth why the 
addition of  patents to what otherwise was a market characterized only by academic kudos should be 
expected to make the market thicker, not thinner, and thereby decrease overall transaction costs.162   
While it is easy to imagine the difficulty facing a scientist who just wants to gain access to a 
patented technology but does not want to spend the time and money to hire a team of  expensive 
lawyers, the patentees figure this out for themselves.   Remarkably low transaction cost business models 
are devised and implemented.  For example, in the “freezer program” business model that has long been 
in common use, the patent is assigned to a business that arranges for the patented biological material to 
be regularly brought fresh and frozen direct to the scientist’s university department or even lab and then 
by charges the scientist’s research account for those quantities actually used.163  The transaction costs 
that the scientist experiences for such a model are even less than typically associated with buying a can of  
soda from a soda machine.  In contrast with this type of  direct billing, the typical soda machine requires 
the buyer to use coins or low denomination bills – a higher transaction cost that is nonetheless well 
 
be an increase in transaction costs there are of  course some ways in which some aspects of  transaction costs may be lower.  
For example, to the extent political markets are constrained by norms, political markets can to some extent function like small 
norm communities and as explored later in the discussion of  norm communities, enforcing deals in small norm communities 
may be in some ways less expensive and more effective than across an open market.  
160  The so-called efficient market hypothesis (also known as “EMH”) is based on the view that in a perfectly thick 
market, assets will be perfectly priced.  The basic theoretical foundation for the EMH was laid by Paul Samuelson and Benoit 
Mandelbrot.  See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof  That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41, 48 (1965); 
Benoit Mandelbrot, Forecasts of  Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and Martingale Models, 39 J. BUS. 242, 248 (1966).  Empirical 
support was added by Eugene Fama.  See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of  Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 392 (1970).   
161  For more on groupthink see infra note 187, and accompanying text.   
162  See Kieff, supra note 82.    
163  One on-line shopping guide for basic scientists provides this description:   
Vendor Freezer and Cabinet programs offer a freezer or cabinet with a customized inventory of  the 
products you use. Companies may provide a complimentary cabinet, freezer, or refrigerator, stock it, and 
often apply discounts to the host lab. 
www.biocompare.com/freezer.asp (web site advertised as “The Buyer’s Guide for Life Scientists”, which lists the details of  
several companies’ programs and provides links).  See also, www.bio.umass.edu/biology/genomics/freezer.phtml. (advertising 
interdepartmental freezer program at the University of  Massachusetts); www.narf.vcu.edu/abi.html (Virginia Commonwealth 
University).   
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tolerated by society.  Indeed, the freezer programs may provide a host of  additional benefits.  They save 
the scientist from having to spend the time and other resources needed to obtain the material herself.  
They also help the scientific community at large by providing a uniform source of  inputs that decreases 
variability across scientific experiments.   
A related point about transaction costs is that they are borne, at least in part, by both the party 
wanting to buy or license and the party wanting to sell or license – both the infringer and the owner.  
This is important because it helps explains why many property owners elect not to aggressively enforce 
the property rights against certain users by granting broad licenses rather than suing to exclude.164  
Indeed, recent empirical data shows that far from being subject to endless holdups and blockades, in 
both industry and universities, researchers have beaten whatever problems patents in this area might have 
imposed by adopting strategies of  “licensing, inventing around patents, going offshore, the development 
and use of  public databases and research tools, court challenges and simply using the technology without 
a license (i.e., infringement)” to achieve their particular goals.165   
And the law correctly makes sure that property owners can’t avoid their share of  these 
transaction costs.  When property owners are not willing to incur the transaction costs associated with 
policing their own rights, the law exposes them to the risk of  varying degrees of  forfeiture.  For example, 
if  a patentee sits back for too long while letting others infringe, then later actions for infringement may 
be barred by laches.166  And, if  the patentee, instead of  sitting back, actually leads the infringer to 
infringe, then an action for infringement may be barred by equitable estoppel.167  Importantly, however, 
neither laches, nor estoppel fundamentally threatens the IP system because each leaves it within the 
power of  the IP owner to avoid the loss.   
What is more, certain features inherent in the commercial law system impose much higher costs 
on property owners than might at first be apparent.  Put differently, in the real world perfectly strong 
property rule protection for IP is not possible in the context of  the existing system of  commercial law 
for several reasons.  First, as Ayres and Klemperer point out, uncertainty in how the rights will be 
enforced in court functions the same as enforcing those rights with liability rules,168 and largely because 
of  the reward theories themselves there is substantial uncertainty in the rules governing the rules for 
obtaining IP rights,169 transacting over IP rights,170 and enforcing IP rights.171  Second, “the ability for an 
infringer to be kept effectively judgment proof  through corporate and bankruptcy laws may also operate 
as a form of  liability rule gloss on the present property rule regime.”172  Third, “[o]therwise infringing 
 
164  See, id., at 705 (explaining why patentees rationally elect not to enforce aggressively).   
165  J.P Walsh et al., Working through the Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003).  See also, J.P. Walsh et al., View from the 
Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 Science 2002 (2005) (reporting empirical results demonstrating that “access to 
patents on knowledge inputs rarely imposes a significant burden on academic biomedical research.”). 
166  A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed.Cir.1992) (en banc) (discussing laches).   This 
does not mean that the patentee must go after every infringer right away.  The laches effect may be put on hold with respect to 
some infringers where the patentee is kept busy tracking down others and bringing lawsuits against them.  Accuscan v. Xerox 
Corp., 1998 WL 273074 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1998) (presumption of  laches rebutted where patentee delayed filing infringement 
suit in order to avoid the burden of  conducting two simultaneous infringement suits and to attempt to negotiate a license 
agreement with the defendant). 
167  Wang Labs. v. Mitsubishi Elecs., 103 F.3d 1571, 1582 (Fed.Cir. 1997) (discussing equitable estoppel).   
168  See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 5.   
169  See, e.g., Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14 (criticizing impact of  reward theories on rules for obtaining patents).   
170  See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of  Intellectual Property, 73 G.W. LAW REV. 
174 (2004) (criticizing impact of  reward theories on rules for transacting over IP and on antitrust enforcement of  IP-based 
transactions).   
171  See, e.g., Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14 (criticizing impact of  reward theories on rules for enforcing 
patents and elucidating the importance of  property rights protected by property rules for enforcing patents).   
172  F. Scott Kieff, Patents for Environmentalists, 9 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 307, 313 (2002) (Invited symposium piece for 
National Association of  Environmental Law Societies annual meeting entitled “Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future,” 
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uses that are by or for the federal government enjoy sovereign immunity protection that effectively 
results in a compulsory licensing regime.”173  Therefore, total restriction on access under a property rule 
always can be avoided to some extent because at least some liability rule treatment always is available for 
IP.   
3. Behavioralism 
Related to the problem of  transaction costs is the problem of  “behavioralism,” which refers to 
all of  the ways in which human beings are not perfectly rational in making decisions and instead are said 
to be only boundedly rational in that they suffer cognitive biases, framing effects, employ heuristics, 
etc.174  While some scholars, such as Posner, have suggested that decision-making under conditions of  
behavioralism can be thought of  as same thing as perfectly rational decision making in a world of  
positive information costs,175 other scholars, such as Williamson, suggest behavioralism really refers to 
something more complex.176 As explained by Williamson, the problems of  behavioralism include 
situations that simply are impossible to think through,177 the problems of  misconception, like short-
sightedness and incorrectly assessing probabilities, the problems of  being rushed to make decisions,178 
and the limitations of  language.179  According to Williamson, an especially productive way to 
 
held March 15-17, 2002, at Washington University School of  Law) (citing Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 733-
34, n.154).  For more on the interface between IP and bankruptcy see, F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, Toward an 
Understanding of  Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and Corporate Control, 82 WASH U. LAW. Q. 1313 (2004).   
173  Id.  (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994), under which the government provides a limited waiver of  its sovereign immunity 
for acts of  infringement by or for the federal government and instead allows suits against the government in the U.S. Court of  
Federal Claims for a reasonable royalty).  State governments similarly enjoy immunity under the 11th Amendment.  See Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (state immunity from patent infringement 
suits); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (state immunity from 
Lanham Act trademark infringement and unfair competition suits); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(state immunity from copyright infringement suits).  The point here is that anyone interested in achieving liability rule 
treatment for an IP right can achieve that result by prevailing on a government agency to arrange for the infringement.   
174  For an excellent recent review of  the behavioralism literature see, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard 
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (collecting sources).  As noted by Troy Paredes, “Explaining 
and understanding these deviations from perfect rationality make up the core of  [the field known as] behavioral law and 
economics.”  Paredes supra note 118, at 434-444 (collecting sources)  (citing BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sustein 
ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1995); Russell Korobkin, A 
Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutional Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 
(2001); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of  Behavioral Economic Analysis of  Law, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1765 (1998)).  Cf, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) 
(commenting on the behavioralism literature in general and in particular Jolls et al. supra); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The 
Economic Way of  Looking at Behavior, in THE ESSENCE OF BECKER (Ramon Febero & Pedro Schwartz, eds. 1995).  
175  Posner, NIE Meets L&E, supra note 9, at 80.  This view of  behavioralism is consistent with a view that sees 
information costs associated with obtaining and processing information, which traces its routes back to the work of  Herbert 
Simon.  See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of  Rational Choice, Q. J. ECON., at 241 (1955) (“the task is to replace the 
global rationality of  economic man with a kind of  rational behavior that is compatible with the access to information and 
computational capacities that are actually possessed by … man.”).  See also, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of  
Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel for 1978 (available on-line at 
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1978/press.html). 
176  Williamson supra note 9, at 109-110. 
177  Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Theories of  Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND ORGANIZATION, 161 (C.B. McGuire & R. 
Radner, eds., 1972)).   
178  Id. (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 453 (1993) 
(problems of  being rushed to make decisions)). 
179  Id. (citing MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1962)).   
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conceptualize the set of  problems associated with behavioralism is taught by Simon as the “idea of  the 
mind as a scarce resource.”180   
Regardless of  precise etiology, the problems of  behavioralism have a number of  manifestations.  
Decision-making processes reveal strategies that, using the terminology of  Simon, seek to “satisfice” 
rather than “optimize;” or in the more modern parlance, employ “heuristics,” as explored more recently 
in the work by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Paul Slovic.181  Other manifestations include risk 
and loss aversions,182 and various cognitive biases such as primacy and recency,183 framing,184 
anchoring,185 and overoptimism, overconfidence, and egocentricism.186   
Another component of  the behavioralism problem is the problem known as “groupthink.”187  
There are several components to the groupthink problem.  One involves the heuristic individuals use to 
avoid having to re-think problems that they think already have been thought through sufficiently by 
trusted others, thereby creating what Cass Sunstein describes as an “information cascade.”188  
Presumably, the opposite effect is also seen, whereby the heuristic is one of  mistrust, not trust, and so 
the information content takes on the opposite sign.189  A related component, also explored by Sunstein, 
is that individuals may appear to change or even actually change their views and behaviors in response to 
perceived peer pressure.190  What is more, once group think has set in, there may be a lock-in effect, as 
pointed out by Arrow:  
 
180  Id. (citing Herbert Simon, Rationality as Process and Product of  Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV., 1, 12 (1978)).   
181  Paredes supra note 118, at 435-36 (citing Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of  Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 
99, 262-64 (1955); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); JOHN W. 
PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 1-2 (1993); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982)).  See also, Press Release: The Bank of  Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of  Alfred Nobel 2002, available on line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/press.html. 
182  For the basic exploration of  methods for measuring risk aversion see KENNETH J. ARROW ASPECTS OF THE THEORY 
OF RISK-BEARING (1965); John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA, 122 (1964).  
183  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1169-70 (2003) 
(“psychologists have found that when individuals are asked to memorize a long sequence of  words, they are more likely to 
remember the first few words (the “primacy” effect) and the last few words (the “recency” effect) much better than the words 
in the middle of  the list”) (citing EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER & STANLEY E. NYBERG, HUMAN MEMORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RESEARCH AND THEORY 60-71 (1982) (reviewing research on primacy and recency effects in memory)).   
184  For empirical evidence of  framing effects see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOL. 341 (1983) (framing effects observed in decisions involving lotteries and other risky monetary payoffs); Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing Effect of  Decisions and the Psychology of  Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (same).   
185  Rachlinski supra note 183 at 1171 (“When making numeric estimates, individuals will tend to rely heavily on reference 
points and then adjust from these reference points”) (citing Tversky & Kahneman supra note 184 1128-30 (explaining 
anchoring and the related process of  adjustment)).   
186  Rachlinski supra note 183 at 1172 (defining “overoptimism, which consists of  overestimating one’s capabilities; 
overconfidence, which consists of  overestimating one’s ability to predict outcomes; and egocentricism, which consists of  
overstating the role that one has played in events in which one has participated”).  See also Paredes supra note 118, at 481 
(“Some of  the most well-known sources of  these deviations from rationality include loss aversion, framing, the 
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, overoptimism, and overconfidence.”) 
187  See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:  Is CEO Overconfidence the Product of  Corporate Governance?, at 60, n. 
227 (2004) (discussing groupthink in the context of  corporate governance and as a contributing factor to CEO 
overconfidence) (working paper, copy on file with author) (citing IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK (2d ed. 1982) and Marleen 
O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of  Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003)).   
188  See id., at 12 (citing Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 
683-691, 720-23 (1999) (describing the problem as one of  “informational cascades” through which a view cascades through a 
pool of  individuals as each individual adopts the view of  those believed to be better informed); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
CONFORMITY AND DISSENT, U. CHICAGO LAW & ECONOMICS, OLIN WORKING PAPER NO. 164 (available on-line at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=314880)).   
189  While this opposite component of  the effect can be seen to be encompassed by the elucidation from Kuran and 
Sunstien, it is stated here separately to make sure it is not overlooked.   
190  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 188 at 723-725.  See also, Paredes supra note 187, at 13.   
KIEFF COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38 
 
                                                  
[Social and political] agreements are typically harder to change than individual decisions.  When you 
have committed not only yourself  but many others to an enterprise, the difficulty of  changing 
becomes considerable…191   
An additional component of  the groupthink effect is tied to the phenomena of  fashion.  
Sometimes a particular behavior, view, slogan, manner, or appearance is desired in its own right, as an 
affirmative expression of  a discrete fashion preference – a fashion statement.192  And, as evidenced by 
the cyclical nature of  changes over time in width of  men’s neck ties, fashion is fickle and so the fashion 
effect may be either to conform to the groupthink or to deviate from it.  That is, an individual might 
either adopt or eschew groupthink as an affirmative fashion statement.  Sometimes the culture is in 
fashion and sometimes the counter-culture is in fashion.   
The behavioralism literature does add a great deal to our understanding.  But some of  the policy 
prescriptions that might at first blush seem to follow from it may not be so prudent.  Consider, for 
example, switching to liability rule treatment as a strategy for avoiding irrational hold ups.  Several 
countervailing concerns must be addressed.  First, if  the ability to avoid the property rule treatment 
hinged upon the failure of  a deal getting done, then there would be a markedly increased incentive for 
those wanting to obtain use through court-ordered terms to resist striking licensing deals.  A legal test 
that rewards a failure to cooperate would lead to a decrease in cooperation, not an increase.  Second, the 
legislators, administrators, or judges who would be asked to determine when this should take place are 
themselves individuals who also face their own behavioralism limitations.  Third, because they are 
government actors they trigger the public choice concerns discussed earlier.   
4. Monopoly Effects 
Whenever property rights are used they trigger at least to some extent the problem of  monopoly 
effects.  But as with the problem of  transaction costs, the problem of  monopoly effects often is 
misunderstood.  One consensus lesson of  economics, NIE and otherwise, is that markets are not perfect 
and they do fail.  Each of  the problems explored in this paper can be, and often is, viewed as a type of  
“market failure.”193  Nevertheless, applying a theory of  second-best, the mere identification of  market 
failure does not in and of  itself  justify a call for resolution because it is the all-in comparative analysis 
among truly available options that should drive policy.  Put differently:   
Traditional economics ascribes departures of  actual market organizations from the ideal type of  perfect 
markets to monopolistic practices.  The approach of  [NIE], on the other hand, holds that because of  
transaction costs, and thus informational problems, such departures may serve economizing 
purposes.194   
 
191  KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, (1974) at 128.   
192  The desirability of  a slogan as a fashion statement in and of  itself  is tied to a controversial issue in trademark law 
relating to marks that are desired in and of  themselves, unconnected to a good or service.   
193  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
549, 553-58 (1979) (exploring various market failures including externalities, monopoly, and information costs); Ian Ayres & 
Eric Talley, Solomnic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (listing 
information costs, transaction costs, and externalities – what they refer to as “free riding” – as examples of  market failure).   
194  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 291 (citing WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM, 
supra note 80) and citing Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research,” VICTOR R. FUCHS, POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59 (NBER, 1972) (“One important result of  this preoccupation with 
monopoly is that if  an economist finds something – a business practice of  one sort or other – that he does not understand, he 
looks for a monopoly explanation.”).   
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For example, rules limiting competition, such as those limiting access to the stock exchange can have 
many positive, or efficiency-promoting, effects: “The exchange organizes not only the conclusion of  
contracts but also all associated transaction activities (from search to enforcement)….”195   
This does not mean that all market failures should be embraced.  Rather, the general point is that 
when thinking about market failures it is essential to keep track of  the real costs and benefits of  all 
available options.  In addition, there are two more specific points that need to be kept in mind when 
thinking about the ways markets work or don’t work within the context of  property rights in general and 
IP in particular.  The first is the distinction between ex ante and ex post, or the distinction between 
dynamic and static efficiency.  The second is the precise nature of  the inefficiency (in contrast with what 
some see as unfairness) associated with monopolies.   
While there is debate about exactly how rational or irrational individuals are when they make 
decisions about whether and how to act there is consensus that individuals do make such decisions and 
do plan.  The term “ex ante” refers to the time period before a decision is made about a given action.  
The term “ex post” refers to any of  the times afterwards.  That is, the information and other resources an 
individual has ex ante will impact the decision-making process.   
This includes not only what is known, but what is expected.  As a result, there can be feedback 
between the ex ante and ex post worlds because individuals interpret events in the world around them as 
having some predictive value for the way events in the future will unfold.  As studied in the work on 
rational expectations by Robert Lucas,196 individuals constantly update and reinterpret information 
presently available to make best estimates about the future.197  In game theory terminology, the point is 
that life is a multi-cycle game, not a single-cycle game, and individuals may use information from past 
cycles of  the game when making decisions about how to play future cycles.198  Individuals may change 
their expectations about what may happen to a given state of  affairs in the future based on what they 
perceive happening to similar states of  affairs in the present and past.  If  individuals perceive that 
property rights and contracts are not being enforced, they may have less faith in property rights and 
contracts being enforced in the future, all other things being equal.  As investment in such property 
rights and contracts becomes less attractive, ordinary incentive analysis suggests that individuals will shift 
investments towards other activities.  Indeed, the literature on private ordering places great emphasis on 
the role of  ex ante predictability and certainty in property and contract enforcement for facilitating 
efficient investment and other decision-making over time, or in the dynamic sense.199   
 
195  FURUBOTN & RICHTER, supra note 23, at 302 (citing other examples such as “the evolution of  ‘privately ordered’ 
medieval trade organizations as explored in [the following works:]” Avner Grief, Reputation and Coalitions on Medieval Trade: 
Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST., 857 (1989) (among long-distance Jewish traders in the Mediterranean during 
11th century called the Maghribi); Roger Milgrom, et al., The Role of  Institutions in the Revival of  Trade: The Law Merchant, Private 
Judges, and the Campagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990) (law merchant system of  the Champaign Fairs of  the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries)).  See also, Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource 
Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2004) (elucidating how antitrust enforcement may interfere with environmental 
conservation and other goals).   
196  See, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of  Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of  Alfred Nobel 
for 1995, available on line at http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1995/press.html.   
197  See, e.g., Robert E. Lucas, Expectations and the Neutrality of  Money, 4 J. ECON. THEORY 103 (1972).  See also, Sanford J. 
Grossman, An Introduction to the Theory of  Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 541, 543 (1981) 
(describing rational expectations equilibrium).   
198  Games that are not static are sometimes said to have multiple cycles, rounds, or iterations, or are said to repeat.  For a 
general overview of  game theory see, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944) (first formal treatment of  game theory as a part of  economics); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ET AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (more modern treatment of  game theory with focus on legal implications). 
199  See generally, Paredes, supra note 157, at 1133-34 (“Legal certainty, which is part and parcel of  well-defined property 
rights, is a valuable asset that facilitates business and investing, aside from how the law actually allocates rights and 
responsibilities”) 
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This dynamic approach can be in tension with other more static approaches to efficiency, which 
may see resource distributions at any point in time as sub-optimal.  For example, a promise to make my 
car available to you at a particular time if  you elect to use it then may put us in a position when that time 
arrives in which the car is not in use by anyone.200  In the static sense, at that moment in time, it may 
indeed look as though the car is being allowed to go to waste, which would be inefficient.201  Yet, if  I am 
allowed to deploy the car to other uses to avoid the risk that it might go unused, then your expectation 
that it will be available for your use if  you so chose will be dashed.  What is more, if  you know this ex 
ante, then you may not even be willing to enter into the contract to reserve the car in exchange for some 
other compensation, such as money, or you will be willing to pay only a lesser amount.  Thus, in the 
dynamic sense, the expected future abrogation of  the contract to provide the car that presumably would 
make both you and me better off  because we each would elect to enter into it in the first instance, may 
make the contract one that is less likely for us to consummate ex ante.  As a result, over time we cannot 
engage in as many productive exchanges as otherwise.  Put differently, there would be dynamic 
inefficiency.202   
It is recognized that recent work by Ian Ayers and Eric Talley, and by Jason Scott Johnston 
shows how, due in large part to many of  the behavioralism problems explored earlier, uncertainty in 
enforcement may in some cases improve the ability to negotiate over property rights and contracts by 
decreasing hold-out problems through a feed-back mechanism in which uncertainty makes more credible 
the threat of  infringement or breach ex post, which may cycle back to decrease the incentive ex ante for 
the rights-holder to hold out in the first instance.203  Nevertheless, other recent empirical work by Rachel 
Croson and Johnston shows that in other cases uncertainty degrades the ability to reach dynamic 
efficiency.204  Indeed, other work by Ayres and Robert Gertner highlights the importance of  at least 
some certainty through the use of  what they term “penalty default rules” because they will have the 
impact of  bringing to light information about potential negotiations and help avoid opportunism by one 
party attempting “to get a larger piece of  the smaller contractual pie.”205  At bottom, at least in many 
cases private bargaining over property rights can be more efficient if  the right is clearly defined ex ante 
according to a predictable rule, rather than made ex post by a judge applying a standard.206   
 
200  To be sure, this is a highly stylized example and in the real world every contract can have detailed insurance, futures, 
and options components.  Indeed, the availability of  these provisions provides justification for treating contracts among 
sophisticated parties as though they do indeed speak to these issues, even when silent on their face.   
201  This gives rise to the approach in some contract cases to allow for what is termed “efficient breach.”  See Richard A. 
Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-19 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing efficient breach approach).  See also Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 301 (Legal Classics Library 1982) (1881) (originating the approach). But see Daniel Friedmann, 
The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989) (criticizing the approach). 
202  See generally, David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 
16-17 (1990) (showing how uncertainty in enforcement discourages investment ex ante). 
203  Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027-
1118 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining under Rules versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256-281 (1995).   
204  Rachel Croson & Jason Scott Johnston, Experimental Results on Bargaining under Alternative Property Rights Regimes, 16 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 50, 67-70 (2000).   
205  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of  Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 
127 (1989).   
206  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988).  For a discussion of  the broader debate 
between legal systems based on rules and those based on standards, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 15–63 (1987) (describing basic framework of  the debate and collecting sources); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: 
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (exploring the costs implicated by the choice between rules and standards and 
showing: rules typically are more costly than standards to create; standards typically are more costly for individuals to interpret, 
both by individuals deciding how to act under them and by government decisionmakers deciding how to apply them; and 
individuals are more likely to act in accordance with the goals of  rules as long as the individuals can determine how they will be 
applied); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (reviewing 
more recent literature and collecting sources). 
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The difference between ex ante and ex post, or dynamic and static efficiency, also matters beyond 
the narrow setting of  individual transactions discussed above – although that is not irrelevant – because 
in many ways change is desirable in and of  itself.  For example, as resources such as fossil fuels become 
depleted, we must change to make use of  alternative energy sources.  Innovation that occurs over time 
can improve the size of  the pie for everyone by making available more options.207  Put simply, the 
distinction between dynamic and static efficiency is particularly important for IP because IP is focused 
on innovation over time.   
The problem of  monopolies is another specific point that must be kept in mind when thinking 
about the ways markets work or don’t work within the context of  IP.  Because monopolies can create 
important inefficiencies, they have been the subject of  substantial attention by both lawyers and 
economists.  Indeed, the core purpose of  antitrust law is “to root out unreasonable restraints of  trade 
and transactions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.”208  The central 
inefficiency associated with monopolies is the creation of  dead weight loss by the monopoly’s ability to 
set price above marginal cost, or to have power over price.209  But, NIE suggests several reasons why the 
extent of  this inefficiency may not be the same in practice as it is in theory.   
First, monopoly is a term that relates to a market, not to any particular good or service sold in 
that market.210  There often is a difference between a product or service market and an IP asset.  
Consumers often buy computers that essentially involve the licensing of  hundreds of  licensed IP rights – 
for hard drive, processors, DRAM, other chips, etc – without acting as direct customers with respect to 
any of  the IP owners.   
While in a certain sense every property right can be thought of  as a monopoly, only those that 
convey effective control over an entire market can have the troubling economic inefficiencies associated 
with monopolies.  For example, the owner of  a hypothetical piece of  real estate Blackacre can exclude 
use of  that particular parcel, but must compete with other parcels of  land in the market for land 
generally.  Indeed, while the amount of  real estate in the world actually is limited by the surface area of  
the planet, unless it turns out that the scope of  human intellectual content is presently so close to the 
limit of  its full potential there is no reason to think that for IP the long run monopoly impact of  a given 
property right is likely to be any worse than for real property; and instead it is likely to be much less.  
Nevertheless, in the short run for at least some goods or services the broad scope of  some IP rights may 
convey what at least some would see as market power with respect to consumers having a particularly 
dire need – such as medical patients in need of  a particular patented drug.   
 
207  Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 275 (2003) (criticizing forms of  antitrust 
enforcement motivated by concerns for static efficiency but that may negatively impact innovation collecting sources).  See also 
Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579 (2003) (reviewing tension between 
static and dynamic efficiency within the context of  public goods and monopolistic competition).   
208  F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of  Intellectual Property, 73 G.W. LAW REV. 174 (2004) 
(generally exploring the interfaces IP law shares with other regimes such as antitrust, and collecting sources including PHILLIP 
AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  PROBLEMS, TEXTS, CASES 174-250, 447-77, 785-806 (1997)).  For a different 
take on the interface between IP and antirust see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST (2003).   
209  This dead weight loss represents a collective loss of  societal wealth, in that it is not merely wealth that has been 
shifted from consumers to producers but rather wealth that is altogether lost from producers and consumers collectively.  The 
dead weight loss inefficiency associated with power over price is depicted graphically, and its etiology is explained in a manner 
targeted for a lay audience, in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 60-66.  To be sure, there are other inefficiencies associated with 
monopolies, including, for example, the rent dissipating effects that competition for monopoly profits may generate.  See 
generally, Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of  Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (studying rent-seeking costs 
of  monopoly).  Yet, the rent dissipating effects of  monopolies, like other rent dissipation, depends on several factors.   
210  See, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., --- S.Ct. ----, 2006 WL 468729 (2006) (patent does not give rise 
to presumption that patentee has market power).  See also,  Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of  Patent Law, 23 J.L. 
STUD. 247, 249-250 (1994) (‘the right to exclude another from ‘manufacture use and sale’ may give no significant market power, 
even when the patent covers a product that is sold in the market”).    
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Second, the economic inefficiency that is associated with a monopolist’s power over price is not 
inevitable.  More specifically, the inefficiency is tied to the potential for a decrease in quantity (not an 
increase in price) as compared with the perfectly competitive model.  If  the monopolist is able to engage 
in perfect price discrimination, then the quantity produced will be the same as if  there were competition 
and while the price charged at least some consumers will be higher, there will be no dead weight loss 
inefficiency.211  While perfect price discrimination, like perfect anything, is not possible in the real world, 
the extent to which the monopolist can engage in price discrimination may mitigate the practical extent 
of  the theoretical static inefficiency associated with monopoly dead weight loss.212   
5. Anticommons, Patent Thickets, and Patent Trolls 
A final problem that some think arises when property rights are used, especially when property 
rights in IP are used, is the problem Michael Heller termed the “anticommons,”213 and others term a 
“patent thicket.”214  This paper suggests that the anticommons problem really is not a problem of  
property rights and instead is a problem associated with using other types of  barriers.  From this 
perspective, the new anticommons literature can be viewed as in a sense at best providing merely another 
term for what previously have been known the problems of  “permit thickets” and “license Raj” and at 
worst both facilitating monopolization and frustrating those aspects of  property rights that work well for 
the private ordering and coordination that help increase access.   
Heller’s contribution to the property literature regarding anticommons was originally based on 
his study of  real property in the post-socialist economies of  Eastern Europe, but he has also applied it 
to IP.  As described by Heller:   
 
211  For those who are familiar with the graphical representation of  the monopolist’s dead weight loss triangle, an 
example of  which is depicted in CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 65, price discrimination allows the monopolist to convert what 
otherwise would be that dead weight loss triangle into being producer surplus instead.   
212  For a basic overview of  the economics of  price discrimination, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 133-68 (1997).  It is also recognized that in certain cases efforts to engage in price discrimination may lead to 
decrease in efficiency.  For example, recent work by Wendy Gordon, Glynn Lunney, and Michael Meurer has shown that while 
price discrimination by IP owners might lead in theory to more use in certain instances, in practice some price discrimination 
strategies can result in less output than if  such price discrimination were prohibited, depending, in part, on the licensing 
arrangements employed to discriminate among users).  Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for 
Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Copyright and the Supposed Efficiency of  First-Degree Price 
Discrimination (2002) (working paper); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001).  
However, as summarized by Richard Posner:  
 Perfect price discrimination would bring about the same output as under competition, because no 
customer willing to pay the seller’s marginal cost would be turned away.  But perfect price discrimination is 
infeasible, and imperfect price discrimination can result in a lower or higher output than under competition, 
or the same output.  See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL 
PERFORMANCE 494-96 (3d ed. 1990); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 42-45 
(1947); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95 (1933).  Many economists 
believe that even crude discrimination is more likely to expand than to reduce output, see, e.g., ROBINSON, 
supra, at 201; SCHERER & ROSS, supra, at 494-96; Peter O. Steiner, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 882 
(1977), but there does not appear to be a firm basis for this belief.  See Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 597, 629-33 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 
1989). 
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 925, 932 n.10 (2001).   
213  Heller, supra note 39.   
214  See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 
Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (treating a “patent thicket” to be the case of  
many patents relating to a single product); James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of  Complex Technologies 
(Research on Innovation Working Paper 2003), available at http:// www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf. (same). 
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Consider new areas for property law, such as the problem of  spurring private investment in 
biomedical research or creating well-functioning markets in post-socialist economies…. By drawing 
the wrong property boundaries around resources, by fragmenting ownership too much, it turns out 
that privatization can destroy resource productivity in enduring ways. To capture these unexpected 
results from excessive privatization, I have proposed the idea of  anticommons property, an image that 
goes beyond the old trilogy [private, commons, and state] and crystallizes emerging real-world 
property relations that had previously remained invisible….[A] resource is prone to underuse in a 
tragedy of  the anticommons when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce 
resource and no one has an effective privilege of  use. In theory, in a world of  costless transactions, 
people could always avoid common or anticommons tragedy by trading their rights. In practice, 
however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive 
biases of  participants, with success more likely within close-knit communities than among hostile 
strangers.  Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into usable private property is often 
brutal and slow…. I developed the idea initially from closely observing privatization in post- socialist 
economies. One promise of  transition to markets was that new entrepreneurs would fill stores that 
socialist rule had left bare. Yet after several years of  reform, many privatized storefronts remained 
empty, while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of  goods, mushroomed up on the streets. Why did the 
new merchants not come in from the cold? One reason was that transition governments often failed 
to endow any individual with a bundle of  rights that represents full ownership. Instead, fragmented 
rights were distributed to various socialist-era stakeholders, including private or quasi-private 
enterprises, workers’ collectives, privatization agencies, and local, regional, and federal governments. 
No one could set up shop without first collecting rights from each of  the other owners.215
Heller seems to suggest that what he terms “fragmentation,” or excessive numbers of  rights holders, is 
key to the anticommons effect because the transaction costs of  dealing with so many claimants will 
dominate.216   
But fragmentation itself  is not the key to the anticommons effect that is observed in post 
socialist economies.  What really drives the problem is the lack of  what Alchian and Demstez call a 
“residual claimant.”217 To provide a brief  summary definition at the outset, in the context of  the 
anticommons problem caused by many holders of  a right to respond “no” to requests for permission, a 
residual clamant is essentially an individual who is able to extract private value from such a request by 
electing to respond with a “yes.”  But to more fully understand the nature of  the issue, further 
elaboration is required.   
As Buchanan and Yoon explain, there actually exists “a formal symmetry between the overusage 
of  a resource because of  common (multiple) access and the underusage because of  multiple exclusion 
rights”218  In highlighting this symmetry, they then point out that in both cases (commons and 
anticommons) the heart of  the problem can be tied to the nature of  the holders of  the right (to use or 
exclude, depending on whether the tragedy is one of  commons or anticommons).  More particularly, 
according to Buchanan and Yoon, the problem lies in whether the holders have “noneconomic 
motivations” in that they are those “who cannot or may not desire to, capture directly pecuniary gains,” 
meaning that their goals may not be “primarily distributional but instead may reflect different 
 
215  Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of  Property Law , 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 79, 87-89 (2001) (drawing the 
definition of  anticommons property from Heller, supra note 39, and building on the discussion of  IP rights from Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) 
[hereinafter Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons]. 
216  See, Heller supra note 39, at 624 (arguing that when too many owners hold rights of  exclusion in a resource, the 
resource is prone to under use).  See also, Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons supra note 215, at 700; Michael A. Heller, The 
Boundaries of  Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 (1999).   
217  See supra note 145.   
218  See, e.g., James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:  Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 12 
(2000).  For an interesting taxonomy applying this symmetry see, Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
907 (2004).   
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objectives.”219  Indeed, Buchanan and Yoon warn of  the potentially pernicious impact in either case 
(commons or anticommons) of  the “genuine zealot…[who] may be insensitive to proffered 
compensations.”220  Therefore, the concern Buchanan and Yoon highlight is that the crux of  the 
problem for both commons and anticommons relates to the ability of  those engaged in the group 
activity to coordinate with each other, but when the individuals have noneconomic motivations they are 
unlikely to so coordinate unless they happen to share some other coordinating attribute, such as being 
close-knit.221   
In contrast, as discussed previously, coordination is a central problem studied by NIE and one 
general response to coordination problems can be property rights.  While at first blush given the way 
Heller presents the anticommons problem it would seem that property rights are more a part of  the 
problem than a part of  the solution, it turns out this just is not so.  Property rights provide individuals 
with the economic motivation to engage in trades with each other.  Indeed, the easier it is for the holder 
of  a property right to engage in such a trade and the greater the value that the individual can extract 
from the trade (the greater the residual claim), the greater the motivation and ability the individual has to 
engage in it.222   
What actually drives the anticommons problem in the post-socialist economies is both the lack 
of  residual claim and the lack of  clarity and certainty that are associated with the pertinent rights of  
exclusion.223  Richard Epstein and Bruce Kuhlik begin the discussion by pointing out in response to the 
perceived anticommons problem relating to IP that one distinguishing feature of  the anticommons in 
the post-socialist economy is that efforts by the bureaucrats to engage in open trading of  their 
permission for personal gain are likely to trigger various forms of  criminal liability for graft, bribery, 
public corruption, etc.224  But the differences are even greater than they indicate.   In such a sequential 
bribe situation there is a greater degree of  uncertainty that each bribe will either be needed or effective.  
This is in part because those being bribed can’t openly coordinate.  It is also because some of  those 
whose permission would be needed might not even be open to being bribed.  They might justifiably be 
steadfastly acting to prevent an activity they see as bad.225  Alternatively, they may derive more benefit – 
perhaps sense of  control or power or even just some other kind of  perhaps perverse pleasure – from 
simply being able to say “no” than from what otherwise might be obtained in exchange for saying 
“yes.”226   
 
219  Id. Buchanan & Yoon (citing the example of  an environmental regulator whose permission is needed to put an asset 
to use but whose permission should not be bought). To be sure, without being motivated by direct pecuniary gains, a regulator 
may be economically motivated along the lines of  the political favors discussed in the public choice literature.   
220  Id.   
221  Heller suggests the coordination benefits of  being “close knit.”  See text accompanying note 215, supra.  See also supra 
Part II.B.1 (discussing the coordination benefits of  norm communities).  
222  See R. Quentin Grafton & Dale Squires, Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study of  Common Pool Resource, 43 J. L. 
& ECON. 679 (2000) (providing empirical data showing how various institutional changes towards the treatment of  private 
property rights as fully tradable assets are essential for facilitating efficient use of  common pool resources).   
223  The importance of  certainty for facilitating private ordering is explored supra notes 196-206, and accompanying text.   
224  See, e.g., Richard Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the 
Course on Hatch-Waxman, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper (2d Series) No. 209, at 4 (“But the state 
bureaucrat is not the owner of  any asset whose value will remain unlocked unless he brings it to market”).  Nevertheless, 
individual regulators have incentives to try to extract such value, which explains the results of  the empirical study of  the public 
choice “tollbooth” theory of  regulation discussed in the text accompanying notes 132-136 supra.   
225  This would be consistent with the public interest view of  regulation.  For more on the public interest theory of  
regulation see supra text accompanying note 136.   
226  Consider for example the well known childhood tease, or prank, in which a peer is offered a lick of  an ice cream 
cone and then after inducing anticipation, but before delivery, the cone is withdrawn to prevent the lick, while the offeror 
utters “Gotcha!” or some more colorful equivalent.   
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The anticommons problem in the post-socialist environment – indeed the anticommons 
problem, period – is tied to the inability of  those who hold rights of  exclusion to negotiate openly for a 
way to extract value from a decision to give reliable permission rather than withhold permission or give 
faulty permission.  There may be no residual claimant who can openly sell a “yes.”  There may be no 
clarity about who to even approach to buy a “yes” or what to give in order to get a “yes.”  There may be 
no certainty about whether a “yes” will even be effective.  Therefore, there is a huge difference between 
the openly tradable nature of  property on the one hand and the anticommons on the other hand.   
Simply put, the anticommons problem can be seen as just another label for what Epstein earlier 
referred to as a “permit thicket.”227  Earlier still the problem was labeled in India, after the removal of  
British rule, which was also called “Raj,” where it was said that Raj had been replaced by “License Raj” in 
the form of  excessive and unpredictable requirements for permits and licenses from the many branches 
of  the central government in order to conduct many important business activities.228  In essence, the 
anticommons problem can be seen as a coin having two poisonous sides:  the pernicious “permit 
thicket” or “License Raj” implications for taxing and retarding development on the one hand; and the 
“tollbooth” implications of  extortion by agencies on the other hand.229   
Another version of  the anticommons problem for IP appears to be what some call the problem 
of  “patent trolls.”230  The argument seems to be that “patent trolls” hold their patents neither for 
development nor for prospective licensing, but solely to holdup others who accidentally stumble in their 
path.  To the extent the concern about trolls reflects anxiety about the uncertainty of  the scope and 
validity of  patents, as well as the high cost of  patent litigation – both of  which would provide potential 
opportunities for “trolls” to exploit even weak or low-value patents – then the problem can be best 
addressed using various tools for policing bad patents.231   
But the pernicious impact of  the troll is limited to a large extent by very practical economic 
factors.  First, all patents are wasting assets in that they have a life capped at less than 20 years, and are 
subject to defenses based on laches and estoppel.   Second, a decision to lie in wait causes the troll to 
lose income that would have to be recouped in the future.  But just like in the context of  predatory 
pricing, the promise of  that future gain is risky.232  Indeed, just like a fallow plot of  land may attract 
offers for development, so a patent posted on the PTO web page and searchable for free, as all are, 
provides sufficient information to attract anyone seriously interested in practicing the covered 
technology.  A patentee who is not looking to sell or license is not beyond reach of  those who wish to 
buy or license.  Those set of  economic forces on both parties help explain why, once the court made 
clear an injunction was imminent, even the infamously bitter litigation over the BlackBerry® service 
 
227  See Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 224 (citing Richard. A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 407 (1995)).   
228  I thank participants in the faculty workshop held at Wolfson College, Cambridge University, June 28, 2004, for 
pointing out this term to me.  For more on the problem of  License Raj in India see, e.g., JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, INDIA IN 
TRANSITION: FREEING THE ECONOMY 49-51 (1993) (discussing the system of  permits and licenses needed in India for both 
outside investment and for internal economic development).  See also, Emran, M. Shahe, et al., After the “License Raj:” Economic 
Liberalization and Aggregate Private Investment in India (2003) (available on-line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=411080) (same); Sunita 
Parikh & Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of  Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (“This system, known in 
India as License Raj, means that the center retains control over the distribution of  permits and licenses for new areas of  
economic development through the relevant central ministry”).   
229  See supra notes 132-136, and accompanying text (discussing “tollbooth” theory of  regulation in the context of  agency 
capture and public choice).   
230  See Brenda Sandburg, You may not have a choice. Trolling for Dollars (July 30, 2001) (available on-line at 
www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf) (attributing the origin of  the term to Peter Detkin, who at the time was counsel at 
Intel).   
231  See, e.g., Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14 (suggesting a decrease in the presumption of  validity as a tool for 
achieving symmetry in fee shifting between patentees and infringers).   
232  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-594 (1986) (discussing perils of  predatory pricing).   
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settled before any disruption of  service took place. What is more, the settlement price in that case is 
both significantly below independent estimates that reflect the holdout risk, and even more significantly 
below the licensee’s reserves of  cash and cash equivalents.233   
Indeed, the raw numbers suggest that one underappreciated element of  the delay in settlement 
in that case may have been restrictions on the market for corporate control, not the problems of  
anticommons, patent thickets, or patent trolls.  The actual settlement price suggests that the infringer 
either was acting rationally in holding out because of  the uncertainty that there was going to be an 
injunction (in keeping with the view that property rules can encourage deals and liability rules can 
frustrate them), or it was acting irrationally in not closing a deal at such an attractive price – a price in 
line with market estimates and lower than its own private estimates as evidenced by the size of  its 
reserves of  cash and cash equivalents.  If  the market for corporate control were working better, there 
might have been enough gains to be had by settling the case sooner that a raider would have done a 
takeover, fired the leadership, and struck a deal with the patentee.234  Earlier settlement also would have 
saved more goodwill for the infringer, RIM, maker of  BlackBerry®, which now has more competition.   
III. NIE AND THEORIES OF IP  
Because the conventional normative theories of  IP – reward and prospect or rent dissipation – 
fail to address the helpful coordination effect explored above, the policy prescriptions they generate fail 
to facilitate the downstream access that can be achieved through such good coordination.  What is more, 
by generally weakening IP rights, the prescriptions that flow from conventional theories only serve to 
facilitate the bad coordination that increases anticompetitive effect.  The focus on coordination offered 
here helps explain why particular features of  the positive law IP regimes of  patent, trademark, and 
copyright are working and why others are not.  This coordination view thereby can inform policy debates 
about which aspects of  these regimes are best candidates for change.   
A. Conventional IP Theories  
Conventional IP theories are focused either on providing direct incentives as a tool for increasing 
access, or on controlling rent dissipation.  Prior work by the present author has shown how both of  
 
233  See, Mark Heinzl & Amol Sharma, RIM to Pay NTP $612.5 Million to Settle Blackberry Patent Suit, Wall St. J., March 4, 
2006, at A1 (noting that settlement estimates ranged to above $1 billion and that infringer’s reserves of  cash and cash 
equivalents were about $1.8 billion).   
234  A quick calculation is instructive.  The infringer in that case, RIM, is a publicly traded company whose stock price 
fluctuated over the year from a low of  about 52, to a typical price around 63, and a high of  about 88, a high that it almost 
immediately regained by the next business day after the settlement.  The majority of  the outstanding shares (191 million) were 
in the public float (141 million).  If  the entire public float were purchased in a takeover by offering a $10 premium over the 
prevailing price of  63, it would require about $1.4 billion over that price.  This new controlling shareholder could then fire 
management and settle the case.  If  the settlement were at the estimated high level of  $1 billion dollars, then that takeover 
investor would have invested a total of  $2.4 billion over the prevailing price, plus perhaps another $100 million in professional 
fees and other costs for a total investment of  $2.5 billion.  If  the price then jumped back to its year high after the settlement – 
which did occur – then this investor would see an increase in book value of  about $3.5 billion, leaving a net gain of  about $1 
billion.  If  the deal were done as a leverage buyout using the shares themselves as collateral for a loan then the return on 
investment would hinge on the valuation used to support the loan, which would determine the size of  the loan.  If  the 
valuation were set at the generally prevailing price then return on investment would be measured as a $1 billion dollar gain over 
an investment of  $2.5 billion dollars, which yields the attractive floor for the rate of  return at about 40%.  If  the valuation were 
set higher, then the rater of  return would be higher as well.  Of  course, Wall Street’s regular raiders likely did the same math.  
The point here is that the reasons they may have elected not to dive in likely included anti-takeover provisions in the corporate 
documents themselves, as well as various regulatory restrictions on the market for corporate control that are designed to 
decrease takeovers. 
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these approaches fail to explain the positive law rules for at least obtaining IP rights in the case of  
patents.235  But as discussed in more depth below, an additional problem with these approaches is that 
following them when shaping the detailed institutional framework of  the positive law regimes would not 
facilitate the good coordination that is effective in increasing access and would facilitate the bad 
coordination that is effective in increasing monopoly effects.   
1. Conventional Majority View on Rewards 
The majority view in the conventional law and economics literature on IP regimes in this country 
sees the role of  the government as both providing targeted incentives to specific creative individuals to 
solve the public goods problem associated with intellectual works while at the same time endeavoring to 
increase access by mitigating the monopoly and transaction costs associated with the IP right to 
exclude.236  The concern driving this perspective is that the subject matter protected by IP will be under-
produced because it is characterized by the Arrow Information Paradox, which is to say it has public 
good qualities or has positive externalities.  Under this view, incentives to produce are provided through 
specific rewards for specific creative work.  For example, patents are offered as incentive to invent; and 
copyrights as incentive to generate creative expression.  Importantly, the literature does not see rewards 
merely as some kind of  ancillary effect of  IP; it sees reward as IP’s central goal.  What is more, under 
this view, the reward and its recipient must be regulated carefully to mitigate monopoly effects and 
transaction costs.237  As summarized by Jack Hirshleifer and John Riley when discussing patents, for 
example, “[t]he central problem considered by modern analysts has been the conflict between the social 
goals of  achieving efficient use of  information once produced versus providing ideal motivation for production of  
 
235  Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14.   
236  See, e.g., Long, supra note 11, at 466 (“The conventional theory of  intellectual property rights posits that such rights 
exist to stimulate the creation and distribution of  intellectual goods”) (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of  Improvement in 
Intellectual Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997) (“Intellectual property [rights are] fundamentally about incentives to invent 
and create.”).  Although there are a number of  incentive-based theories for IP that are mentioned in the literature – including 
“incentive to invent”, “incentive to disclose” or “teach,” “incentive to innovate,” and “incentive to design around” – there are 
essentially three dominant theories today: (1) some version of  the “incentive to invent” and “disclose” theories treated together 
under the rubric of  “reward;” (2) the “prospect” theory; and (3) the commercialization theory.  For a recent review of  the 
patent literature on incentive theories and a collection of  sources see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 58-90 (reviewing various 
incentive theories for the patent system).  See also, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of  Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, at 1024-46 (1989) (same); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories Of  Patents – 
The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (same).  For recent reviews of  the copyright literature on 
incentive theories and a collection of  sources, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 483 (1996) (reviewing and collecting sources and suggesting that incentives may draw efforts away from other 
productive activities); Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-03 
(2003) (available on line at http://ssrn.com/abstract=374580 (reviewing and collecting sources and highlighting the 
opportunity cost issues discussed by Lunney as well as showing how additional works on the margin may contribute little while 
at the same time causing rent dissipation).   
237  See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of  Intellectual Property, 5 J. Econ. 
Persp.  3, 8 (1991) (“The patent offers the incentive of  the statutory right to exclude as a means for inducing creative activity.”).  
Several types of  regulatory responses to IP rights are generally justified by this concern.  Examples include liability rule 
treatment, misuse, fair use, etc.   
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information.”238  Glynn Lunney has called this conflict, or balance, between incentive and access the 
“incentive access paradigm.”239   
Although the reward literature contributes much to our understanding of  IP, it has a number of  
serious limitations.  One perspective is to see these theories as focusing on the role of  government in 
providing both subsidy and regulation rather than in providing less invasive forms of  intervention, such 
as setting rules and resolving disputes.  That is, the government is seen as needed on the one hand to 
prop up potential holders of  IP and then on the other hand to keep them in check.  Another perspective 
is to see the reward literature as paying too much attention to direct incentives for creators, to monopoly 
power, and to transaction costs, all on only some settings, while paying remarkably little attention to 
these same issues in other settings, as well as overlooking a host of  other important issues including, for 
example, coordination problems and public choice problems.  Simply put, both sides of  the incentive 
access paradigm are inapt:  the incentive side because designing an IP system to provide direct incentives 
is imprudent, and the access side because property rights facilitate access.   
One problem with the incentive side of  the paradigm is that direct incentives are very sloppy in 
their effect.  They achieve some beneficial effect; but at high cost.  Focusing on providing direct 
incentives with rewards has limited need, has limited effectiveness, can’t be targeted, and has bad side-
effects.  Rewards have limited need because much of  the desired activity may occur without added 
incentive of  the reward.240  Rewards have limited effectiveness because much of  the desired activity is 
 
238  Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics of  Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 1375, 
1404 (1979) (emphasis in original) (citing Kenneth Arrow, Comments on Case Studies, and Economic Welfare and the Allocation of  
Resources of  Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (Nat’l 
Bureau Comm. for Econ. Res. eds., 1962) 355, 609, and Fritz Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 461 (Macmillan, Free Press, 1968)). 
239  Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996) (reviewing the 
incentive access-paradigm and highlighting an additional cost of  IP is the opportunity cost of  deploying resources towards IP 
that could instead have been deployed elsewhere).   
240  For example, individuals may be driven by self-satisfaction, search for knowledge, reputation, etc.  Indeed, although 
the positive shift in 1980 to allow patents in basic biotechnology did lead to some increase in amount of  inventive activity 
being done in the field, the amount before was still quite substantial.  This is not surprising given that in a field with large 
lumber of  people having sufficient creative ability working to solve a problem it is likely the solution will be found.  See JACOB 
SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 215 (1966).  For more on the norms of  science and the incentive they 
provide towards discovery see, e.g., Robert K. Merton, The Role of  Genius in Scientific Advance, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 1961, at 
306.   
 In the real world, many externalities turn out to be irrelevant to efficient allocation of  resources.  See, DAVID D. 
HADDOCK, IRRELEVANT INTERNALITIES, IRRELEVANT EXTERNALITIES, AND IRRELEVANT ANXIETIES, Northwestern 
University School of  Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Research Paper No. 03-16 (2003) (available on-line at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=437221) (providing examples and models and citing James M. Buchanan, & William Craig 
Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 371 (1962).  For example, in the case of  positive externalities, such as the pleasure a 
visually aesthetic garden brings to many of  those passersby who happen to see it regardless of  whether they contributed to its 
upkeep, the keeper of  the garden has managed to fund its creation and maintenance without reaping specific contributions 
from those passers by.  For other examples of  such irrelevant positive externalities see Bernstein & Nadiri, Interindustry R&D 
Spillovers, Rates of  Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (1988) (finding that, in recent years, social 
rates of  return significantly exceeded private rates of  return in five high-tech industries). The positive externalities the 
passersby enjoy have not prevented the good from being produced.  In economic terminology, these uses are said to be 
“inframarginal,” as opposed to “marginal,”  HADDOCK, at 24 (“Transaction cost for collective goods—even those 
demonstrably enjoyed by millions—are chronically overestimated in policy discussions. Only one or a few strong demands 
often determine both actual and ideal provision, and even two million demands are irrelevant if  inframarginal.”). While the 
possibility of  capturing some benefit from these users of  the garden may be a factor a garden planner might consider when 
making decisions about how to fund the garden creation and maintenance processes, those gains would have to be weighed 
against the costs of  such metering techniques.  Indeed, many such externalities are found in the real world effectively to be 
irrelevant to decision-making because a sufficiently small number of  individuals having sufficiently great interest in the 
externalities are able to engage in sufficient private ordering for the appropriate amount of  the desired activity to take place.  
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not responsive to additional incentive.241  Even to the extent that rewards to have a beneficial effect, it is 
very hard to correlate the amount of  reward and the merit of  the awarded activity, especially in a way 
that is predictable to all players ex ante.242   
Most importantly, efforts to achieve even such sloppy reward effect have serious costs.  One that 
is well recognized in the literature is that the social costs of  investments made to get rewards may be 
greater than the social value of  the activity rewarded.243  Indeed, this has spawned the minority view in 
the conventional law and economics literature on IP regimes in this country, which focuses on rent 
dissipation, as discussed below.244   
But one cost of  rewards that is underappreciated in the literature is tied to the importance of  
understanding the relationship between the reward and the activity being rewarded.  This matters 
because it would inform determinations about how to set the reward in practice.  If  set too low, then 
there may be insufficient positive response.  If  too great, the marginal excess may generate too little 
marginal positive response or may generate too many negative side effects.245  While simple metrics such 
as too big or too small may turn out not to matter, at least some dimension of  the reward will matter and 
yet the reward theories offer no guidance as to how to set the reward along that dimension, whatever it 
may be. This problem is described as “screening” in earlier work by the present author and its resolution 
is one of  the strengths of  any IP theory focused on coordination:  such theories turn out to have great 
explanatory power for the positive law rules governing when valid IP rights are available.246   
 
Id., at 1-2 (citing Buchanan & Stubblebine supra).  This means that in many cases things that generate positive externalities 
would be made anyway, whether that positive externality is fully internalized to the producer or not.  
241  This may be because the activity is only responsive to alternative inducements such as self-satisfaction, search for 
knowledge, reputation, etc.  See, e.g., Besen & Raskind supra note 237, at 6 (“Another critical element in deciding how to strike 
the balance between encouraging innovation and dissemination is the extent to which creative activity responds to economic 
rewards.  The less that innovation depends on the resources invested and the potential economic rewards, the more limited is 
the case for granting substantial rights to creators.”).   
242  On the one hand, for example, empirical works by Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele and by Michael Kremer 
have shown that at least for patents the patentee often does not receive the full social surplus created by the patented 
invention.  See, e.g., SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 139, at 1-8; See, 
e.g., MICHAEL KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION 1-5 (National Bureau of  Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 6304, 1997).  Social surplus is the amount of  total social welfare generated by the invention minus 
the costs of  making the invention, such as research by the inventor and the inventor’s competitors.  Social welfare is the 
aggregate value of  all utility that individuals obtain from the invention.  On the other hand, for example, there are important 
difficulties in developing a theory of  just deserts as a basis for government to allocate any reward among potential claimants, 
whether the reward is a patent or cash.  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 713-14, n. 77.     
243  This may be because they may trigger rent dissipation.  A related concern over the opportunity cost associated with 
the efforts made towards winning the reward.  See Lunney supra note 239 (discussing role of  opportunity costs).   
244  For more on rent dissipation within the context of  IP see infra Part III.A.2.   
245  For example, too little positive response might occur because those responding to the rewards might have decreasing 
marginal desire or ability to respond.  Similarly, for example, too many negative side effects might occur if  the opportunity 
costs of  the resources being spent responding are too high or if  their rent seeking costs are too great. 
246  See, Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14 (elucidating the normative case for these positive law rules for patents 
within the context of  a coordination approach to IP based on commercialization and registration elements).  As Rob Merges 
has pointed out, a related limitation of  reward theories is that they seem to view an IP right as somehow having a one-to-one 
correlation with a good or service that is sold in a market.  See, Merges, supra note 11, at 1859-60 (criticizing common view in 
the literature as assuming a one-to-one correlation).  As a result, while on the one hand seeing the transaction costs of  property 
rights as an obstacle to the cumulative nature of  intellectual endeavors, the reward theories overlook that this very cumulative 
nature makes it remarkably difficult to allocate merit among various contributors to an intellectual endeavor.  For example, in 
the model offered by Shavell and van Ypersele, the reward is determined by looking to market demand, SHAVELL & TANGUY 
VAN YPERSELE, supra note 139, yet they do not suggest how to disaggregate demand for licenses to intermittent windshield 
wiper technology used in cars, for example, from the demand for cars.  Put differently, “[e]very market having large demand 
would generate droves of  reward claimants each asserting to have made some contribution.” Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, 
supra note 14, at 713.  What is more, “no market participant would have an adequate incentive to provide the government with 
information relating to [the validity of  the reward].” Id.  Only in the rare cases of  two individuals claiming to have invented the 
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Some of  the reward theorists suggest techniques for solving some of  the problems of  
determining the reward while at the same time mitigating the monopoly power and transaction costs 
problems associated with the IP property right by suggesting as alternatives to IP rights various forms of  
cash reward, prize, buyout, or subsidy.247  These reward or prize proposals are each more ingenious than 
the other in developing methods for finding, at least on average and in theory, the “right” price for 
rewards.  And while Michael Abamowicz provides extensive analyses of  many of  their shortcomings, for 
several of  these he also provides potential solutions.248   
But there are at least two central problems with these approaches.  First, they trigger their own 
high transaction costs.  While their strength is in using market forces to generate better information with 
fewer public choice problems than the simple Pigouvian subsidies that were the target of  criticism in the 
treatment by Coase and Demsetz of  the externality problem, they rely on their own extensive 
government-mediated collateral markets for IP auctions, buy backs, etc., which themselves will be costly 
to operate.  Second, even the best case for these proposals sees them only as adjuncts to the IP system, 
not as complete replacements, precisely because they are all premised on IP acting first as a coordination 
tool to some extent.249   
Therefore, the most serious cost of  rewards, which is almost totally overlooked in the literature, 
is that rewards themselves fail to facilitate coordination of  the type needed to increase downstream 
development and access.  Reward systems assume, but do nothing to facilitate, this type of  coordination.   
What is more, the reliance of  even reward systems on some initial coordination is instructive 
because it highlights the reason why the access side of  the incentive-access paradigm is similarly inapt.  
The access problems associated with property can be mitigated more effectively than the access 
problems associated with avoiding property.    
The reward literature places great emphasis on the risk that the right to exclude associated with 
property rights in IP will lead to insufficient access to the subject matter protected by IP essentially 
because of  the potential monopoly distortion and transaction costs associated with the IP right to 
exclude.  But, as explored below in the discussion of  the commercialization theory and its implications 
for these and other social costs in the context of  IP, the reward theory concerns about these costs are in 
a sense both overstated in that the costs are not as great a feared and understated in that property rights 
can be essential for mitigating them.  In addition, any approach that avoids property rights, whether or 
 
same exact thing does one individual have an incentive to challenge the claim of  the other.  Id., n. 75 (noting that so-called 
“interference” proceedings among two or more claimants to the same patent typically involve less than 0.25% of  all patent 
applications that are filed with the Patent Office).  When IP is the focus of  a reward, the reward provider must determine how 
to allocate the reward, and it is likely there will be excessive claimants.  When IP rights instead are protected by property rules, 
the allocation is made among those holding the various IP rights through whatever contracts they entered into so as to obtain 
commercialization.  What is more, in contrast to the difficulties in setting appropriate reward, the positive law rules for 
obtaining the IP rights can serve as remarkably inexpensive screening tools for determining who will even get such a right.   
247  For an excellent review of  these proposals including in-depth critiques see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent 
Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).  For convenience, these proposals can be summarized in very brief  form as follows:  (1) 
patents are bought out by the government with prices informed by test marketing (Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, 
Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q., June 1995, at 213); (2) awards are given in the place of  
patents with the amount of  reward set by later developed data from actual demand (SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, supra 
note 139); (3) patents are bought out with prices informed by probabilistic auctions (KREMER, supra note 242); (4) subsidizing 
purchases of  subject matter covered by patents as a tool for improving effectiveness of  price discrimination by patentees 
(Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of  Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 123 (1997)); and (5) the use of  retrospective prizes in exchange for efforts to decrease monopoly effects of  patents 
(Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes).   
248  See Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, supra note 247.   
249  See, e.g., Id., at 115 (ultimately concluding that its proposal “would complement rather than replace the patent 
system”).   
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not such an approach includes rewards, triggers its own access problems that are tied to a lack of  
coordination.   
2. Conventional Minority View on Rent Dissipation 
The minority view in the conventional law and economics literature on IP regimes in this 
country, which focuses on rent dissipation, also fails to facilitate access while potentially increasing 
anticompetitive effect.  The rent dissipation view of  IP is premised on the concern about excessive and 
improper rent seeking on the part of  those seeking a government-provided benefit like a patent.  The 
theory was first explored by Edmund Kitch in his 1977 piece on what he called the prospect theory of  
the patent system, which builds upon work by Yoram Barzel and others, and argues that the use of  
property rights in the form of  IP rights like patents could avoid or mitigate the rent dissipating effect 
otherwise associated with those rewards.250  A similar view of  IP called the rent dissipation theory was 
offered by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander in 1992, which focused on harnessing the IP owner’s control 
power over downstream users to coordinate what otherwise would be competing efforts.251  The thrust 
of  the prospect or rent dissipation approach is premised on the view that that property rights can 
facilitate coordination among competing users of  a target asset so as to avoid overuse of  other assets in 
the race to obtain the target.252  Kitch suggests that patents operate similarly as a tool to decrease both 
pre-patent and post-patent rent-seeking.253  The prospect and rent dissipation theories of  IP make 
important contributions by elucidating the ways that property rights can facilitate coordination among 
competing users of  an asset so as to avoid over use of  other resources.  It seems from the literature that 
patents may indeed have this net beneficial impact in the real world to some extent.   
Nevertheless, prior works by the present author and Michael Abramowicz have explored in some 
depth several serious shortcomings of  the prospect and rent dissipation approaches to IP.254  By way of  
summary these include:  that a number of  factors mitigate rent dissipation effects in practice; that rent 
seeking for prizes has countervailing positive effects in the case of  innovation because there is not a 
single or even a practically limited number of  prizes.   
But most importantly, the prospect and rent dissipation theories fail to provide a way to use the 
social cost lessons of  prospecting to design legal rules for obtaining patents that can operate ex ante to 
mitigate the social costs of  prospecting.255    This final problem is so important because ex ante 
predictability is essential both for facilitating the private ordering of  the property owner and those with 
whom it contracts, and for mitigating the information costs of  third parties.256  In addition, leaving these 
 
250  Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of  the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–67 (1977) (citing Barzel supra 
note 141). 
251  Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 305-310, 316-322 (1992) (going 
further than the building upon the prospect theory by suggesting that the particular contours of  the positive law rules for 
obtaining and enforcing patents are and should be adapted to minimize rent dissipation both pre patent and post patent).   
252  Kitch supra note at 256 (citing Barzel supra note 141).   
253  Id.  See also Grady & Alexander supra note 251.   
254  Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 63-66 (pointing out limitations in prospect and rent dissipation theories and 
citing, among other sources, Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, supra note 236, at 10-18 (collecting sources and 
showing how each of  these factors may operate to mitigate rent dissipation effects)).   
255  Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 65-66.   
256  See id. at 67-68 (discussing importance for facilitating private ordering).  In addition, as Henry Smith has pointed out, 
property rights can be and should be structured so that they impose sufficiently modest information processing costs on third 
parties who must evaluate and understand them enough to respect them by avoiding infringement.  Henry E. Smith, The 
Language of  Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108, 1114-15 (2003) (“If  everyone in the world is 
expected to respect an owner’s right to Blackacre, the content of  that right cannot be too complicated or idiosyncratic without 
placing a large burden on many third parties.”) (“the correlation between extensiveness of  the audience and mandated 
unintensiveness of  legally significant communication holds in a variety of  areas beyond land law, including patent law, 
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decisions to ex post determination within the broad discretion of  government agencies or courts will 
inevitably favor the large established players over market entrants.  Although the capture problem is tied 
to agencies, a related problem arises before courts where the outcome of  such a broad discretionary 
inquiry so often, as it has in the past for IP, leads simply to most victories being won by the large 
established players who are better able to finance protected litigation than market entrants.257  Finally, as 
explored earlier, the work by Anderson & Hill in the NIE literature itself  has taught that an effective way 
to avoid rent dissipation effects is to allow the residual claimants of  a property right to define it when 
staking it out,258 a technique that at least the present patent and trademark systems presently follow.   
3. Conventional Views on Anticommons, Anticompetitive Effects, and Public Choice 
What is perhaps most disturbing about the conventional literature on IP is that it seems to get 
the anticommons, anticompetitive effects, and public choice concerns essentially backwards.  That is, 
through public choice problems the government responses generated by these concerns of  liability rule 
treatment and regulation are themselves likely to generate true problems of  anticommons and 
anticompetitive effects.  Indeed, the anticompetitive effects are achieved because the bad type of  
coordination is facilitated – coordination among existing players not among those interested in forming 
market entrants.  Public choice problems have, at least until recently, almost entirely escaped attention in 
the IP literature.259  Nevertheless, public choice problems do matter and should be considered because 
they are linked inextricably to government action, and so must be weighed as countervailing 
considerations to the extent regulation is offered as an alternative to IP.     
To begin the public choice analysis of  IP it is may help to begin with the legislative origins of  the 
present positive law IP regimes, which at least hint at reasons to think the public choice problems may be 
greater in some areas than in others.  Through what may have been mere historical happenstance,260 the 
basic framework of  the present patent and trademark regimes both grew out of  a concerted effort about 
 
copyright law, and innovative forms of  intellectual property such as that suggested by the approach of  the Supreme Court in 
International News Service v. Associated Press”) 
257  For examples see discussion infra in Part III.A.3.   
258  See supra Part II.C.1.   
259  The recent recognition of  public choice problems in the body of  IP literature that discusses copyright term 
extension only scratches the surface.  The recent IP literature often discusses the recent Copyright Term Extension Act 
(“CTEA”) as an example of  public choice pressure from the entertainment industry.  While this may be so, it gravely 
underestimates the public choice problems in IP.  For examples of  the public choice view of  the CTEA, see, e.g., Free Mickey 
Mouse: Lawrence Lessig Wants Less Copyright Protection, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2002; Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and 
the Constitution: “Have I Stayed Too Long?,” 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 1005 (2000) (arguing that the CTEA provided “not an incentive, 
but a gift or windfall”); William Patry, The Failure of  the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
907, 932 (1997) (“[t]he real impetus for term extension” was to benefit “a very small group: children and grandchildren of  
famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the public domain, thereby threatening trust funds”); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of  the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 128 (2002) (CTEA “pads the 
wealth of  the widows and children of  the original copyright holders” and is a “massive giveaway of  public domain resources”); 
Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of  Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 232-36 (2002) (setting forth 
basic public choice view of  CTEA). Larry Lessig has gone so far as to refer to the statute itself  as the “Mickey Mouse 
Protection Act” in reference to perceived public choice pressure brought by Disney.  Doug Bedell, Professor Says Disney, Other 
Firms Typify What’s Wrong with Copyrights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 14, 2002, at 3D.   
260  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 740: 
Heady with success in implementing the Lanham Trademark Act [our present trademark system] a few 
years earlier, in 1948, the New York Patent Law Association had Giles Rich draft for introduction in 
Congress a bill [that eventually became the 1952 Patent Act, our present patent system].   
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the same time, the 1940’s, by the same bar association, the New York Patent Law Association.261  
Focused not on any particular set of  clients, owners or infringers, because the drafters typically 
represented both, but rather on crafting a coherent system, these efforts produced institutional 
frameworks that generally cohere and as a result are effective and efficient at achieving their core goal, 
which is commercialization.262  This seeming purity in the drafting of  these regimes has not persisted.  
For example, the overhaul to the statutory regime governing the interaction between patent law and 
Food and Drug law called the Hatch-Waxman Act263 was very much a collective bargaining process that 
raises a host of  public choice, administrative, and market power problems.264  Similarly, the basic 
statutory scheme for the present copyright regime grew out of  a classic public choice bargain among 
large interest groups.  These groups have regularly returned to the legislative process to re-shape the 
framework and reach new compromises each time technology or other factors sufficiently have changed 
the interests of  those groups.265  While such an approach does do a reasonable job integrating into the 
statute many of  the collective preferences of  those present in the negotiations at that time, it does less 
well integrating concerns of  others, or even of  the same parties at later times.266  Further research might 
compare the operative legislative histories of  these different regimes to determine the reasons why they 
seemed to have taken such different approaches and led to such different results.   
A related public choice problem with IP – and indeed with the creation of  any types of  property 
rights or other benefits available from the government – is the rent dissipation problem studied by 
 
261  The organization is presently called the New York Intellectual Property Law Association.  For a historical review of  
the organization see, Gregory J. Battersby, et al, A Seventy-Five Year History of  NYIPLA, available on-line at 
http://www.nyipla.org/public/01_history.html.   
262  The point here is not that these statutes are perfect.  The drafters of  these statutes, like all human beings, are 
characterized by human foibles including, for example, behavioralism.  Rather, the point is that because of  the way they were 
organized during the drafting process, the individual incentives they each faced happened to be more consistent with their 
efforts being directed towards drafting a statute that coherently achieved the coordination function to which they had 
subscribed than with their efforts being directed towards helping any one class of  client.  At a minimum, they were largely 
isolated from public choice pressures.   
263  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Public Law 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984), codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. 156 & 271.   
264  See, e.g., FTC report entitled “Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration” (July 2002) (describing problems with 
Hatch-Waxman Act and collecting sources).  While getting interested constituencies together to negotiate a statute sounds 
attractive, as the basic economics of  the drafting constituencies’ businesses change over time due to changing technologies, 
norms, etc., it should not be surprising that each iteration of  the legislative bargain often will be too intensely focused on 
responding to prior allocations.  That is, there is a lag between the change in technology and the change in economics and a 
subsequent lag between the change in economics and efforts to renegotiate the legislative bargain.     
265  See generally, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright, 23, 135-63 (2001) (reviewing “unique” public choice history of  
copyright and explaining how since 1909 all but two of  the frequent revisions to copyright law were essentially written by 
collective bargaining among some of  the impacted industries and citing the following as the only two exceptions: (1) The 
Computer Software Copyright Act of  1980, Sec. 10, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, which revised Section 117 to expressly 
extend copyright protection to computer programs on the recommendation of  the Commission on New Technological Uses 
of  Copyrighted Works (CONTU), a committee of  experts focused on copyrights in computer software; and (2) The Fairness 
in Music Licensing Act of  1998, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, which amended 
Section 110(5) to limit the number of  institutions required to pay performance royalties for nondramatic musical works)).  See 
also, Niels Schaumann, Intellectual Property Symposium: The Impact of  the United States Supreme Court on Intellectual Property This 
Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1617,  1619, n.8 (citing same two exceptions).  Even these two revisions that putatively 
did not emerge directly from interest group pressures may themselves have been driven by concerns for interest groups.  For 
example, I thank Mike Meurer for pointing out the interest Congress may have had in appearing to be sensitive to the needs of  
small restaurants and coffee shops when passing The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of  1998.  See also, David Nimmer, 
Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1281 (arguing that the statute “smacks of  special interest legislation 
for the benefit of  a defined class”).   
266  In part this is a race to the bottom story and so does not argue that such a process will always yield this bad result but 
rather it explains how one contributing factor may have played a role in this case.   
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Anderson & Hill that can come when each particular right is created.267  As they point out, this problem 
can be mitigated if  the potential owners of  the rights are able to tailor them at the time of  creation.268   
But the public choice problems in IP have extended beyond the legislatures to the agencies and 
the courts.  For example, when decisional frameworks in IP have been left open to sui generis 
determination, as opposed to being guided by applicable statutory framework, courts and agencies have 
acted swiftly to eviscerate IP.269  Even if  any of  market power, transaction costs, anticommons, or 
behavioralism is a concern that ought to drive regulation of  IP, the central problem that public choice 
adds to the mix, and one which is often overlooked by the literature, is that too often these concerns 
have been invoked in particular cases to restructure particular arrangements ex post for the benefit of  one 
particular constituency or set of  constituencies.270  For example, the recent trend by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of  Justice Antitrust Division to pursue actions against patentees on so-
called “upstream” technologies in the name of  mitigating problems of  market power, transaction costs, 
and anticommons problems, may be evidence of  agency capture that both frustrate market entry and 
upset private ordering overall, as all players in the market realize over time that terms like “upstream” 
and “downstream” are so relative that they simply may be synonyms for “things to be bought” and 
“things to be sold” by any private party able to gain the agency’s attention.271  Only if  the government 
actions called for in the literature were to eliminate IP or to regulate it through revisions to statutory or 
regulatory decisional frameworks that were sufficiently predictable, would these types of  public choice 
problems be potentially mitigated, including their negative impact on ex ante incentives and private 
ordering.   
If  in any given case a party may invoke concerns about market power, transaction costs, 
anticommons, or behavioralism as a justification for avoiding IP, then we should not be surprised to see 
many cases in which parties make precisely such charges, successfully.  These concerns are of  course 
important, and prior work by the present author has shown how that can be used to inform a set of  
positive law rules for determining validity that can operate in a relatively predictable manner based on 
facts knowable to both plaintiffs and defendants ex ante, thereby facilitating private ordering.272  But the 
rub is that having used those concerns to shape the positive law regimes that guide decisions going 
forward, they should not then be available for use in a one-off  basis to re-work decisions ex post.273   
 
267  See Anderson & Hill, supra note 143, at 443 (showing how less centralization in the definition and enforcement 
property rights helps to improve efficiency by avoiding rent dissipation).   
268  Id.   
269  Examples in the patent context include the agency and court decisions to prohibit patents in software and modern 
biotechnology, which were finally reversed by later court decisions.  See, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“A claim 
drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, 
computer program, or digital computer.”) and Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–18 (1980) (holding living organisms 
not per se unpatentable).   
270  For at least the computer software example, the public choice story has been infamously demonstrated on two 
occasions.  The first involved the decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding software to be not eligible for 
patent protection).  The second involved the decision in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (1994) (en banc) (reversing Patent Office 
decision to re-constitute its internal Board of  Appeals to hold a rehearing before a specially-packed Board designed to reject 
the patent on a type of  software).  Some suggest the problems of  agency capture and improper political influence may be 
playing out in the most recent iteration of  the Blackberry® dispute – the reexamination of  the patents in that suit.  See, e.g., 
Patents/Reexamination: NTP Charges Misconduct in PTO’s Review of  Patents in Blackberry Dispute, 72 PTCJ 52 (May 19, 
2006).   
271  For an excellent and easily accessible review of  such recent FTC activities see Stanley M. Gorinson, James L. Ewing, 
IV, and Peter M. Boyle, Federal Antitrust Enforcers Focus on Intellectual Property Abuses, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW TODAY 38 
(Aug. 2003) (discussing Rambus and Unocal cases).  For more detailed discussion of  the theoretical underpinnings of  the 
problem with these actions see F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of  Intellectual Property, 73 G.W. 
LAW REV. 174 (2004).   
272  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14.   
273  See Kieff  & Paredes supra note 271.  
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What is most troubling about the concerns expressed in the literature about market power, 
transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism, is that no attempt is made to suggest a decisional 
framework for determining ex ante when these concerns will be enough to trigger government action.  
This leaves open the possibility of  a return to the time when the decisional framework by courts was so 
obtuse that either no IP right could satisfy them,274 or so unpredictably able to be satisfied that the 
effective value of  all impacted IP rights simply collapsed towards zero.275   
What may be worse than effective elimination of  IP,276 is that the nature of  IP may be changed 
through this public choice mechanism so that it entirely favors established big players in the industry 
who are able to bring best public choice pressure and at the same time actually hinders competition and 
market entry.  There is at least some evidence this is already happening. 
Consider what might be called a “keiretsu” strategy for dealing with IP.  The term “keiretsu” 
refers to the large conglomerates in Japan,277 where patent system is well known to be replete with large 
numbers of  essentially weak patents and devoid of  strong patents.278  Fears about transactions costs of  
litigation and conflict aside, the keiretsu might actually prefer to have a system like this exactly because it 
makes it easy to have large numbers of  skirmish battles while avoiding the threat of  death-blows.  While 
large numbers of  skirmish battles do have high transaction costs, they also buy a great deal.  First, they 
allow the battling keiretsu to communicate with each other in a way that may be more forthright than a 
direct conversation, they solve a trust problem.  Seeing where an opponent will spend resources to fight 
can communicate more than can a direct conversation about what territory is most coveted.  Second, 
they allow the battling keiretsu to communicate with each other in a way that may be more protected 
from antitrust review than a direct conversation, they solve an antitrust problem.  The taking of  one 
territory while yielding up another through a set of  court battles will more easily escape antitrust scrutiny 
– and also would more easily mitigate the damages awarded if  any antitrust action were brought and won 
– than would a direct conversation to divide these territories.  Third, having large numbers of  patents 
can be a simple tool for extracting a higher price after regulatory interventions because in the large 
antitrust actions brought against large patentees, like the IBM litigation,279 the amount the regulators 
allow the companies to charge is often based in part on the simple total of  the number of  patents in its 
portfolio.  But what is essential to this keiretsu model is that only weak patents be available.  The 
 
274  For example, the test for patentability has at different times become so rigid for some courts that no patents were 
held valid within their jurisdiction.  The standard had become so vague and yet so difficult to satisfy throughout the U.S. by the 
early 1940’s that Justice Jackson remarked “[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get its 
hands on.”  Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Even after the statute was 
amended in response to these cases, the problem persisted in the Second Circuit as late as the 1960’s.  See Gerald J. 
Mossinghoff, Side Bar: The Creation of  the Federal Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL. supra note 1, at 30, 30-31 (former Patent Office 
Commissioner Mossinghoff  recounting that during the confirmation hearings for then-Second Circuit Judge Thurgood 
Marshall’s nomination to the Supreme Court, Judge Marshall responded to a question about patents by saying “I haven’t given 
patents much thought, Senator, because I’m from the Second Circuit and as you know we don’t uphold patents in the Second 
Circuit”).  
275  This is in effect the “permit thicket,” “License Raj,” or true anticommons problem discussed earlier.  See supra Part 
II.C.5.   
276  Elimination of  IP may not even be bad.  The commercialization theory would embrace a decision to eliminate IP if  
it turned out that the commercialization benefits were outweighed by the costs of  the system.  The analysis offered here 
suggests reasons why that is not expected to be the case but the ultimate question is an empirical one not answered here.   
277  Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial 
Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871 (1993). 
278  The terms weak and strong are somewhat vague but the general idea is that the patents are either given very narrow 
scope and so are easily avoided or they are enforced with what amounts to liability rule treatment.  For a general overview of  
the Japanese patent system see Toshiko Takenaka, The Role of  the Japanese Patent System in Japanese Industry, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN 
L.J. 25 (1994) (collecting sources).  
279  See IBM Ordered to Offer Its Machines for Sale and Open Some Patents to Others in Antitrust Suit Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 
1956, at 3.   
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availability of  a strong patent would be great for market entrants – it would give a David Co. an effective 
slingshot against a Goliath Inc.280   
This keiretsu strategy is at least consistent with the recent explosion of  antitrust regulation for 
IP.  In October, 2003, after conducting a year of  joint hearings with the Department of  Justice’s 
(“DOJ”) Antitrust Division “to develop a better understanding of  how to manage the issues that arise at 
the intersection of  antitrust and intellectual property law and policy,”281 the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) issued a report of  over 300 pages that appears to represent only the patent portion of  only its 
own (not the DOJ’s) conclusions and recommendations.282  Many of  the important recommendations of  
the report would make it so the present U.S. patent system would only have weak patents.283  
Interestingly, the recommendations in the FTC Report closely correlate to data recently gathered and 
reported by Iain M. Cockburn of  the Boston University School of  Management and the National 
Bureau of  Economic Research and Rebecca Henderson of  the Massachusetts Institute of  Technology’s 
Sloan School and also of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research.284  This information was gathered 
from a survey conducted in the late summer of  2002 of  senior intellectual property managers at large 
companies and was sponsored by the Intellectual Property Owners Association.  This close correlation 
between the recommendations in the FTC Report and the results of  the survey is consistent with the 
view that some leaders in the field think the agency “got it right.”  But this data does not speak to 
whether the agency “got it right” in the view of  the same people at a different time or other people 
situated differently, such as those who work in small and medium-sized businesses, or those who 
endeavor to approach the issue without any specific client with a present specific agenda in mind.  
Indeed, the close correlation between the views of  large patent holders and the FTC Report is totally 
consistent with a public choice agency capture story and only support the perception that the 
recommendations of  the FTC Report will lead to a more keiretsu-like approach for the U.S. patent 
 
280  See infra note 441 and accompanying text.   
281  See Notice of  Public Hearings Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based 
Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146, 58,147 (Nov. 20, 2001) (announcing joint hearings and explaining the reasons for them); see also 
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Muris Announces Plans for Intellectual Property Hearings (Nov. 15, 2001) 
(collecting sources, including links to Federal Register Notice and to speech by Chairman Timothy Muris, and questioning 
these and other aspects of  the patent system), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/11/iprelease.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 
2003).   
282  Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of  Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003) 
[hereinafter “FTC Report”], available at http://www.ftc. gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).  For 
an excellent and easily accessible brief  review of  the report and its main recommendations see Constance K. Robinson, James 
L. Ewing, IV, and Peter M. Boyle, IP and Antitrust: US antitrust enforcement agency proposes changes to US patent law, COMPETITION 
LAW INSIGHT, 20 (Dec., 2003/Jan., 2004). 
283  For example, the proposed changes on nonobviousness, utility, subject matter, economic impact, more involved 
examination, and deference, would expose small and medium-sized patentees to the concentrated public choice pressures that 
have repeatedly injected these pernicious judge-made and agency-made laws into our system over the past 100 years.  For more 
on the FTC report see FTC Report, supra note 282, at 10–17 (Recommendations 3–6, 8–10).  But see, Kieff, Registering Patents, 
supra note 14 at  at 122, n.291 (discussing FTC Report).  Similarly, the proposed changes on increased funding would at worst 
raise the same objections and at best simply lead to waste because the information needed to determine validity over the prior 
art is more inexpensively provided by private parties in litigation.  Id. at 74-98.  The proposed change to give prior user rights 
for parties who infringe claims that are disclosed in a published application but not actually added to the claims portion of  a 
patent application until after publication should be avoided because they would totally pervert the nuanced and smooth 
interaction between patent law’s disclosure rules and the notice function of  patents.   Lastly, the proposed requirement for 
written notice or deliberate copying before a patentee could win enhanced damages for willful infringement should be avoided 
because they would make the patent right more like a liability rule and less like a property rule in ways that particularly favor 
bigger parties.    
284  The author is grateful to Iain and Rebecca for generously sharing the results of  their data. Interview with Iain M. 
Cockburn, Professor of  Finance and Economics, Boston University School of  Management, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 11, 2003). 
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system than ever before, in which large players could regularly trade large numbers of  weak patents with 
each other while market entry is frustrated.     
At bottom, public choice problems are an important countervailing consideration to the 
regulatory proposals suggested throughout the reward literature in response to concerns about IP, 
including concerns relating to power over price, transaction costs, anticommons, or behavioralism.  In 
the comparative institutional analysis, the question to always consider is not merely whether a particular 
problem can be fixed, but rather, all things considered, the state of  affairs in general is improved by 
following the particular prescription to fixing that particular problem.   
B. Commercialization Theory, Coordination and Social Costs 
The commercialization theory and its component registration theory are explored at some length 
within the context of  patents in earlier works by the present author,285 and so only an overview is 
provided here, along with a discussion of  newer implications and applications.  The commercialization 
theory of  IP views IP rights backed by property rules as important tools for facilitating the downstream 
commercialization of  the subject matter that is protected by IP rights, after that subject matter has been 
made.286  This downstream commercialization requires coordination among the many complementary 
users of  the IP subject matter including developers, manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, 
advertisers, marketers, etc.287  Providing a focal point, or beacon, the publicly recorded IP right helps 
each of  these individuals to find each other,288 and then by cracking the Arrow Information Paradox 
otherwise facing them, helps them negotiate with each other.289  At the same time, therefore, IP rights 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of  both diversity and socialization among individuals within the 
market by providing these diverse individuals with incentive and means for coordinating with each other.  
In addition, as studied by the registration component of  the commercialization theory, the positive law 
rules for determining when a valid IP right may be obtained protect reasonable investment-backed 
expectations (and thereby decrease the risk of  asset specific investments and opportunism) by making 
sure that the right to exclude does not block activities individuals otherwise are doing, and they do so 
with relatively low administrative and public choice costs.290  In this regard, the commercialization and 
registration theories are essentially two components of  the coordination view explored here.   
What is perhaps most striking about the commercialization theory given that it is not either the 
majority or the minority views within the conventional literature on the law and economics of  IP, is that 
as a matter of  historical fact, it was the central motivation behind the framing of  at least the present 
patent system, the 1952 Patent Act, as well as part of  the motivation behind the present trademark 
system, the 1946 Lanham Act.291  Moreover, while the commercialization theory is discussed by the 
 
285  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, and Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14.   
286  See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 707-712 (discussing commercialization role of  patents).   
287  Id.  (discussing these many players and their incentives to interact).   
288  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 99-100 (pointing out that the publicly recorded patent documents help 
coordinate commercialization by giving notice of  the property right over wish bargaining or avoidance can occur).  Compare, 
Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of  Contract in the Law of  Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) (proposing “that under 
a unified theory of  servitudes, the only need for public regulation, either judicial or legislative, is to provide notice by 
recordation of  the interests privately created”).   
289  See, Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 710 (discussing importance of  property right for encouraging 
“holder of  the invention and the other players in this market to come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate 
commercialization of  the patented invention.”).   
290  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 76-98 (pointing out that the prior art rules for patents protect 
investments by third parties with low administrative and public choice costs).   
291  Id., at 736-747 (reviewing the central role of  the commercialization theory in the history of  the framing of  the 1952 
Patent Act, which provided what essentially remains as our present patent system, by the same group that had only soon before 
framed the Lanham Act, which essentially remains as our present trademark system ).   
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conventional literature, it is often misperceived in at least two ways.  First, the theory is often 
misperceived on its own terms.  Second, the solutions it offers for many of  the problems generally 
identified with IP rights often are overlooked.  Both types of  misperceptions are discussed below.   
1. Correcting Conventional Takes on Commercialization 
The focus of  the commercialization theory is on the incentives for diffuse individuals to decide 
individually to act in a way that ends up being coordinated.292  While rewards may provide an incentive 
to act to the individual reward recipient, rewards do little compared to property rights to bring that 
individual together with all other complementary users to engage successfully in the complex 
commercialization process.293  Regrettably, this simple mechanism of  the commercialization theory’s 
coordination function is often misunderstood in the literature in several respects.   
First, the link between the commercialization theory and the prospect or rent dissipation theories 
often is confused.294  Put simply, the commercialization theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate 
efforts among complementary users of  the asset to increase (or avoid insufficient) use of  resources, whereas 
prospect theory focuses on the ability for IP to coordinate efforts among competing users of  an asset to 
decrease (or avoid excessive) use of  resources.295  Therefore, efforts to respond to the prospect and rent 
dissipation theories’ concerns about overuse (rent dissipation) are inapposite to commercialization 
theory.   
Second, the link between the commercialization theory for IP and the theory of  property rights, 
generally, is often overlooked.  That is, much of  the conventional literature overlooks the coordination 
function in its entirety and simply lumps the property rights aspects of  the prospect theory by Kitch 
with the property rights aspects of  the work by Demsetz on internalizing externalities.296  But as 
 
292  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 707-712 (discussing role of  patents in coordinating complementary 
users of  an invention so as to facilitate inventions commercialization).   
293  Id.  Compare the focus on providing direct incentives to the holder of  the IP rights under the reward theories.  See, 
e.g., Lemley, supra note 11, at 130 (discussing role of  IP as an “incentive the right gives the owner”).  For more on reward 
theories, which focus on such direct incentives, see supra Part III.A.   
294  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 11, at 141, n. 42 (referring to commercialization theory as “elaboration” of  “prospect” 
theory).  In addition, unlike the prospect and reward theories, the commercialization theory, and its companion registration 
theory, has explanatory power for the positive law rules of  the of  the IP legal institutions.   
295  See supra note 287, and accompanying text (elucidating the basic coordination function of  the commercialization 
theory).  See also Kieff, Registering Patents supra note 14, at 62-66 (discussing prospect and rent dissipation theories in relation to 
commercialization theory).  For game theory examples of  the formal link between the role property rights can have in these 
two different settings – described in that paper as racing games and mating games – see Dale T. Mortensen, Property Rights and 
Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 968  (1982).  One additional point about rent dissipation that 
bears mentioning is that it also teaches something about the coordination theory of  property.  More specifically, what is often 
overlooked in the view of  property rights as tools for internalizing externalities is that the free rider, tragedy of  the commons, 
and positive externalities problems each can be thought of  essentially as an inverse of  the problem of  rent dissipation.  The 
problems of  free riding, commons, and positive externalities refer to cases in which individuals within a group decide not to 
invest in a given activity for fear that others will benefit but not compensate and as a result too little of  the activity is produced.  
The problem of  rent dissipation refers to a case in which individuals within a group decide to invest in a given activity for fear 
that others will do the same and win the race for the common prize and as a result too much of  the activity is produced.  In 
both sets of  cases, the failure to coordinate leads to inappropriate amounts of  the given activity being conducted.   
296  See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of  “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 
462, 497 n.121 (1998) (citing work by Demsetz and noting: “Similar reasoning underlies Edmund Kitch’s proposed ‘prospect’ 
approach to patents.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of  Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1017, 1040 (1989) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “The prospect theory offers a justification for patents 
that is in keeping with broader theories of  property rights elaborated by Harold Demsetz . . . .”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 309 n.108 (1996) (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz and noting: “For 
neoclassicists, therefore, intellectual property is less about creating an artificial scarcity in intellectual creations than about 
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discussed in Part II.A, property acts as a tool for facilitating coordination among complementary users 
of  the assets protected by IP in a way that is not explored in the early Demsetz work or in the work by 
Kitch but is explored in the work by the present author on the commercialization theory.297
Third, the commercialization theory also has been confused erroneously with the work of  
Schumpeter in being focused on the IP holder’s assertion of  control.298  While the commercialization 
theory is focused on who will have an incentive and ability to negotiate with whom, it is agnostic on the 
question of  who will end up controlling those negotiations.  In fact, control will be a function of  a great 
many factors other than who owns the patent.  For example, the parties’ relative wealth effects, 
bargaining positions, negotiating skills, other resources, holdout prices, alternative options, etc., will each 
impact the bottom line issue of  control.  In a world in which each market player may bring its own skill 
sets, patent sets, technology sets, and other assets and opportunities to bear on development of  a 
particular patented subject matter, the end result of  who will control subsequent development and use 
of  that subject matter is unclear, and indeed is left to the market and private bargains.  For this reason, 
for example, the concern raised by Robert Merges and Richard Nelson about control by the owner of  an 
IP right that they consider to be too broad is also overstated.299  The mere fact that a particular IP right 
is broad does not mean that its owner will control negotiations with others in that same technology.  In 
this regard, the coordination function of  IP is distinct from the two extremes of  open competition on 
the one hand and control on the other hand.  The IP right facilitates coordination among both 
competing and complementary users of  the asset without determining who will control in any given 
case.  The commercialization view of  IP focuses on the importance of  IP backed by a property right as a 
tool for facilitating such a division of  labor and other forms of  specialization. 
Fourth, the importance the commercialization theory places on the distinction between ex ante 
and ex post may be confused by the different use of  those terms recently by Mark Lemley.300  Under the 
commercialization theory, for IP to serve the commercialization function, the rules about how IP can be 
obtained and enforced must be knowable to all market actors ex ante, in advance of  their decisions about 
whether to act.  This means that regulation and liability rule treatment may be suspect to the extent they 
have the effect of  re-writing agreements or changing rules ex post.301  When used in this context, the 
terms “ex ante” and “ex post” are used in their general sense, which is different than how they are used in 
the recent work by Mark Lemley.302  Lemley uses the term “ex ante” in a special narrow sense to refer to 
the time period before any specific creative work is made.303  Similarly, he uses the term “ex post” in a 
special narrow sense to refer to a time period after any specific creative work is made.304  The 
commercialization theory relies on the term “ex ante” in the more general sense to refer to a time period 
before any given act occurs, with a focus on the importance of  predictability.  For example, this view of  
ex ante would focus on the period before the textured contracting needed to facilitate commercialization 
 
managing the real scarcity in the other resources that may be employed in using, developing, and marketing intellectual 
creations.”); Rai, supra note 81, at 121 n.236 (citing work by Kitch and Demsetz). 
297  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions supra note 14.   
298  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 11, at 139, n. 35 (discussing role of  patentee as coordinator due to the control exerted 
through the patent and citing Kieff  supra note 14 and SCHUMPETER, supra note 78).  See also Lemley at 140 (suggesting that 
when the government assigns the IP right it is effectively selecting who will have “control over an area of  research and 
development rather than trusting the market to pick the best researcher”).   
299  See Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of  Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) 
(studying problem of  a single firm controlling development of  a particular technology).  .   
300  See Lemley, supra note 11.   
301  For a discussion of  a number of  such ex post changes and the problems they present see  Kieff  & Paredes, supra note 
273.  
302  See Lemley, supra note 11.   
303  Id. at 130.   
304  Id.  
KIEFF COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 60 
 
                                                  
takes place.  Similarly, it relies on the term “ex post” in the more general sense to refer to a time period 
after any given act occurs, again with a focus on predictability.  For example, this view of  ex post would 
focus on the period after the contracting has taken place.  That is, as these terms are used for purposes 
of  the commercialization theory, the focus is on the ability for private actors to predict a legal result 
before deciding whether, or how, to act on any specific issue.  Under the commercialization view of  IP, 
predictability ex ante is essential in facilitating private ordering.   
Fifth, some have suggested that “if  patent law’s concern is to ensure commercialization of  
inventions, then it is both overinclusive and underinclusive.”305  The point is well taken, as far as it goes; 
but it may not account for the full reach of  the commercialization theory.  On the question of  
overinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out that “sometimes first-mover advantages will outweigh second-
mover advantages.”306  This is correct.  But only where a sufficient number of  the complementary users 
of  the asset believes ex ante that this is the case with sufficient conviction to take on the coordinating role 
will coordination so easily take place without the property right.  This can and likely does happen.  But 
the point of  the commercialization theory is that IP rights can make it easier for this to happen in many 
more settings.  On the question of  underinclusiveness, Abramowicz points out the need for 
commercialization of  subject matter that does not meet the positive law rules for IP protection.307  But 
point of  the registration component of  the commercialization theory of  IP is that the positive law rules 
for obtaining IP are normatively important for protecting the reasonable investment backed expectations 
of  potential commercialization efforts by third parties.308  Put simply, these positive law rules about IP 
validity are essential for making the IP system work well.  The extent to which they leave behind some 
subject matter is a reason to explore the use of  other tools to help coordination in those areas, such as 
perhaps the firm, or maybe the government.  IP does not solve all problems and it is only offered as an 
additional tool for helping to solve some.   
2. Commercialization’s Overlooked Solutions  
The commercialization theory also provides several overlooked solutions for the underlying 
problems often associated with IP.  These include the problems of  transaction costs, anticompetitive 
effect, and access.   
The commercialization theory sees the IP right backed by the credible threat of  an injunction as 
playing an essential coordinating role for all the players in the commercialization process.309  Those 
wishing to buy title to or permission under the IP right must negotiate with the IP holder.  As long as the 
existence of  the IP right and the identity of  the IP holder are readily discernible,310 each of  the putative 
 
305  Abramowicz, supra note 247, at 174.  See also Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 68, n. 57 (noting that 
“participants in the Spring 2001Workshop Series of  the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at the University of  
Chicago Law School [raised] a similar objection”).   
306  Id.   
307  Id. at 174-75 (“Patent law is underinclusive because commercializers of  unpatentable inventions also face the 
prospect of  copying”).   
308  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14, at 68-70, and 76-98 (responding to Abramowicz by noting that the 
registration theory component of  the commercialization theory elucidates the importance of  the positive law rules for 
obtaining IP rights for protecting third party investments in a way that mitigates administrative costs and public choice costs).   
309  By focusing on the right to exclude, the commercialization theory of  IP differs in important ways from the general 
theory of  property in land and goods, which typically consider more than the right to exclude.  Adam Mossoff  provides an 
excellent historical account of  property theories that emphasizes the failure of  approaches that focus only on the right to 
exclude.  See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 376 (2003) (“The concept of  
property is explained best as an integrated unity of  the exclusive rights to acquisition, use and disposal; in other words, 
property is explained best by the integrated theory of  property.”).  But see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 747–48 (1998) (suggesting right to exclude is central feature of  property). 
310  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 14 (discussing notice function of  IP).   
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participants in the commercialization process will have an individual incentive to seek out and negotiate 
with that person, and through that person with each of  the others.311  
While the reward literature in particular has emphasized the concerns about output restrictions, 
or problems of  access, the below discussion points out why such concerns are significantly less severe 
than perceived and indeed why in some cases property rights may be essential for mitigating them.  It 
also shows both why the concerns about government and public choice must not be overlooked as well 
as the ways in which these problems either can be magnified or mitigated by particular aspects of  
positive law IP regimes.  As a result, it shows several aspects of  the present positive law regimes that are 
candidates for change because they only exacerbate the problems of  anticompetitive effect and access.    
As discussed above in the context of  reward theories, much of  the literature on IP rights is 
consumed with concerns about limiting the potential monopoly power associated with property rights in 
IP.312  But actual empirical data is inconclusive on whether, for example, patents have been used to 
facilitate cartel behavior.313  Although a dominant concern of  the reward literature on IP is that IP rights 
can confer power over price of  the type generally associated with monopolies, the connection this 
literature draws between IP and monopolies in essence is backwards in several respects.  That is, as 
discussed below, IP rights often just do not confer monopoly power; and yet they can be essential anti-
monopoly weapons – their availability can serve as an effective anti-monopoly vaccine for a market.   
IP rights often do not confer monopoly power in large part because there is rarely a one-to-one 
correlation between any particular IP asset and a market.314  In addition, IP rights face competition from 
alternative technologies, extant and potential.315  At bottom, for example, even a patent on the better 
mousetrap faces competition from existing spring and glue traps, the threat of  future traps, and, of  
course, cats.316   
What is more, IP rights can facilitate market entry, at least so long as they are backed by property 
rules.  As a result, they can be powerful anti-monopoly weapons.317   
For example, the commercialization theory suggests that if  meaningful IP rights had been 
available in the computer software industry in the 1970’s and 80’s,318 by the time of  the Microsoft 
antitrust suit the industry likely would have been characterized by a medium number of  medium-sized 
players rather than a single large player.319  “According to Judge Frank, in this context the David Co. v. 
Goliath, Inc., competition is dependant upon investment in David Co., which will not occur unless it is 
armed with the patent slingshot.”320   
As another example, consider the impact on competition of  the 1980 shift in positive patent law 
that opened patents to the field of  modern biotechnology.  Only in the U.S. and only since 1980 have 
patents been available in modern biotechnology.321  While the U.S., Europe, and Japan each had large 
 
311  See supra notes 67-68, and accompanying text (discussing transitive nature of  these interactions).     
312  See supra Part III.A.   
313  See, C.D. Hall, Patents, Licensing, and Antitrust, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 59 (1986).   
314  See Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14 at 729-731 (reviewing reasons why IP rights confer insufficient 
market power to be monopolies and collecting sources).   
315  Id.  
316  See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 61 (providing an overview). 
317  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14 at 744 (discussing role of  IP rights as anti-monopoly weapons).   
318  Patents were not available because of  judge-made exceptions to patent law that had crept into the law in the late 
1960’s.  The utilitarian nature of  the industry made it an unlikely candidate for benefiting in the anti-monopoly sense from 
copyright and trademark protection.   
319  Id. (giving example of  computer software industry as one in which the putative monopoly power of  Microsoft was 
correlated with a time of  no meaningful IP protection in that industry).   
320  Id. (citing Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J. concurring)).   
321  See F. Scott Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, in F. SCOTT KIEFF, PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN 
GENOME PROJECT 125 (2003) (discussing shifts in positive law).   
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biotechnology companies often collectively called “Big Pharma”322 before 1980 and still have them after 
1980, only in the U.S. and only since 1980 has the biotechnology industry also included a steady pool of  
roughly 1,400 small and medium-sized companies that is also consistently turning over.323   
In addition, the gains IP rights offer for competition and market entry across markets at any one 
time as well as across time offset the potential for individual dead weight loss in cases where an IP right 
truly conveys a monopoly in some point in time for some market.  In part, this point here is tied to the 
distinction between dynamic and static efficiency, which is to say that the static inefficiency associated 
with monopoly dead weight loss may be outweighed by the dynamic efficiency gains associated with 
innovation and entry.324   
What is more, IP rights can and often do operate to facilitate price discrimination, which can 
mitigate the dead weight loss efficiency considerations of  monopolies.325  That is, the use of  property 
rights in IP  
is also consistent with another basic work by Demsetz in which he demonstrated that (1) private 
producers can produce public goods efficiently given the ability to exclude nonpurchasers and (2) 
price discrimination is consistent with competitive equilibrium for such public goods.326
Indeed, because of  the doctrines of  indirect infringement, IP rights facilitate price discrimination 
through tying in a great many more cases than otherwise, including for example where tying is not 
facilitated by technological constraints.327   
At bottom, while IP rights do give some power over price and therefore are associated with 
some dead-weight loss in theory, the actual monopoly effects of  IP are overstated and the anti-monopoly 
 
322  NIH: Moving Research from the Bench to the Bedside: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of  the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 49 (2003), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/action/108-38.pdf  (statement of  Phyllis 
Gardner, Senior Associate Dean for Education and Student Affairs, Stanford University) (detailing the differences between the 
biotechnology industry and the pharmaceutical industry). 
323  Id. at 47.  At the same time, both Europe and Japan have demonstrated technological capacities in this industry that 
are comparable to the U.S.  In addition, both Europe and Japan have comparably developed capital markets and even if  they 
didn’t businesses could operate in Europe and Japan while still having access to the capital markets in the U.S.   
324  See supra note 207, and accompany text (pointing out the importance of  exercising restraint for certain forms of  
antitrust enforcement designed to protect static efficiency so as to facilitate innovation and promote dynamic efficiency).   
325  See supra note 212, and accompanying text (discussing role of  price discrimination in mitigating output-restricting 
effects of  monopolies).   
326  Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of  Public Goods, 13 
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970)).  See also supra notes 211-212, and accompany text (discussing price discrimination as limit on 
monopoly power).   
327  Id., at 727-730 (exploring use of  IP rights as tools for facilitating price discrimination).  See also, Kieff  & Paredes, 
supra note 273 at 9-11 (pointing out that the diverse contracting that is allowed facilitates both price discrimination and 
coordination among complementary users).  There are several aspects of  the positive law IP regimes that facilitate complex 
and contacting of  the type that can both facilitate coordination and decrease output distortions of  a property right.  For 
example, the work for hire doctrine in copyright law helps concentrate ownership in the result of  a complex production 
process.  As another example, the provisions of  Section 271 of  the Patent Act insulate patentees from fear of  liability for 
misuse which allows patentees to elect to sue or license anyone would otherwise be liable for direct infringement, induced 
infringement, or contributory infringement.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(d).  See also Kieff, Commercializing Inventions, supra note 14, at 
736-38.  Before the 1952 Act, courts had used the misuse doctrine to erode the ability for intellectual property owners to price 
discriminate or engage in restricting licensing.  Section 271(d) expressly states that such conduct shall not be misuse.  See also 
Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (recognizing impact of  Section 271(d) and its reason for inclusion 
in the 1952 Patent Act).  To be certain this was clear, Congress acted again in 1988 by adding subparts 4 and 5 to Section 
271(d) of  the Patent Act to expressly provide that neither a refusal to license nor a tying arrangement in the absence of  market 
power is patent misuse.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5) (added by Pub. L. No. 100-703, 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988)).  The trademark 
regime allows similar contracting but the because the need to make commercial use of  the subject matter protected by 
trademarks is less compelling than for patents – since functionality is a bar to trademark protection – the impact of  any 
remaining distortion caused by market power is less severe.  That is, there is still the potential for static economic dead weight 
loss, but the alternative moral claims about output effects are mitigated.   
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benefits of  IP are overlooked.  In the real world, the benefits of  this type of  market power for capital 
formation and dynamic competition must be weighed against its theoretical cost in the form of  static 
dead-weight loss.  Indeed, the lessons of  the literature on second-best and the basic comparative 
institutional analysis of  NIE are that there are many reasons why it may be prudent to avoid letting anti-
monopoly concerns drive us to respond too aggressively to every occasion of  power over price.  In this 
sense, for example, the reward literature’s concern over mitigating monopoly effect of  IP can be seen as 
unduly exalting static efficiency over dynamic efficiency.328   
While the commercialization theory sees the nature of  IP as a right backed by the credible threat 
of  an injunction to be the core benefit of  IP in providing coordination, it recognizes that this 
coordination requires transactions.  But transactions have both good and bad components to them, and 
as do their realistic alternatives, and one lesson of  NIE is to engage in comparative institutional analyses.   
One of  the central focuses of  the reward theories is on the transaction costs associated with IP 
compared to a commons.329  Thus, it is appropriate to compare the transaction costs of  exchanges over 
property rights in IP against the transaction costs of  exchanges over what otherwise would be the 
subject matter of  IP but instead were within a realistic commons, such as the putative commons of  basic 
academic knowledge.330  Prior work by the present author has shown that even this so-called 
“commons” is riddled with its own form of  less commercial but nonetheless important property rights 
known informally as “kudos,” which include more personal and less fungible assets generally associated 
with academic and public sectors such as reputational benefits, fame, promotions, awards, titles, etc.331  A 
comparative institutional analysis reveals why for exchanges in that setting of  a putative commons 
compared with the same setting having added IP rights, the transaction costs of  exchanges are likely to 
be worse without IP than with IP because IP brings increased wealth and diversity to that market.332  
One of  the lessons of  NIE explored earlier is that transaction costs are likely to be more pernicious in 
thinner markets than in thicker markets,333  and the use of  IP thickens the market.334  As also discussed 
earlier, recent work by Buchanan and Yoon adds to this analysis by pointing out that exchanges in such a 
commons also are more likely to fail because of  what they call the “non-economic motivations” 
associated with such assets.335  Put simply, there are reasons to think that transaction costs are likely to be 
higher for a commons compared to for IP, and recent empirical work by John Walsh, Charlene Cho, and 
Wesley Cohen did not find transaction costs problems associated with patents in basic science, essentially 
 
328  See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST 
IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (showing that truly inefficient outcomes are extrelemy rare instead that even situations of  serial 
monopoly may be the best available in reality).   
329  See supra Part III.A (discussing reward theories and their incentive-access paradigm).   
330  See, e.g. Rai, supra note 81 (arguing that IP rights impose greater transaction costs than the basic scientific norms in 
the open “commons” of  academics); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of  Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 
YALE. L.J. 177 (1987) (exploring the potential negative impact of  patent rights on scientific norms in the field of  basic 
biological research); see also, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of  Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (exploring an experimental use exemption from patent infringement as a device for alleviating 
potential negative impact of  patent rights on scientific norms in the field of  basic biological research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) 
(offering preliminary observations about the empirical record of  the use of  patents in the field of  basic biological research and 
recommending a retreat from present government policies of  promoting patents in that field); Heller & Eisenberg, 
Anticommons, supra note 215 (arguing that patents can deter innovation in the field of  basic biological research). 
331  Kieff, supra note 82.   
332  Id.   
333  See supra notes 160-161, and accompanying text.   
334  Kieff, supra note 82, at 703-4.   
335  See supra note 219, and accompanying text.   
KIEFF COORDINATION, PROPERTY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 64 
 
                                                  
because potential infringers engaging in low value uses were simply being allowed to infringe with 
approval, albeit tacit, from patentees.336   
Somewhat related to the concerns over transaction costs in the reward literature are similar 
concerns about behavioralism.  More specifically, in response to concerns about behavioralism leading to 
failures in transactions over IP rights, commentators have called for regulation of  IP rights through the 
imposition of  liability rule treatment and greater antitrust enforcement.337  To be sure, like all actors in 
the real world, IP owners are not perfectly rational.  That is, people are only boundedly rational in that 
they suffer cognitive biases, framing effects, employ heuristics, etc.338  On the one hand, identification of  
behavioralism concerns does suggest reasons to be skeptical about the ability for individuals actually to 
achieve for themselves what is in their own best interest, and behavioralism has justified resort to liability 
rules, regulation, immutable contract terms, etc.  On the other hand, the individuals the government will 
use to affect these responses – legislators, regulators, and judges – are, of  course, human beings, too, and 
so will also suffer the limits of  behavioralism.339  What is more, to the extent these government 
decisions will be to occur ex post, they will interfere with ex ante incentives.  Finally, regulation brings with 
it the inevitable costs of  government, including the tollbooth and rent-dissipation problems of  agency 
capture, as well as the real concomitant problems of  permit thickets, License Raj, or anticommons; and 
as discussed below these indeed can be real problems within the context of  IP. 
Ironically, much of  the recent literature advocating enhanced regulation of  IP rights is tied to 
anticommons concerns.340  But these concerns are misplaced for several reasons.   
In contrast to the real anticommons problem of  the post socialist economy discussed earlier, an 
IP owner extracts private value from the IP right to exclude use by openly trading permission for use in 
exchange for money or other consideration.341  As discussed earlier the economic motivations associated 
with such “residual claims” are precisely what mitigate anticommons concerns.342  While an IP owner 
may have some incentive to suppress the subject matter protected by IP, this incentive is countered by 
the uncertainty that higher untapped value may lie in wait.343  Put simply, the resulting social value of  IP 
rights is that they encourage their owners and others with whom the owners can coordinate to discover 
and market methods for pushing use towards the full competitive level so the IP rights will not create 
anticommons problems, in biotechnology, software technology, or even for more mundane technologies 
like nails and screws.344  Indeed, recent empirical work by Ronald Mann has found that even in the 
controversial area of  business method patents, there turns out not to be any serious “patent thicket” 
problem.345   
 
336  John P.Walsh, et al. View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005).  Based on the 
reasoning explored here and in prior work by the present author, this result was expected.  Kieff, supra note 82 at 704-05.   
337  See, e.g., Lemley supra note 11, at 133 (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of  Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997) (discussing implications of  relaxing rationality assumption for IP); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) (pointing out costs 
of  rationality assumption).   
338  See supra Part II.C.3 (reviewing behavioralism problems).   
339  See Paredes, supra note 174 (pointing out countervailing behavioralism problems for government actors, as well as 
public choice problems, and collecting sources).   
340  See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, Anticommons, supra note 330 (initiating literature on anticommons for IP); Kieff, supra 
note 118.   
341  That is, the IP owner may either actively license the IP to someone else who will in turn sell the subject matter 
protected by the IP, or the IP owner itself  may sell the subject matter protected by the IP, which sale would include an implied 
license to the IP for its buyers.  See Kieff supra note 321.   
342  See supra notes 217-222, and accompanying text.   
343  See Kieff  supra note 14 at 726 (commercialization risk and potential for future development provides incentives to 
license broadly).   
344  See Kieff, Perusing Property Rights in DNA, supra note 341.   
345  Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 961 (2005). 
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Interestingly, the realization that IP rights do not trigger anticommons concerns does suggest 
that it is worth pushing on the analogy to real and personal property rights and ask whether it makes 
sense for IP to be time-limited.346  Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are each time-limited to some 
extent,347 but property rights in real and personal property do not simply expire.  Recent work by 
William Landes and Richard Posner has suggested a regime in which IP rights might be infinitely 
renewable; under their proposal the default for failure by the IP owner to act is that the IP passes into 
the commons.348  The commercialization benefits of  IP suggest that it might be worth considering why 
the default position is commons, rather than continuing status as property.  When owners of  personal 
and real property are negligent custodians of  their assets, the default position is not that they fall into the 
public domain, but rather that they remain the subject of  private ownership.  To be sure, the original 
owner typically loses title, but ownership itself  is not destroyed and indeed is most often essentially put 
up for auction.349  Perhaps IP, too, should be left the subject of  private ownership and merely put up for 
auction if  left sufficiently fallow.  Indeed, perpetual ownership in IP would help solve the problem noted 
earlier that the commercialization view otherwise is underinclusive by not encompassing works that are 
old, but not commercialized.350   
Implementing perpetual IP would not be conceptually difficult.351  IP owners could be required 
to maintain updated records in a central filing office so anyone thinking they can put the IP to higher 
and better use will be able to initiate negotiations at low cost.  If  the records are not kept (and perhaps a 
fee to cover their maintenance at a central office not paid), then the IP would be condemned and put up 
for auction.   
Some may suggest that surrender also should occur if  the IP owner fails to either practice the 
subject matter covered by the IP or license the IP for someone else to practice.  But it is not clear that 
such an approach would be good.  The relative restrictive power of  a property right in real or personal 
 
346  I thank Bruce Owen at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research for suggesting this exploration.  
Conversation with Bruce Owen February 25, 2004.  Lemley seems to suggest this notion offhandedly but does not explore it, 
and indeed seems critical of  it.  See Lemley supra note 11, at 131 (suggesting commercialization view may support “perhaps 
unlimited duration” for IP rights).   
347  By statute, patents expire after 17 years, on average (20 years from filing, and examination takes three years, on 
average).  For a brief  discussion of  the change from a 17 to 20 year patent term, see CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 898-900.  
Also by statute, copyrights expire after a time certain.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (life of  the author plus 70 years for works by 
individual authors, or the shorter of  95 years after publication or 120 years after creation for works made for hire, anonymous 
works, and pseudonymous works).  Trademarks last only so long as the mark is used in commerce in a consistent fashion.   
348  William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003). 
349  Foreclosure sales, and tax sales are the most common type, but even adverse possession can be thought of  as a type 
of  auction open for bidding by the first to become adverse possessor.   
350  See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text.   
351  Indeed, trademark rights already are potentially unlimited in duration, so long as they remain in consistent use.  See In 
re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d, 1042, 1046–55 (CCPA 1982) (opinions by Judges Rich and Nies concurring in result and 
reviewing the life-cycle of  a trademark – beginning with initial use and ending only with abandonment or genericness); see also 
Daphne Leeds, Trademarks – The Rationale of  Registrability, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 666 (1958).  For patents and copyrights, 
the term may be limited by the language of  the constitutional grant of  power under which these regimes are presently 
promulgated, wherein Congress is given the power 
[t]o promote the Progress of  Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 
U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.  In contrast the trademark laws are promulgated under the general Commerce Clause 
power of  Article 1 that is now recognized to be quite expansive.  Compare In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879) 
(holding trademark laws to be improper exercise of  Commerce Clause power because they regulate activity that is not 
sufficiently interstate) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that even growing wheat for personal consumption 
in one’s own back yard has sufficient nexus to interstate commerce that it may be regulated by Congress using Commerce 
Clause power).  Thus, the patent and copyright could be similarly viewed as at least within Constitutional power if  passed 
pursuant to the same commerce clause power.  For an interesting recent treatment of  this option see Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004).   
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property is greater than that in IP (at least in the long run) because the total subject matter protectable by 
real and personal property is limited – there is only so much stuff  and real estate available in the world – 
while the total subject matter protectable by IP rights has a limit that is not even known.  Only to the 
extent we think we are approaching the limit of  knowable IP subject matter – inventions, creations, and 
symbols – is the restrictive power of  IP potentially as great in the long term dynamic sense as it is for 
real and personal property.  Importantly, perpetual property rights in real and personal property is the 
norm precisely because we think that best allows for private actors to consistently evaluate and shift real 
and personal properties towards their highest and best use.  Just as an empty plot of  land is not 
automatically transferred into a commons for lack of  use, perhaps neither should IP be left to the 
commons.  And just as concerns about transaction costs or anticommons do not allow the user of  a plot 
of  land to elect not to treat the claims of  labor and suppliers as undue and thereby avoidable when 
building on that plot, such concerns perhaps should not worry those wishing to use subject matter 
covered by IP.   
One reason why extended term for IP may be problematic has nothing to do with transaction 
costs and anticommons but rather with coordination and commons. 352  The concern is that over time there 
may become fragmentation of  ownership.  This is less of  a problem for real and personal property than 
it is for IP.  Real and personal property may have private value to co-owners absent cooperation by other 
co-owners, as long as there is not too much interference by the co-owners.  For example, one owner may 
still play baseball on a co-owned empty lot without active cooperation from the other co-owners.  
Because IP only includes the right to exclude, not the right to use, a co-owner may not sue to enforce 
that right without joining in the lawsuit all other co-owners.353  Inaction by a co-owner is tantamount to 
a free license to the world.   
In the end, the idea of  perpetual ownership for IP certainly requires further consideration before 
adoption.  The point of  raising it here is because it is helpful in elucidating the implications of  the 
commercialization theory in operation.  The focus of  commercialization is making sure that all of  the 
different complementary users of  the IP subject matter can coordinate with each other.  It sees the role 
of  IP as the focal point, or beacon, that brings these diverse actors together.  At bottom, what provides 
them with incentives to indeed come together is the identification of  this beacon as a right to exclude 
combined with its exchange attributes:  residual claim, tradability, enforceability, and private information.    
3. Example: Introducing a Case against Copyright 
To provide one example of  how the coordination approach offered here could inform practical 
policy discussions about how positive law rules could be shaped going forward, the below sketch 
provides a coordination-focused review of  one IP regime, the copyright system.  Even to the extent the 
copyright system does provide benefits in the form of  direct incentives, or otherwise, the analysis 
explored in this paper suggests some reasons to question whether the system could do significantly 
 
352  The prior work by the present author incorrectly agreed with concerns in the reward literature about transaction 
costs and anticommons concerns.  Kieff  supra note 14, at 734-735 (expanded term may exacerbate anticommons problems).  
But it also suggested that increasing term might trigger commons problems of  the very type IP and commercialization are 
designed to avoid:  
Indeed, the possibility of  fragmented ownership presents a particular problem for [IP]. The [IP] right is 
only a right to exclude, not a right to use. In addition, each co-owner of  a patent can decide not to exclude 
third parties, by giving a partial assignment or license, without accounting to any other coowner.  As a 
result, an assignment by a co-owner will dissipate the entire value of  the patent for all other owners.  For 
this reason, it is well recognized that co-ownership in patents can create a tragedy of  the commons. 
Id. at 735 (citing ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228-36 (2d ed. 1997). 
353  See, Schering Corp. v. Roussel–UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed.Cir.1997) (‘‘one co-owner has the right to impede 
the other co-owner’s ability to sue infringers by refusing to voluntarily join in such a suit.’’) 
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better.  More particularly, as discussed in more detail below, several elements of  the system fail to 
facilitate coordination of  the type helpful for market entry.  As a result, even if  these elements of  the 
copyright system have benefits, the extent to which they frustrate coordination for entry is a factor that 
cuts against changing the system further in their direction.   
The below outline is designed to point out ways in which coordination of  the type helpful to 
market entrants is frustrated by elements of  the copyright system.  The system’s prevalence of  
uncertainty and of  liability rule treatment frustrate private ordering.  Its reliance on immutable rules 
create for market entrants extremely high transaction costs in the form of  either contracts that courts 
won’t enforce or in the form of  antitrust liability.  The combination of  these effects leaves consumers 
frustrated over lack of  access and the threat of  criminal liability.    The discussion also points out that the 
beneficial coordination that a copyright system might provide, can at lest to some extent be provided in 
other ways.   
One reason for copyright’s problems, as mentioned previously, is that the basic statutory scheme 
for copyrights grew out of  a classic public choice bargain among large interest groups and these groups 
have regularly returned to the legislative process to re-shape the framework and reach new compromises 
each time technology or other factors sufficiently have changed the interests of  those groups.354  The 
central problem with such an approach is that as the basic economics of  the drafting constituencies’ 
businesses change over time due to changing technologies, norms, etc., each iteration of  the legislative 
bargain often will be too intensely focused on responding to prior allocations.  That is, there is a lag 
between the change in technology and the change in economics and a subsequent lag between the 
change in economics and efforts to renegotiate the legislative bargain.     
A second reason is that copyright is famously difficult to understand, even for business actors 
within the system.355  Even though copyright involves assets over which private parties are more 
informed than government actors (and so property rules dominate liability rules) the system employs a 
host of  liability rules, as well as exceptions to infringement (such as fair use and home recording for self  
use and for distribution to friends and family) and exceptions to those exceptions (such as the Napster 
case holding liability for sharing with peers where done over the internet).356   
Even the rules on validity and scope of  copyright itself  are comparatively murky.357  What is 
more, unlike for patents and trademarks, they essentially are set through the central regime rather than by 
the individual claimants, and therefore are most likely to be associated with rent-dissipation.   
A third reason is that evolved rules on preemption and misuse leave property owners at least 
unclear as to what coordinating deals can be struck, if  not certain that important deals cannot be 
struck.358  That is, taking the strong form of  the preemption arguments at face value would suggest that 
efforts to sell songs through services like i-Tunes® under contracts limiting subsequent distribution may 
be trying to impose acceptance of  restrictive contract terms that are as a matter of  law preempted and 
 
354  See supra note 265 and accompanying text.   
355  According to Rob Glaser, Chairman of  the company MusicNet, “It’s as if  Franz Kafka designed this system and 
employed Rube Goldberg as is architect.”  Amy Harmon, Copyright Hurdles Confront Selling of  Music on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 2002, at C1.   
356  Consider compulsory licensing at positive rates in many areas like re-transmissions (Sections 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 
122) and jukeboxes (Section 116).  Also consider compulsory licensing for free for those uses determined to be fair (Section 
107 on Fair Use and Section 122 on copies for the blind).   
357  Consider, for example, the murky rules about what constitutes a derivative work or an adaptation.  Also consider the 
basic question of  whether putative copyright subject matter is protectable expression or unprotectable idea.  On the difficulty 
with the so-called idea/expression dichotomy, see Gregory Aharonian, Problems with Copyright and Trade Dress, available on-
line at http://www.patenting-art.com/copyprob/cpyqst-e.htm (quoting F. Scott Kieff  at the conferences “Promoting Markets 
in Creativity: Copyright in the Internet Age” held June 10, 2003 in Washington, D.C. (“The ‘idea/expression’ dichotomy is so 
ill-defined that lawyers have no idea how to express it”)).   
358  See Kieff  supra note 265, at 5-7 (discussing preemption); Kieff  & Paredes supra note 273 (discussing misuse).  
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therefore void as against public policy.359  Then, taking the strong form of  the misuse arguments at face 
value such an effort to impose illegal terms in a contract over material that relates to copyright would 
constitute misuse of  a type that would at a minimum make any otherwise valid IP rights involved in the 
transaction unenforceable and at a maximum subject the one imposing the contract terms to antitrust 
liability including, potentially, treble damages and attorney fees.360  In effect, the legislative bargains that 
were struck have led to a set of  immutable rules (not even default rules) about what types of  contracting 
is allowed, which in turn prevents new types of  industrial organization approaches from entering the 
market.   
Cases like Napster, Aimster, and Grokster can be seen as evidence that the regime is failing to allow 
sufficient private ordering to occur to meet new customer needs.361  Cases like this can be seen as 
evidence of  large numbers of  consumers manifesting some willingness to pay some positive price by 
going through the hassle costs of  participating in the services but electing instead to pay no monetary 
price because no effective sales venue was provided.  Put differently, these cases can be seen as evidence 
of  producers being motivated not to sell in these markets at least in part by the fear that such business 
models would not be afforded legal protection, and instead might generate legal liability under doctrines 
of  misuse or antitrust.362  Indeed, for some time the fear of  rampant copying by consumers has driven 
producers to seek and obtain statutory changes providing criminal liability for copyright infringement in 
certain circumstances.  The fear of  this criminal liability imposes an added cost on consumers.   
In addition to the limitations on the copyright system’s ability to facilitate coordination, the 
affirmative need for enhanced coordination may be significantly decreased in the modern entertainment 
industry, such as publishing, film, and television, at least against the backdrop of  certain patent and 
trademark rights.    
This suggests considering how this industry might operate without copyright.  The intuition 
behind such suggestion is the realization that commercialization problems today in the entertainment 
industry are largely those associated with advertising, reputation, and business networks.  Due to 
technological changes, physical plant costs of  distributing in this industry need not be as large as 
before.363  Yet, trademark law allows some coordination and some pricing above marginal cost of  the 
type necessary to facilitate commercialization of  goods and services facing such reputation and network 
costs.  Thus, as discussed below, a model approach might be suggested under which the industry would 
rely essentially on trademarks (and to some extant patents) rather than copyrights.  Put differently, the 
model begins the conversation of  a modest proposal: for the entertainment industry to rely on 
trademarks and patents instead of  copyrights.   
Implementing effective coordination in the entertainment industry absent copyright may be 
conceivable.  First, major advances in these industries, although likely rare, would be eligible for patent 
protection (a new projector, a new chord, etc).364   Second, while non-commercial infringements may not 
 
359  See Kieff  supra note 265, at 5-7 (discussing preemption).   
360  See Kieff  & Paredes supra note 271 (discussing misuse).  
361  See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (suit against service that facilitated peer 
to peer sharing of  copyrighted music); In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 , __ US __ (2005) (same).   
362  To be sure, other motivations such as fear of  copying also operate here.  Therefore, an important area of  further 
research would include a determination of  which motivations are operating and to what extent, such as through the gathering 
of  empirical evidence of  legal positions explored by players in this industry.  Gathering such data is likely to face several 
obstacles, however, because it seeks to elucidate information that would be both protected by the attorney-client privilege and 
potentially very damaging.   
363  An internet server of  sufficient bandwidth will be sufficient if  advertising and other network costs have been 
effectively deployed.   
364  See CHISUM, ET AL. supra note 1, at 728-828 (discussing statutory subject matter).   
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be actionable under trademark law,365 content providers can adapt to nevertheless make coordination 
and commercialization profitable against the backdrop of  effective trademark protections.  For example, 
trademark suits would be viable against commercial infringers.  To the extent needed, these rights can be 
strengthened by re-instating dilution law, or by reversing Moseley.366   
Content providers may be able to take several different steps that in concert with consumer 
prescriptive norms and preferences may yield a landscape of  descriptive norms in which coordination 
and commercialization are profitable.  First, as Demsetz pointed out, private producers can produce 
public goods efficiently given the ability to exclude non-purchasers, and price discrimination is consistent 
with competitive equilibrium for such public goods.367  That is, content providers can establish networks 
that sell, or even give away, content along with other bundled goods and services, such as updates,368 
replacements, library management tools and services, etc.369  By effectively educating consumers on such 
practical, commercial, benefits of  purchasing through licensed sources, content providers may be able to 
maintain profitable networks.  Indeed, further strengthening of  the content provider’s position – and 
further protection of  consumers – may be obtained by reversing Dastar’s elimination of  certain false 
advertising suits.370  
Second, the role of  consumer norms must not be overlooked.  If  artists and publishers make 
clear which works are “authorized” and therefore associated with some pay-back to the originators of  
the work, then the customers may be willing to pay more for those works.  Again, at the very least, false 
advertising suits under 43(a) would be available against commercial competitors, even when there is only 
falsity, as opposed to confusion as to source.  In much the same way that cult followings like to support 
their object of  allegiance, general consumer norms may – at least at the right prices – be willing to pay 
simply to support their preferred performers and distributors.371 Indeed, much of  the direct income 
generation that already occurs in the entertainment industry is based on marketing of  products and 
services that are only linked to core content, a strategy known as “merchandizing.”  The ability to 
capture revenues though such tying, however, requires the availability of  suits for false advertising and 
dilution, as well complex contractual arrangements.  Importantly, transaction costs are lower when tying 
is done through merchandizing or through advertising (as is done with broadcast television content that 
is itself  provided for “free” when tied to the sale of  advertising time).  Instead of  the content provider 
having to transact directly with each user, the transaction can be with the tied merchandisers or 
advertisers.   
At bottom, the analysis offered here is designed to explore a hypothetical industrial organization 
model under which coordination may be achieved for entertainment industry by using the regimes of  
trademark and perhaps patent; but not copyright.  To the extent the model yields lower social costs than 
the present copyright system with the same or higher access and entry benefits, both the producers and 
the consumers in this industry would be getting more, at lower cost, by eschewing, or perhaps even 
 
365  That is, file sharing will still likely occur.   
366  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 115 (2003) (interpreting statute to be limited to causes of  action for 
only actual dilution, not likelihood of  dilution, which is in contrast to the causes of  action available for confusion that include 
both those for likelihood of  confusion and actual confusion).   
367  See Kieff  supra note 14, at 727 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of  Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293 
(1970)). 
368  This method is used frequently for software.   
369  Apple i-Tunes® is one approach to selling.  The Wallmart® approach is more like bundling since they are 
(supposedly) selling below cost and so are essentially bundling with advertising in much the same way that Demsetz suggested 
that television signals could be bundled with advertising.   
370  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 539 U.S. 23, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (2003) (holding Lanham Act does not 
prevent unaccredited copying of  uncopyrighted work).    
371  Compare, Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004) 
(suggesting that authors may respond particularly well to reputation incentives).   
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jettisoning, copyright.372  The idea is not totally without basis in reality.  Recent work by Kal Raustiala 
and Chris Sprigman studying the fashion design industry, which is a very strong user of  trademark rights, 
shows that the industry operates successfully in the face of  rampant copying.373
To be sure, the model offered here is only a model, and only of  most relevance for an industry 
where the commercialization costs are largely those associated with advertising, reputation, and 
networks, such as the entertainment industry.  As a result, a number of  areas of  further study must be 
considered before the model could even be tested seriously.  For example, a comparative study of  the 
relative importance of  trademark and false advertising rights as compared with copyright rights to 
established networks in the real world would provide some insight as to the model’s practical appeal.   
In addition, objections to the model may include pointing out that even on its own terms it does 
little to address the copyright needs of  low volume industries, such as sculptors and painters.   While 
reputational effects help in those sectors, absent copyright, they may not be sufficient to drive trademark 
and false advertising issues, particularly with regard to the type of  factual data about overall consumer 
behavior that are needed to mount a successful case using those causes of  action.  Nevertheless, 
reputational effects may be sufficient to drive other methods through which income can be extracted 
such as the selling of  authentic signatures on mementos or authentic artifacts associated with the works 
of  art.  For example, both of  these techniques have been employed by the artists Christo and Jeanne-
Claude, whose works themselves – such as the wrapping of  the Reichstag, which culminated in a pubic 
display in 1995 – simply are not able to be sold.374   
Before the model could be implemented in a working legal system a number of  additional 
obstacles would also need to be overcome.  For example, as indicated in the model itself, the trademark 
system would need to be rolled back to the way it was before Dastar and Mosley – both false advertising 
and dilution would be needed.375  In addition, a number of  administrative and public choice costs are 
raised by the need to determine the carve-out from copyright that the model proposes for certain 
industries.   
Most importantly, the model is not so much offered as the beginning of  the end of  copyright; 
but rather as a tool for showing how the coordination approach offered here can explain how many 
aspects of  the existing copyright system that are the products of  efforts to increase access and market 
entry can have the counterintuitive effect of  limiting access and increasing anticompetitive effect.  In this 
regard, the present study elucidates the tie between social costs and conventional reward theories.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although many different useful perspectives have been offered in the literature about the goals 
society should have in mind before deciding to create property rights in general and IP rights in 
particular, too often an overlooked goal is coordination.  This paper suggests that coordination of  the 
type needed to facilitate commercialization is a goal that can be achieved by property rights in general 
 
372  Jettisoning may be needed to avoid the effect of  the immutable rules imposed by the preemption and misuse issues 
discussed earlier.  See supra notes 358-360, and accompanying text.   
373  Kal Raustiala and Chris Sprigman, THE PIRACY PARADOX: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN FASHION 
DESIGN, University of  Virginia Legal Working Paper Series and University of  Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper 29 (February 2006) (available on-line at 
law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art29). 
374  See The Art of  Christo and Jeanne-Claude, available on-line at http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/ (web site 
authorized by the artists).   
375  Laura Heymann has provided an excellent and detailed treatment of  the importance of  allowing trademark-type false 
advertising causes of  action relating to potentially copyrighted works.  See Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of  the Authornym: 
Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, The George Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 101, forthcoming at 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005). 
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and IP rights in particular.  Coordination of  this type is useful in helping diverse members of  society 
remain diverse from each other in terms of  skills, assets, and preferences, etc. while at the same time 
interacting with each other as complementary users of  assets in a way that helps bring those assets to 
market.   Focus on coordination is offered as an alternative to focus on other goals that have been 
suggested in the literature including internalizing externalities, avoiding rent dissipation, and providing 
direct incentives.  And property rights are offered as tool for achieving this goal that is an alternative to 
other institutions and organizations including norm communities like open source projects, firms, and 
government.  Recognizing that each institution and organization will have benefits and costs the paper 
also highlights strategies for helping to ensure that the benefits of  property rights are enhanced while the 
costs of  property rights are mitigated or otherwise structured to be easily borne.  The paper also shows 
ways in which the liability rule prescriptions that dominate the literature can have the counter-productive 
effect of  facilitating the type of  coordination that frustrates competition.  The paper then sketches some 
reasoning to explain why particular features of  the present IP regimes may be working well and why 
other may be good candidates for change.  The paper elucidates why institutional choices for IP regimes 
that have been motivated by conventional approaches toward IP that have not focused on coordination 
have turned out to be both less effective and less efficient.  It is hoped the approaches offered here help 
frame debates over choices about both studying and shaping these regimes in the future.   
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V. APPENDIX – TABLE 1  
Table 1:  Property Rights Offer a Mix of  Some of  the Costs and Benefits of  Various Other Institutional 
and Organizational Options for Coordination 
 
Institution or Organization Benefits Costs 
Contracts across an open market 
without property rights 
x Strong incentives of  an economic 
market 
 
x Coordination problems 
x Transaction cost of  economic 
market  
Property rights x Strong incentives of  an economic 
market  
x Publicly recorded ownership serves 
as beacon to facilitate coordination  
x Property rules facilitate negotiations 
(crack Arrow Information Paradox) 
x Facilitates both diversity and 
socialization  
x Transaction costs of  economic 
market 
x Information costs when allocating 
x Asset specificity and opportunism 
x Rent dissipation  
x Power over price and monopoly 
effects 
Norm communities defined by 
philosophic, friendship, ethnic, 
religious or familial, bonds, such as 
open source projects 
x Centralized control can coordinate  
x Can rely on informal norms rather 
than formal rules 
o Enforcement and other 
administrative costs can be lower
o Enforcement can be more 
predictable and more effective 
x Crony capitalism 
o Asset specificity and 
opportunism 
o Decreased fungibility (harder to 
trade, bundle, or divide) 
x Decreased diversity (relies on 
homogeneity) 
x Closed to strangers  
Fame (as the defining element of  a 
norm community’s leader) 
 
x Same as above with families, etc. 
plus… 
x As a beacon, it can coordinate 
x Same as above with families, etc. 
plus… 
x Not widely accessible 
x Not predictable 
Firms 
 
x Centralized control can coordinate 
x Can decrease transaction costs by 
bringing transacting parties under 
one roof   
x Administrative costs 
x Agency costs 
x Asset specificity and opportunism 
x Weakened incentives overall 
x Hierarchy is a particular problem 
for innovation 
o Managers don’t know what the 
innovators really do 
o Innovators don’t get full credit 
but face full risk 
Government agencies x Centralized control can coordinate 
x Can avoid many market failures of  
transaction costs, externalities etc. 
x Same as firms plus… 
x Transaction costs of  a political 
market: harder to define and 
enforce promises for a vote than a 
price  
x Information costs of  a political 
market: lower information content 
of  a vote compared to a price 
x Public choice problems of  rent 
dissipation, agency capture, and toll 
booth theory 
 
 
  
